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This thesis explores the engagement of seventeenth-century English republican thinkers, 
namely John Milton, James Harrington, Marchamont Nedham, Henry Neville and Algernon 
Sidney, with Dutch and Venetian models, theories, and experiences of republicanism. It 
challenges J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner's approach of tracing the origins of political 
ideas back to the ancient world and instead develops Franco Venturi’s emphasis on the 
significance of contemporary models to the development of early-modern republicanism. 
Chronologically the focus is c. 1640-1683 when republican ideas were at their height in 
England. In spatial terms, however, the approach is broader than traditional accounts of 
English republicanism, which tend to tell a purely national story. By adopting a transnational 
perspective this thesis promises to highlight the continuities and points of conflict between 
different republican thinkers, and in doing so challenges the idea of a coherent republican 
tradition. It suggests that narrowly defined and distinct definitions of republicanism do not 
capture the nuances in English republican thought, and that these thinkers engaged with 
various understandings of republicanism depending upon contextual political circumstances.  
The thesis looks at three significant themes. The first is the role of single person rule, an issue 
which has come to dominate discussions of English republicanism. By examining the ways in 
which English republicans understood the Dutch and Venetian models, both of which 
included an individual figurehead within a republican constitution, this thesis suggests that 
existing historiography places too much emphasis on 1649 as a turning point in English 
republican thought. Building on this discussion of non-monarchical government, the thesis 
then explores the constitutional proposals advocated by English republicans. It demonstrates 
that Venice was actually much less broadly admired and utilised for its constitutional model 
than has previously been assumed, and that in fact it was the Dutch Republic with which 
comparisons were more readily drawn. Finally, the thesis delineates a shift towards the end of 
this period. Post-Restoration, constitutional modelling was largely rejected in favour the 
practical experiences of the Dutch and Venetian Republics; the strengths, wealth and 
successes of which demonstrated, to these writers at least, the superiority of republican 
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‘An English Man should be shewn the Misery of the enslaved Parts of the World’ asserted 
Robert Molesworth in his 1692 book An Account of Denmark, which sought to explain that 
nation's loss of its liberty. The difference between liberty and slavery, Molesworth argued, 
‘may be seen written in the very Faces of the several People…and when we find nothing but 
Misery in the fruitfullest Countries subject to Arbitrary Power, but always a face of plenty and 
Chearfulness in Countries naturally unfruitful, which have preserv’d their Liberties, there is 
no further Argument’. In short, ‘all our Gentry should go abroad…to make him in Love with 
the happiness of his own Country’.1 Molesworth evidently considered travel essential to 
coming to a full understanding of the difference between liberty and slavery, and particularly 
in order to teach men the importance of maintaining liberty within England. But 
Molesworth’s political approach was also more nuanced than a simple dichotomy between 
good and bad governments, for he also believed that ‘few governments are so ill constituted, 
as not to have some good Customs’. There were, he believed, ‘admirable Regulations in 
Denmark’, a country miserable under its recent enslavement; even ‘among the Savage 
Americans’ customs could be found ‘to serve for Models to the most civilized Europeans’.2 
He used the metaphor of trade to illustrate his point, arguing that our ‘Merchants bring every 
day from barren Countries many useful things, which our own good one does not produce’. 
Why then, asked Molesworth, should we not learn of ‘the Constitutions, Manners, and 
Condition of other Nations, as we might without doubt find out many things to our purpose, 
which now out of mere Ignorance keeps us from being sensible that we want’.3 
Although writing after the key constitutional crises of the seventeenth century, Molesworth’s 
tract highlights some important themes that have been overlooked in the scholarship of early 
modern republicanism. In emphasising the educational value of travel, Molesworth indicated 
that valuable political lessons could be learned from contemporary nations, and not just as 
was more conventionally advocated, from the ancient world. Nor did he just look to those 
countries that could be idealised as representing the ‘best’ form of government. Instead, he 
perceived that even in flawed nations or those with very different political arrangements, 
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history and customs from England, there might still be valuable lessons the English could 
learn or ideas that could be borrowed. Finally, Molesworth emphasised how travel was the 
best way to teach Englishmen the value of liberty, and for them to learn about foreign forms 
of government. Again this emphasised the value of modern examples of government, and it 
reminds us that Englishmen were not living in a vacuum in the seventeenth century. Travel to 
and around the continent was entirely possible, and was in fact undertaken by many of the 
English republicans who feature in this thesis.  
Each of these aspects has remained somewhat overlooked in the wealth of scholarship on 
seventeenth-century English republican thought. Traditionally, that scholarship has placed 
considerable emphasis on the influence of ancient and classical models, with a particular 
focus on the texts of Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero and Livy. By analysing the thought of 
five key English republicans – James Harrington, John Milton, Marchamont Nedham, Henry 
Neville, and Algernon Sidney – through their engagement with the modern, contemporary 
republics of Venice and the United Provinces, this thesis goes some way to rectifying this 
imbalance. It will be shown that rarely did they idealise these commonwealths, instead 
picking them apart for both their good lessons as well as the ways in which an English 
republic could improve on their continental cousins. Furthermore, this approach will 
demonstrate that constitutional modelling did not always stay at the forefront of English 
republican writing; in certain contexts the historical functioning of republicanism, particularly 
with regards to the Dutch Republic, took centre stage. In approaching these English 
republicans through their understandings of, and interactions with, these two continental 
commonwealths, this thesis will shed new light on the connections between these individual 
figures. It will highlight the similarities, but more importantly, the nuanced differences 
between them and in doing so undermine the idea that there was one single coherent ‘English 
republican tradition’. It will demonstrate that narrow definitions of republicanism, particularly 
those of classical republicanism and the exclusivist republic, have obscured our vision of 
these English thinkers. Instead, this thesis will show that they were flexible with their 
republican languages, responding not just to the given political context, but to the political 
languages of one another. In this way, English republicanism in the mid-seventeenth century 





The Historiography of Republicanism and Republican Exchanges 
The examination of republicanism as an independent field of study began in the mid-twentieth 
century with Zera Fink’s book The Classical Republicans: An Essay in the Recovery of a 
Pattern of Thought in Seventeenth-Century England.
4
 Fink identified a group of men, 
primarily John Milton, James Harrington, Henry Neville, and Algernon Sidney, whom he 
defined as ‘classical republicans’, and who would become the cornerstone of the English 
republican tradition. He termed these men ‘classical republicans’ because he saw them as a 
political counterpart to a similar revival in the seventeenth century of other kinds of ancient 
ideas. Fink argued that these English republicans invoked a very specific classical source, that 
of Polybian mixed government, itself an adaptation of the Aristotelian concept of the cyclical 
rise of good and bad forms of government. Moreover, Fink argued that the Venetian republic 
best exemplified the superiority of mixed government, and that as a result it became the most 
significant constitutional model for English republicans. Fink's book influenced numerous 
scholars over the course of the next few decades, with important and seminal works that 
expanded upon Fink’s thesis being produced.5  
The zenith of this development was J.G.A. Pocock’s magisterial book The Machiavellian 
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Pocock 
emphasised the Aristotelian foundation of what he termed the ‘Atlantic republican tradition’, 
tracing ancient ideas of republicanism from their origins in the classical world, through 
Renaissance Italy - where Machiavelli was a crucial point of transmission - and via 
seventeenth-century England through to eighteenth-century America.
6
 Like Fink before him, 
Pocock emphasised the theory of mixed government, but he added a deeper level of analysis, 
setting the constitutional approach in the context of more abstract notions regarding the nature 
of humanity and politics. Pocock analysed the early modern republican tradition as a mode of 
discourse that was ultimately rooted in classical conceptions of politics, more specifically in 
the Aristotelian notion of man as a political animal. He argued that republicanism was not 
primarily concerned with rights but was a language of active citizenship and virtue. It was a 
language that was more about positive than about negative liberty; if virtue, as expressed 
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through citizen participation, was indeed the highest human goal, it followed that a classically 
inspired republic composed of self-ruling citizens was to be regarded as the most desirable 
form of government. Quentin Skinner has challenged Pocock’s conclusions, suggesting 
instead that Roman moral philosophy was more influential than Greek to early modern 
republicanism, and as such the focus ought not to rest exclusively on active participation and 
virtue but instead on the importance of liberty.
7
 Moreover, Skinner offered an innovative 
understanding of the concept of liberty, one that he eventually termed ‘neo-Roman liberty’, 
which was defined by the distinction between freemen and slaves, and characterised by a lack 
of dependence on the will of any other man. Like Pocock, Skinner’s account still placed 
Machiavelli at its heart, but he was innovative in emphasising the importance of a negative 
concept of liberty within the republican tradition.
8
  
In response to Skinner's work, Eric Nelson has challenged the very idea of a single ‘classical 
republicanism’. He questioned the understanding of ‘classical’ as denoting a coherent Greco-
Roman inheritance, arguing that Fink and Pocock too easily connect Aristotelian and 
Ciceronian philosophies, whereas in fact Roman political philosophy cannot be considered 
merely an off-shoot of the Aristotelian-Polybian tradition.
9
 He argues that the Greek and 
Roman traditions posed different questions that yielded different answers. Roman authors 
assumed the goal of life was civic glory whereas the Greeks concentrated on the pursuit of 
happiness; Romans were concerned with property-owning citizenship whereas the Greeks 
were more concerned with abolishing private property.
10
 On this basis Nelson offers a more 




Despite their disagreements, all the authors discussed so far agree on the predominance of 
ancient influences (whether Greek or Roman) on modern republicanism. Yet this assumption 
too has come under attack in recent years. Seminal in challenging this generally accepted 
position was Paul Rahe, who has sent the scholarship in a new direction by arguing that 
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Anglophone republicanism was not necessarily classical in character.
12
 Rather, he places 
Machiavelli at the start of a modern republicanism, rejecting the common late twentieth 
century presentation of him as ‘the admirer of classical antiquity'.13 Rahe’s Machiavelli 
rejected classical, particularly Aristotelian, republicanism and a politics of virtue in favour of 
a populist republicanism whereby people are inherently self-seeking. In order to service this 
self-interest, Rahe’s modern republicanism is more institution-oriented, with laws and orders 
allowing the multitude to participate in government; in turn this rejected the classical view of 
the selfless public service by the virtuous few. Examining English republicanism from this 
perspective offers new ways in which to interpret each political thinker. So Milton transforms 
into a figure at odds with his contemporaries, since he remained the only 'genuine classical 
republican' of the age because of his dismissal of Machiavellian ideals, whereas Nedham and 
Harrington to various degrees favoured Machiavellian ideals.
14
  
What all of these scholars have in common is that they all sought out the origins of the early-
modern republican tradition, indicating that they all worked within the same parameters. 
However, one book that had often been overlooked until recently proposed a very different 
approach. Franco Venturi’s Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment, published in 1971 and 
almost immediately overshadowed by the publication and success of The Machiavellian 
Moment, argued that attempting to trace ideas back to their origins was not necessarily 
beneficial as it could actually distort the history of ideas to suit a particular purpose. While 
Pocock sought to offer an overarching synthesis of republicanism, Venturi rejected this ‘quest 
for origins’ by limiting the temporal boundaries of his study but broadening the geographical 
perspective.
15
 So in Venturi’s analysis, Pocock’s attempt to explain eighteenth-century 
political thought in terms of Aristotelian and Polybian influences on Machiavelli was 
essentially flawed.
16
 Rather than looking right back to the classical world, Venturi proposed 
looking at more recent influences, particularly the republics of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Although this approach faltered before it really had a chance to begin, some 
scholars did attempt to follow through on Venturi’s proposals. David Wootton, for example, 
presents his edited collection Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776 as 
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an attempt to answer the question ‘what were the lessons to be drawn from actually existing 
republicanism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ by looking at the cases of Holland, 
Geneva and Venice. However, Wootton quickly concludes that Venturi’s approach 
‘substitutes for a myth of origins what one might term a myth of contemporaneity’, rejecting 
the idea that ‘because Holland and Venice were contemporary examples of republicanism 
they must have influenced the radical Enlightenment.
17
 
Though not doing so explicitly, Skinner and Martin van Gelderen have also pursued Venturi's 
approach by offering the most comprehensive attempt to date to examine republicanism 
within a European context.
18
 Republican ideas from a vast range of republican nations are 
explored in these two volumes, from Italy, the Netherlands and England, to the more under 
examined Berne, Poland, and Spain. Moreover, the contributors have explored six key 
themes; anti-monarchy, republican citizenship, republican constitutions, and the relationship 
between republicanism and political values, women, and commerce. Skinner and Van 
Gelderen were clearly ambitious when they set about examining the shared heritage of 
republicanism in Europe, and as a result this is a deeply useful resource for scholars. It is not, 
however, without its problems and critics. One important flaw is that the books do not 
actually examine the way in which ideas were shared between nations. Instead, most chapters 
look at the ways in which native republican traditions developed within their own national 
boundaries.
19
 Consequently, it is difficult to understand the usage of the term ‘shared’ in the 
title, and neither Skinner nor Van Gelderen offer any explanation or justification for its use. 
As Wootton expresses it, the volumes give very helpful accounts of individual trees in the 
forest, but are incapable of giving a sensible overview of the woods.
20
  
A different approach was followed by Ann Thomson and Simon Burrows, who utilise the 
concept of ‘cultural transfers’ in their collection of essays examining France and Britain in the 
long eighteenth century.
21
 Developed in Germany in the 1980s as a means through which 
German national identity could be studied while simultaneously rejecting the national 
framework that still dominated German analyses of itself, the concept of cultural transfers 
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coincided with the development of comparative history.
22
 However, Thomson and Burrows 
argue that for their purposes, cultural transfers is superior since the emphasis is on the 
integration inherent within its concept thereby providing a more in-depth analysis, whereas 
comparative history can offer only a ‘series of snapshots of particular individuals or cases’.23 
Because the idea of cultural transfers is relatively new, scholars have predominantly focused 
on building individual ‘egocentric’ networks, which centre on particular figures and their 
immediate contacts and correspondents.
24
 In building up these networks across national 
boundaries, scholars have sought to break up the picture of homogenous and internally stable 
national cultures, and to demonstrate the extent to which such national cultures depend on a 
dialectical process through which indigenous and foreign elements are selectively 
appropriated.
25
 With regard to the history of the seventeenth century, cultural transfers is now 
more focussed on the investigation of how circumstances and channels of communication 
favoured the appropriation of certain aspects of the others' culture, and how these aspects 
were adapted, contributing to the development of common learning and intellectual practice 
which was not confined to a particular national culture.
26
  
Rachel Hammersley offers an example of how this approach may work in practise in her 
examination of the English republican tradition and eighteenth-century France. She 
demonstrates that at least some French republicans were influenced by English republican 
ideas, as well as by ancient or American political texts. She looks at the way in which English 
republican works were disseminated within France and the ways in which the ideas were put 
to use by French republicans.
27
 Gaby Mahlberg and Dirk Wiemann also demonstrate the way 
in which the European nature of ideas can be examined by studying the period after 1649 and 
looking at the ways in which English republican ideas were disseminated, moulded, adapted 
and utilised on the continent. They seek to correct the overemphasis on the Atlantic tradition 
by examining the European inter-connections being established in the seventeenth century. In 
European Contexts for English Republicanism they seek to do this by highlighting the 
complexities inherent in the process of writing, dissemination and reception. Writing, they 
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argue, is a cooperative endeavour that traverses spatial, temporal and political boundaries; 
moreover, every reading is also a rewriting, and as such meanings shift and alter upon each 
discovery of a text. Their collection of articles demonstrates that not only did English 
republican writers respond to continental authors, but that their ideas in turn were subjected to 
unexpected rewritings in a multitude of continental contexts.
28
 This is an important step in 
understanding the cultural transfer of ideas across national boundaries.  
This concept sits at the centre of this thesis. Each of the English republican figures examined 
here engaged with European places, ideas, texts, and concepts. With the exception of 
Nedham, they all visited at least one of the two featured republics. They interacted with the 
cultures of these commonwealths, and gained an understanding of the ways in which these 
countries functioned simply by visiting them. Beyond this, they each had access to lengthy 
tracts outlining the constitutions and histories of these republics. Some of these tracts were 
written by those native to the Dutch or Venetian republics, some were by outsiders, some 
were subsequent translations of these books, some were Englishmen, some were royalists and 
others were not. There were manifold ways in which English republicans could engage with 
the political ideas of these European republics. Moreover, these ideas could shift and alter 
with each adaptation and reinterpretation. This thesis therefore builds on the work of 
Hammersley, Mahlberg and Wiemann in engaging with the way in which specifically Dutch 
or Venetian republicanism became incorporated in and influenced representations of the 
English republican tradition. 
English Republican Tradition 
The narrative of the English republican tradition has long been connected to, but also 
complicated by, the execution of Charles I on 30
th
 January 1649. This event has caused 
English republicanism to be consistently tied to the issue of individual rulers within a 
republican constitution. This is true to such an extent that the regicide is seen by some as a 
significant turning point, as the origin of republican thought in England. Thus, if 
republicanism is defined as ‘a doctrinaire antagonism to all forms of kingship’, then those 
‘who created the revolutionary government were not, for the most part, republicans’.29 
English republican theory was, therefore, ‘far more the effect than the cause of the execution 
                                                 
28
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of the king in 1649’.30 Historians of the English republican tradition have subsequently 
understood ‘republic’ as the antonym of ‘monarchy’. Both Skinner and Blair Worden, for 
instance, only consider those who were committed to non-monarchical government as 
genuine republicans, although Worden also stipulates that an attempt to construct republican 
architecture must also be present alongside the rejection of monarchy. Many, including 
Worden himself have commented that with such a narrow definition, most of those 
traditionally considered ‘English republicans’ would have to be excluded from the canon.31 
Narrowly defining English republicanism in such a way has limited the scope of research. 
However, in recent years, David Wootton and James Hankins have reassessed this 
understanding of English republicanism, which has come to be understood as ‘exclusivist 
republicanism’. Both scholars have demonstrated that the binary distinction between republic 
and monarchy only developed in fifteenth-century Florence, only becoming the dominant 
definition in the eighteenth century; so in the seventeenth century, more than one 
understanding of republicanism would likely have been present.
32
 The events of 1649 
whereby England executed its monarch and established a commonwealth in its place has been 
argued to represent the institutional manifestation of the linguistic transformation of the term 
res publica which had taken place during the fifteenth century. Prior to that point, the term 
was taken to simply denote good government in the public interest; however, in the fifteenth 
century the Florentines introduced the idea that monarchy was completely distinct from a 
republic. Wootton and Hankins have both highlighted this shift, and although they disagree as 
to the exact point at which this change began, they both agree that the idea was popularised in 
the works of Machiavelli and the English republicans of the 1650s. Nonetheless Wootton still 
considers the regicide to be a crucial stage in the development of this modern understanding 
of republicanism.
 33
 Similarly, James Hankins argued that ‘republican exclusivism’, defined 
as government based on the will of the people as the only legitimate form of government 
combined with a complete rejection of any non-elective monarchy and all hereditary political 
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privileges, is a modern invention
34
 Hankins makes the distinction between pre-modern and 
modern republicanism, arguing that the shift from res publica being applied to a variety of 
political regimes to very specifically exclusivist regimes occurred in the fifteenth century 
during the Italian Renaissance.  
On the other hand, not all scholars have centred their understanding of republicanism on 
constitutional forms. Pocock spoke of a form of ‘civic republicanism’ which he argued 
existed prior to the outbreak of the English Civil War.
35
 Pocock's ‘civic republicanism’ was 
an Anglicised Machiavellianism which called for political action and civic virtue, rather than 
specifying a particular constitutional structure. Nonetheless, like Skinner, Pocock perceives a 
change after the regicide, when these principles were united with a commitment to non-
monarchical rule. For Pocock, then, principle and form only became relevant after the 
execution of the king. Established historiography has therefore highlighted the significance of 
practical events to ideas.  
Both Markku Peltonen and David Norbrook, however, have been critical of the distinction 
drawn between pre- and post-civil war republicanism, arguing that ‘civic republicanism’ is a 
nascent form of ‘constitutional republicanism’, thus emphasising continuity rather than 
change.
36
 They argue that an anticipatory form of constitutional republicanism can be 
demonstrated by the evidence of political ideas derived from the republics of antiquity and the 
Renaissance, often found in pre-seventeenth-century literary sources. However, the use of 
classical allusions in literature would not have been uncommon in a society educationally 
steeped in that culture, and to suggest that all these writers were nascent republicans is to 
force too many people under the overarching term ‘republican’.37  
This thesis builds on the pluralist understanding of English republicanism. It will consider the 
engagement of English republicans not just with the republican elements of the Dutch and 
Venetian constitutions, but also with their monarchical components, and consider how this 
influenced or mirrored their ideas for an English constitution. Similarly, it will look at the 
way in which they interpreted the balance of power in these contemporary republics, and look 
at what this can tell us about their understanding of good government.  
                                                 
34
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36
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Dutch Republicanism 
Dutch republicanism has proved somewhat tricky to pin down. It has long been considered to 
stand apart from the paradigm of the Atlantic republican tradition, and as a result was 
overlooked for far too long. Indeed Pocock has posited that there may in fact have been two 
“republican traditions”, which he refers to in metaphor as the elephant and the whale, which 
share a common evolutionary history with some comparable outcomes, but that ultimately 
they are entirely different organisms.
38
  
Historians have largely agreed that political thought during the Dutch Revolt remained largely 
traditional and pragmatic, focused more on their native history rather than abstract 
philosophy.
39
 During the course of the Revolt and after the abjuration of Philip II, the Dutch 
continued to seek a new king or queen to act as their sovereign or figurehead. This indicates 
that the Revolt was not a rejection of monarchs or monarchy in general, but rather a 
demonstration of their discontent with one specific tyrant. The Dutch were concerned with the 
ways in which the Spanish king had overstepped his powers by violating traditional Dutch 
rights and customs. The traditional rights were broadly conceived as independence, provincial 
autonomy and religious toleration. The revolt was therefore an attempt to restore the status 
quo, rather than to establish a radical new form of government. This therefore connects back 
to debates within the English republican historiography on the role of a single person or 
monarch within a republican constitution. Recent research into Orangism, royalism and the 
Dutch Republic has mirrored English studies whereby a more nuanced understanding of the 
interconnectedness of monarchy and republicanism has been developed.
40
  
A specifically Dutch republicanism took many years to develop, and is generally considered 
to have only become clearly defined and systematic in the United Provinces after 1650.
41
 Eco 
Haitsma Mulier demonstrates that the first unequivocal expression of republicanism only 
appeared from the 1650s in the works of the brothers De la Court and Spinoza, and that prior 
to this political theory consisted of unsystematic ideas of sovereignty and a focus on the 
                                                 
38
 J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The Atlantic Republican Tradition: The Republic of the Seven Provinces’, Republics of 
Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts, 2, 1 (2010), 1-10.  
39
 Thomas Maissen, ‘Liberty and Liberties in Europe’s Federal Republics’, in Freedom and the Construction of 
Europe, Vol 1, eds. Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
235-55. 
40
 Particularly prominent are the works of Jill Stern and Helmer J. Helmers: See Jill Stern, Orangism in the 
Dutch Republic in Word and Image, 1650-75 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010); Helmer J. 
Helmers, The Royalist Republic: Literature, Politics, and Religion in the Anglo-Dutch Sphere, 1639-1660 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
41
 Maissen, ‘Liberty and Liberties in Europe’s Federal Republics’, 235-255. 
 12 
advantages and disadvantages of monarchy.
 42
 In recent years, innovative new research has 
moved studies of Dutch republicanism beyond the traditional discussions of political theory. 
Arthur Weststeijn has brought two themes, often studied independently of one another, 
together to create a new strand to republicanism in the Dutch Republic. In Commercial 
Republicanism in the Dutch Golden Age he argues that political thinkers in the mid 
seventeenth century, particularly the brothers De la Court, proposed an ideal republic in 
which self-interested commerce was the fundamental political principle.
43
 
There have been some attempts to connect Dutch republicanism to a broader European 
tradition. Martin van Gelderen and Wyger Velema have both explored Dutch republicanism 
in greater depth and have explored its connections with wider European political thought, 
focusing particularly on themes such as liberty and mixed government.
44
 Particularly 
important for the purposes of this thesis is Haitsma Mulier’s study, which focused more 
specifically on the influence of the Venetian republic on key republican writers, including the 
De la Courts and Spinoza, in the Dutch Republic, leading him to conclude that the Dutch 
combined the uniqueness of their history and political situation with influence from Europe to 
create a distinct republican tradition.
 45
 Although Venice and its myth was not universally 
accepted or utilised by Dutch thinkers, it was used selectively or as an admonitory example. 
This stands in opposition to the work of Ernst Kossmann who argued for the distinctly Dutch 
nature of Dutch Republicanism.
46
  
The scholar who has done the most to draw connections and comparisons between the 
experiences of the Dutch and the English has been Jonathan Scott. Scott has paid close 
attention to the many connections between English and Dutch republicanism.
47
 He argues that 
republican practice and theory arose in both England and the United Provinces as a result of 
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specific ‘troubles’; thus English and Dutch republicanism arose from connected practical 
circumstances, specifically relating to the abolition of monarchy, the establishment of liberty 
of conscience and the debated importance of maritime and mercantile economic policies.
 48
 
Dutch and English republicanism therefore had distinctive connections that support the 
approach of this thesis, and there is certainly more to be said on the role of the Dutch 
Republic on English republican thinkers.   
Venetian Republicanism 
Compared to the Dutch Republic, Venice has received less attention in recent years when it 
comes to its connections to English republicanism. This may be due to the fact that Venice 
was so strongly tied to Fink’s initial sense of the classical republican tradition, and as a result, 
historians have perhaps been keen to explore new terrain and push the Venetian Republic 
from the forefront of the historiography. However, Venice did influence English 
understandings of republicanism, and to overlook it because of its connection with an 
outmoded understanding would be an error. 
The history of the Venetian republic is largely told in relation to the ‘myth of Venice’. As 
Venice lost economic and political power in the aftermath of the Italian Renaissance, its 
apologists – mainly fellow Venetians or Florentines – began to formulate a mythical image of 
its history, constitution and government that sought to portray Venice as a unique polity, and 
that as a successfully functioning commonwealth it was the natural heir to the great republics 
of classical antiquity.
49
 This process began in the sixteenth century and became universally 
pervasive, with Venice being lauded across Europe for its polity and heritage. It was able to 
achieve such success because it supported, and more importantly exaggerated, a set of beliefs 
that were pre-existent in the consciousness of the Venetian patriciate and people.
50
 However, 
with the passage of time and the continual decline of Venetian fortunes, the divide between 
myth and reality grew ever starker.   
As a historiographical tool, the ‘myth of Venice’ became prominent from the mid-twentieth 
century, most notably in the works of Oliver Logan, Myron Gilmore, Felix Gilbert, J.G.A. 
Pocock, and Eco Haitsma Mulier.
51
 In particular, James Grubb has offered the best overview 
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of the conceptualisation of the myth of Venice in twentieth-century historiography.
52
 There is 
disagreement as to the precise content of the myth, with different scholars favouring one 
aspect of the myth above another; for instance, Pocock emphasised the mechanised virtue 
engendered in Venetian institutions, whereas Gilmore emphasised the importance of the 
aristocratic ruling class within the broadly conceived mixed constitution. However, the very 
lack of consensus among modern scholars regarding the exact specifics of the myth simply 
serves to highlight its complex and multifaceted nature. However, at least one scholar has 
suggested that the choice of terminology employed by historians is unfortunate. James Orlo 
Hancey has found the phrase ‘myth of Venice’ problematic since the term ‘myth’ frequently 
tends to lead scholars to seek the relationship between myth and reality, and in doing so 
scholars lose sight of the value of the myth in its own right.
53
  
Certainly, scholars have fallen into this trap. John Julius Norwich has offered an excellent 
chronological history of the Venetian republic, but at the very outset he bemoans that ‘one of 
the most infuriating aspects of early Venetian history is the regularity with which truth and 
legend pursue separate courses’.54 Indeed, outlining the reality of Venetian history helps to 
explain the challenges that threatened the myth, and sets out the context of the increasing 
influence of the anti-myth. As Venice’s power and influence waned and the city’s reputation 
was increasingly marred by its portrayal as Europe’s pleasure garden, the counter-myth of 
Venice, as a country of corruption, immorality and licentiousness became the dominant 
narrative. There had, of course, always been those who viewed Venice in a negative light; but 
as a pervasive concept, the anti-myth only came to fruition much later. In fact, this is 
generally associated with the eighteenth century and beyond, but some scholarship has traced 
its origins into the seventeenth century. Wootton in particular has traced the anti-myth as a 
genuine challenge to the predominant narrative into the mid to late seventeenth century.
55
  
This is not to suggest, however, that the historiography of Venice has been entirely dominated 
by the debates surrounding myth, anti-myth and reality. Building on the work of earlier 
historians such as Frederic Lane, M. E. Mallett and J. R. Hale, who were particularly 
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interested in the military and naval power of Venice, recent work by Maria Fusaro has 
focused on empire, trade and territory, which importantly, compares Venetian fortunes in this 
arena to those of England across the early modern period.
56
 There has also been recent work 
on sociability and public life; Peter Miller, for instance, has examined the political role of 
friendship and how in Venice the concept and language of community developed out of its 
older republican inheritance.
57
 Nonetheless, even where the mythical narrative is not at the 
forefront of scholarly intention, it often makes its presence felt. In the edited collection Venice 
Reconsidered topics as diverse as slavery, women, and material culture form the main basis of 
the work, but these chapters are sandwiched between an introduction and epilogue that assess 
the myth of Venice.
58
 The historiography of the Venetian republic is therefore intimately 
connected with the mythologies surrounding it.  
Scope and Rationale 
The cast of characters at the heart of this thesis form part of the traditional canon of English 
republican thinkers. While most have already been well examined, the approach adopted here 
necessitates consideration of lesser known works alongside those central to the canon. This is 
particularly the case for Algernon Sidney and Henry Neville. Mahlberg's important study of 
Neville has highlighted the previously underappreciated political messages of Neville’s lesser 
known pamphlets.
59
 This study builds on this assumption. Similarly, the manuscript of 
Sidney's Court Maxims was only discovered in the 1970s, meaning that it remains a rather 
understudied tract. Moreover, my approach casts new light on these relatively well known 
figures and their political works. Looking at them from the perspective of the Dutch and 
Venetian republics allows us to draw innovative connections between the thought of these 
English republicans.  
The Dutch and the Venetian Republics were chosen as the focus points of this thesis because 
they both feature significantly in the works of several English republicans. The influence of 
Venice on Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana has often been commented on but not 
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sufficiently explored in depth. Moreover, the myth of Venice was itself perhaps at the very 
peak of its influence by the 1650s. As the seventeenth century progressed and the power of 
Venice declined as a trading superpower, the perception of the most Serene Republic began to 
shift in favour of an anti-myth which espoused the more negative aspects of the Venetian 
polity. The Dutch Republic features heavily in both The Isle of Pines and Court Maxims. It 
was England’s closest republican neighbour and they shared a commitment to the Protestant 
faith. However, despite their political and religious similarities, the naval and commercial 
ambition of both nations brought them into conflict three times over the course of the period 
upon which I am focusing here.
60
 Moreover, the geographic closeness of the Dutch Republic 
meant that it was within easy reach for the English to visit, and it meant too that news and 
information was regularly, frequently, and quickly transferred between the two nations.  
The structure of this thesis is for the most part chronological, and is split into three sections. 
The first outlines the political and historical world surrounding the Dutch and Venetian 
republics. There are then two main sections, which take 1660 as the dividing point. The first 
of these deals with the 1640s and 1650s, during which time there was considerable political, 
social, and economic instability, which gave rise to a wave of new ideas. The final section 
considers the concept of republicanism under a monarchical regime, both in the years 
following the Restoration and also during the Exclusion Crisis, when republicans saw another 
opportunity to influence the form of government. Taking a look at the way in which 
republicanism was conceptualised, and more particularly the way in which contemporary 
examples of European republics were put to use and manipulated, highlights the way in which 
English republicanism adapted and shifted according to circumstance and context. It also 
highlights the intellectual flexibility of the English republicans, who could adapt the Dutch 
and Venetian examples of republican government to serve different purposes at different 
times. Nor is this to suggest that it was just different republicans portraying these republics in 
distinctive ways; any given republican could and often did, over time, adapt the way in which 
a given republic was utilised or portrayed in their political works.   
Within the chronological sections, the chapters take a thematic approach. Chapter 1 provides 
the important contextual information underpinning the thesis. It outlines the ways in which 
English republicans were influenced by the immediate world around them through both their 
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own personal experiences on the continent as well as the political and historical tracts 
available to them on the Dutch and Venetian republics. It sets these against the histories of 
these nations, and a brief outline of each republic's respective republican institutions in order 
to provide the readers with a sound understanding of how these English republican figures 
gained their knowledge about contemporary commonwealths.  
Chapter 2 explores the issue of single person government in the 1640s and 1650s, and in 
doing so, contributes to the debate surrounding the definition of republicanism. While Milton 
has generally been understood as accepting some form of single person rule right through the 
1650s, this has less often been the case for Nedham and particularly for Harrington. There 
were, however, individual figureheads in both the Dutch and Venetian Republics, and this 
chapter will explore how these three thinkers understood these individual figureheads as 
functioning within a republican constitution, and will consider how this informs our 
understanding of their republican thinking more generally. 
Chapter 3 follows much of the traditional scholarship on the English republican tradition by 
placing Harrington front and centre. It explores the way in which he engaged with the myth of 
Venice, demonstrating the various ways in which he diverged from and adapted the myth to 
better serve his own political agenda. It also looks at how and why Harrington incorporated 
the Dutch Republic into his political writings. In exploring these two aspects of Harrington’s 
writings, it becomes possible to contribute further to the growing body of work portraying 
Harrington as a democratic republican. This leads to a wider discussion in Chapter 4 
concerning Harrington’s distinctiveness within the republican canon, and challenges the 
initial sense of him, reflected in the works of Fink and Pocock, as the archetypal English 
republican. In juxtaposing Harrington’s use of the Venetian and Dutch Republics with that of 
his immediate contemporaries, particularly Milton and Nedham, it becomes clear that his 
commitment to Venetian constitutional models was divisive and ill favoured, thereby shifting 
the central English republican narrative further away from Harrington.  
Chapter 5 moves into the post-Restoration years and considers how the use of contemporary 
European republican examples shifted in accordance with the altered political circumstances 
within England. In particular, there was a notable move away from the Venetian 
constitutional model to the republican experiences and successes of the Dutch Republic. In 
noting this new dynamic, the chapter also draws a previously under-considered parallel 
between two lesser known English republican works, namely Sidney’s Court Maxims and 
Neville’s The Isle of Pines. Chapter 6 continues to examine these two figures, exploring the 
ways in which their political writings, republican ideas, and utilisation of contemporary 
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republics shifted under the auspices of the Exclusion Crisis. In particular, it considers the role 
and purpose of the Noble Venetian in Neville’s Plato Redivivus in order to assess how far this 











Chapter 1: English Knowledge of Europe 
 
Travelling the Continent 
Robert Molesworth’s position regarding the importance of travel in imparting valuable 
political lessons did not come from nowhere. It was built on earlier ideas, particularly those 
found in a key political tract of 1656. In The Commonwealth of Oceana, James Harrington set 
out the means of educating men ‘in the womb of the commonwealth’ in order to remould 
them as ‘citizens’. His proposal was a six-stage educational process ‘at the school, in the 
mechanics, at the universities, at the inns of court or chancery, in travels, and in military 
discipline’.1 Travel was therefore an essential aspect of Harrington’s formation of the 
politicised citizen, and its significance extended to his approach to formulating his ideal 
constitution. This is important in two key ways. Firstly, he outlined the idea of ‘a 
commonwealth which will herself be a traveller’.2 Travel to different commonwealths was 
useful for the political man, since it provided the material for the formulation of a good polity. 
Indeed Harrington's own ideal commonwealth, Oceana, was made up of elements of existing 
commonwealths past and present, a process which was explicitly dramatised by Harrington in 
‘The Council of Legislators’. The Lord Archon gathers his council of legislators around him, 
and requests ‘an urn to be brought’ so that each man may draw lots to decide which model of 
government each should investigate. The models included ancient governments such as 
Athens, Rome, and Carthage, but also modern ones, such as the Swiss Cantons, United 
Provinces and Venice. These governments, Archon claims, contain ‘in them all those 
excellencies whereof a commonwealth is capable (so that to have added more had been to no 
purpose)’.3 The councillors were to study the government assigned to them, and based on 
their findings, the orders and constitution of the commonwealth of Oceana were to be 
modelled. Harrington, therefore, placed equal value on ancient and modern republics in 
providing useful material for legislators. In this way, Harrington’s commonwealth itself was a 
traveller - an amalgamated commonwealth made up of elements of other European republics 
past and present.  
The second point of significance regarding the commonwealth as traveller is that it clearly 
outlined that travel was not recreational, but a key element in the formation of politically 
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engaged citizens. Harrington further emphasised this point when he declared that ‘no man can 
be a politician, except he be first an historian or a traveller; for except he can see what must 
be, or what may be, he is no politician’.4 Harrington therefore placed equal emphasis on the 
value of historical republics and contemporary ones, on the reading of ancient texts and on 
travel. Moreover, as well as insisting on the importance of travel as part of a citizen's political 
education, he also suggested that: 
every youth at his return from his travels is to present the censors with a paper of his own 
writing, containing the interests of state or form of government of the countries or some one of 




Acknowledging that not all men had the luxury of being able to travel across Europe, 
Harrington encouraged those who could to document their accounts, giving these travel 
narratives a distinctly political purpose. This served a dual purpose: to encourage those who 
could travel to reflect deeply on what they encountered and observed, and in creating these 
additional travel narratives, the result was more opportunities to learn for those who could not 
leave the country. Indeed, over the last half century, historians have recognised that travel and 
the written accounts emerging out of it could possess a political purpose. John Stoye and 
Jeremy Black have both argued that the early conception of the Grand Tour and much of the 
didactic writing on travel chiefly justified it as a means to create educated servants for the 
state, who were well informed of the politics and governments of Europe.
6
 Similarly, Andrew 
Hadfield has demonstrated that some of ‘the most vociferous expressions of republican 
sentiment were contained in the representations of other countries and cultures’.7  
Travel, politics, and education demonstrably shared intimate connections. In their quest for 
the origins of republican thought in England, many historians have overlooked this fact and 
have focused too exclusively on the ancient world. However, the ancient world was not a 
place one could actively visit or experience. On the other hand, many of the key figures of the 
English republican tradition spent time on the continent. The time they spent in Europe took 
different forms: Harrington and Milton undertook relatively traditional ‘grand tour’ style trips, 
as did Neville, but the latter was also later exiled on the continent with Sidney after the 
Restoration of the Stuart monarchy. Despite the fact that some of the key texts in the English 
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republican canon were written on the continent – namely The Isle of Pines and Court Maxims 
– historians have failed to address the influence that contemporary republics might have had 
on English republican thought. In operating as a corrective in this respect, this thesis will 
demonstrate not only that the Dutch and Venetian republics really did impact upon English 
thinkers, but also that in approaching this subject from a different angle, new light can be shed 
on our understanding of these important thinkers.   
Considering the importance of travel, it is worth outlining briefly here the experiences in 
Europe of each of the English republican figures whose works are explored in this thesis. As I 
indicated above, Harrington and Milton undertook the most conventional travel on the 
continent. Our knowledge of Harrington’s travels comes not from his own pen (despite his 
encouragement that others ought to document their journeys) but from those of his 
contemporary biographers. John Toland edited and published the works of Harrington in 
1700, including within that volume an account of Harrington’s life. Toland also had access to 
a manuscript collection of papers relating to the author, which had been compiled by one of 
Harrington’s sisters. Based on the contents of these papers, Toland wrote his account of 
Harrington’s life. The basic content of what Toland writes about Harrington is reinforced by 
other contemporary sources, although Toland’s account contains significantly more detail.8 
Any original manuscripts have since disappeared, and as a result it is impossible to know how 
much of the detail is accurate.
9
 We must therefore approach Toland’s account with a healthy 
degree of scepticism, but I believe that comparing his account with the ideas relating to travel 
in Oceana lends authenticity to Toland’s biography.  
Toland emphasised the key role that his visit to Holland played in the development of 
Harrington’s political thought. He tells us how his ‘first step was into Holland, then the 
principal School of Martial Disciplin, and (what toucht him more sensibly) a place 
wonderfully flourishing under the influence of their Liberty which they had so lately asserted, 
                                                 
8
 Those contemporaries were John Aubrey and Anthony Wood. However, Toland appears to have largely relied 
on the account of Aubrey, and Aubrey on Wood’s account, so the similarities between the three are not too 
surprising. See John Aubrey, Aubrey’s Brief Lives, ed. Oliver Lawson Dick (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1949), 282-86; Anthony Wood, Athenæ Oxonienses, Volume II (London, 1721), 588-595.  
9
 Historians have debated the accuracy of Toland’s account. Blair Worden is more sceptical of Toland’s editorial 
motivations, whereas J. G.A. Pocock and Justin Champion have concluded that Toland was overall fair and 
unobtrusive in his editorship of Harrington’s works. See Blair Worden, ‘Whig History and Puritan Politics: The 
Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow Revisited’, Historical Research, 75, 188 (2002), 209-37; J.G.A Pocock, ‘Editorial 
Introduction’ and ‘Historical Introduction’, The Political Works of James Harrington, ed. by J.G.A. Pocock 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), xi-5; Justin Champion, Republican Learning: John Toland and 
the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696-1722 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 100. 
 24 
by breaking the Yoke of a severe Master, the Spanish Tyrant’.10 Toland’s suggestion that 
Harrington was influenced by the remarkable prosperity and success of the United Provinces 
since they had overthrown Philip II, was advanced further when he asserted that Harrington’s 
experiences and time spent in Holland was absolutely crucial in the formative development of 
his political thought:  
Here, no doubt  it was, that he begun to make Government the Subject of his Meditations: for he 
was often heard to say that, before he left England,  he knew no more of Monarchy, Anarchy, 
Aristocracy, Democracy, Oligarchy, or the like than as hard words whereof he learnt the 
signification in his Dictionary.
11
  
It seems that Toland wanted to imply that Harrington was only truly inspired to the study of 
politics during his time on the continent, and more particularly in the Dutch Republic. We can 
only offer conjecture as to why Toland emphasised this particular facet of Harrington’s 
experience in Holland. It may be that the sheer diversity of types of government across the 
seven United Provinces awoke Harrington to the array of polities that existed, and how they 
could work alongside or against one another.
12
 It may also have been the uniqueness of the 
Dutch constitutional system that piqued his interest, or perhaps the struggles of the Dutch 
people to throw off the Spanish yoke and establish their own form of government. Regardless, 
what was clearly important was that the experience of another country, and likely an 
observation of its customs and constitution, appears to have influenced his understanding of 
politics in a way that could not have been achieved simply through reading ‘his Dictionary’.  
Of the rest of Harrington’s travels we glean very little from Toland, barely finding out the 
cities he visited along the way. There is no account of the sights he saw, or experiences he had 
during his journey. Rather we learn that in France Harrington saw the things that deserved his 
curiosity, before making ‘such remarks on their government as will best appear in his Works’. 
He then appears to have moved on to Italy, of which we only learn that: ‘He prefer’d Venice 
to all other places in Italy, as he did its Government to all those of the whole World’.13 Both 
of these small comments continue to support the assertion that Harrington was primarily 
interested in the specifics of the governments of each of these nations. Beyond this, we can 
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only speculate about the impact travel had on Harrington – if only he had followed his own 
advice, and published an account of his travels for the education of his fellow countrymen.    
  
Although hardly amounting to a travel narrative in the traditional sense of the term, we do at 
least have an account of Milton’s time in Europe from the pen of Milton himself.14 After his 
mother’s death in 1637, Milton declared that he developed a desire to travel, which he acted 
upon when he left England in May 1638 for a tour of the continent.
15
 Prior to leaving 
England, he sought out the advice of Sir Henry Wotton, who had previously been ambassador 
to Venice, although he did not follow Wotton’s suggestions to the letter.16 He travelled first to 
France, meeting while he was in Paris the Dutch thinker Hugo Grotius, before heading to 
Italy, where he visited Genoa and Pisa and then Florence, where he stayed ‘for about two 
months’. This city, he declared, he had ‘always admired above all others because of the 
elegance, not just of its tongue, but also of its wit’.17 He particularly enjoyed interacting with 
the learned men of the private academies of Florence, but eventually he moved on to Siena, 
Rome and Naples, from whence he ‘desired also to cross to Sicily and Greece, but ‘the sad 
tidings of civil war from England summoned me back’.18 He hardly rushed home, though, 
returning again to Rome and Florence first, and ‘gladly lingering there for as many months as 
before’. He subsequently visited Venice, Bologna, Geneva and Milan, before finally ‘by the 
same route as before, through France, I returned home after a year and three months, more or 
less, at almost the same time as Charles broke the peace and renewed the war with the 
Scots’.19 
The purpose of travel, for Milton, was ‘the cultivation of my mind’, a further aspect of his 
tireless pursuit of knowledge.
20
 In his third Prolusion, Milton declared ‘how much better were 
it…now to let your eyes wander as it were over all the lands depicted on the map…then to spy 
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out the customs of mankind and those states which are well-ordered’.21 Education, Milton 
argued, was richer and more beneficial, when all countries of the world were studied, not just 
those that were considered ‘well-ordered’. He therefore prefigured Molesworth’s argument 
that one should be just as open to learning about governments that were poorly constituted as 
those that had an admirable constitution. Having said this, however, while Milton did visit 
Venice, little is known for certain of his time there, or of his feelings towards it, other than 
what Milton himself outlines in A Second Defence. All he says of Venice is that ‘when I had 
spent one month exploring that city and had seen to the shopping of the books which I had 
acquired throughout Italy, I proceeded to Geneva’.22 The reason for Milton’s short stay is 
uncertain. It may have been that Milton had heard of the ‘the sad tidings of civil war from 
England’, which he claimed summoned him home, and thus decided not to linger in Venice.23 
However, this is pure speculation, and perhaps there was simply little of interest to keep him 
there for long. After all, at this particular time, Milton was yet to demonstrate any particular 
interest in constitutional, or even broader political, issues, and the fact that he did not stop to 
discover the specifics of the Venetian constitution should perhaps not surprise us.  
There is, however, another way that Milton may have gained knowledge on the Venetian 
Republic. John Aubrey says of Milton that ‘foraigners came much to see him…and much 
admired him’ while Anthony Wood states that ‘he was more admired abroad, and by 
Foreigners, than at home; and was much visited by them’.24 Having made a positive 
impression among scholars and the literati during his time in Europe, and having further 
heightened it through his Latin Defences, he seems to have maintained a level of fame as a 
scholar that encouraged substantial visitation. Milton’s connections with Sir Henry Wotton, 
for instance, might have served as one such source of political knowledge.   
Like Harrington and Milton, Neville also took a Grand Tour style journey around Europe. 
After taking an oath of allegiance to the existing regime, he began his journey in May 1641.
25
 
He went first to France and then Italy, spending most of his time in Florence. He appears to 
have had a real love of Italy and developed a strong command of the language.
26
 He returned 
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to England around 1645, having missed the first few years of the civil war.
27
 But Neville also 
had another, different experience on the continent. In 1663, Neville was arrested for his 
alleged involvement in the so called Yorkshire or Northern Plot. After fourteen weeks in the 
Tower, he petitioned Charles II for ‘his liberty’ and a pass ‘to Transport himself beyond the 
Sea’. This was granted, and Neville left England for Italy. He initially settled in Florence, 
before travelling to Pisa, Venice and Rome.
28
 There are debates surrounding whether Neville 
obtained some form of court employment in Tuscany, or whether he was actually sent to Italy 
to serve the English government there.
29
 In support of the latter theory, a letter from the Earl 
of Clarendon to Neville of December 1664 asks Neville to reproach the Venetians for ‘not 
having a constant ambassador’ in London, which was to the disadvantage of English trade 
with the republic.
30
 He does not appear to have undertaken this duty with any relish, and his 
letters back to Clarendon lack any useful information. He returned back to England in 1668, 
apparently without any objection from the government.  
Algernon Sidney spent more time in Europe than his fellow republicans.
31
 During his youth 
he travelled with his father, Robert Sidney, second Earl of Leicester, on embassies to 
Denmark in 1632 and France from 1636. He remained in France for five years, where he 
continued his education, before returning to England in 1641. Sidney played a small role in 
the English Civil War before focusing on politics. He entered the House of Commons in 1645 
and remained there until Cromwell’s dissolution of the Rump in April 1653, returning when 
the Rump was briefly restored in 1659. Under this restored Rump, Sidney was appointed as 
an English ambassador and was sent to the Baltic to mediate between Denmark and Sweden. 
Sidney’s approach to diplomacy has been described as ‘at the very least unorthodox’, and 
when word of his behaviour, combined with his strident republicanism, reached the ears of the 
newly restored Charles II, Sidney realised that returning to England would risk his life.
32
 Thus 
began seventeen years in exile on the continent, during which time he narrowly avoided two 
assassination attempts. In the early years of his exile, he moved around regularly, initially 
heading towards Italy from northern Europe, travelling through Hamburg, Frankfurt and 
Augsburg. In Italy, he largely stayed in Rome, although he certainly visited the Republic of 
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Venice. For the most part, this was Sidney’s period of political retirement. However, by mid-
1663 events in England were pulling him back to action; religious persecution had begun and 
the regicides, including Sidney’s friend Henry Vane, had been executed. He left Italy and 
headed through Switzerland towards Flanders and Holland, visiting fellow exiles and 
attempting to rile them up and unite them in political action against the English monarchy. He 
visited the United Provinces briefly in 1664, before returning for approximately eighteen 
months from mid-1665. Sidney’s aim was to continue to unite English exiles and to 
encourage the Dutch government to support their attempts to overthrow Charles. Support was 
not forthcoming, and Sidney eventually settled down to a quiet life in France, before finally 
returning to England in 1677.  
The only figure who did not travel abroad was Marchamont Nedham. Born in Burford in 
approximately 1620, he attended Oxford University and then obtained a place at Gray’s Inn, 
where he developed the legal knowledge that would inform his later political thought. Perhaps 
he intended to go abroad, but the onset of political turbulence in England in 1641 led him to 
become editor of a parliamentarian newsbook, Mercurius Britanicus, and it was through this 
career that Nedham became notorious for his numerous newsbooks of differing allegiances.
33
 
What is particularly surprising was that unlike Neville and Sidney who were both forced into 
exile, Nedham managed to play the game well enough to avoid banishment from England. 
Thus, he never visited Europe either willingly or by force. However, at least during the period 
of his editorship of the government sponsored newsbook Mercurius Politicus, Nedham had at 
hand the resources of spymaster John Thurloe, which provided an excellent network for 
reporting on foreign affairs. Moreover, Nedham supplemented this intelligence network with 
correspondents of his own distributed across continental Europe. So while he may not have 
visited these nations first hand, he certainly had a very strong second-hand knowledge of the 
affairs of countries across Europe, and particularly the Dutch Republic.
34
 
Each of these men therefore had knowledge of the Venetian and Dutch Republics without 
reading lengthy histories or political tracts. Harrington, Milton, Neville and Sidney all visited 
Venice, while Harrington and Sidney both spent significant time in the United Provinces. 
Moreover there are good reasons for thinking that their experiences on the continent helped 
shape their political understandings. Though, of course, the specific ways in which these 
experiences influenced their thought are much more difficult to pin down than the tracing of  
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influences through contemporary literature. It is to these books and pamphlets that recounted 
the histories and polities of Venice and the Dutch Republic that we must turn next.  
Literature on Venice 
The myth of Venice was well documented in English, as was its subsequent counter-myth 
which began to permeate into English language tracts in the 1670s. Both the myth and the 
counter-myth will be examined here, but both must be preceded by a brief narrative of the 
history of Venice in order to set the myth against the historical context of the republic. The 
intention here is not to pull out every theme of the myth and counter-myth, but rather to pick 
out the elements that were most frequently utilised or conceptualised by English republican 
writers. However, it is also worth remembering William Bouwsma’s reminder that ‘these 
books did not by themselves create an interest in Venice; they are significant because they 
nourished, and can therefore help us understand more deeply, a taste that had deeper 
sources’.35 So although these texts remain crucial for examining exactly which aspects of the 
Venetian myth, history or government English republicans utilised, it is important to 
remember that Venice as a republic was likely already part of the cultural zeitgeist.  
Venice was made up of a collection of islands that were slowly populated in the fifth century, 
when men and women fleeing the onslaught of the Goths, Huns, and later the Lombards, 
sought refuge in the lagoon. Initially these islands provided only a temporary base, but 
eventually these refugees realised returning to their homes permanently was not an option, 
and they began to build a rudimentary form of communal self-government, initiating the slow 
constitutional process towards the creation of the Republic of Venice.
36
 Although they started 
out governing as tribunes, continued internal instability led to the need, in the early eighth 
century, for a single leader, and the first Doge, or Duke of Venice, was chosen. The Doge was 
held accountable to the tribunes and the people by virtue of his elected position; however, 
these checks proved insufficient, and continued political turmoil and the increasing threat of 
the dogeship becoming a hereditary monarchy meant that additional checks had to be imposed 
upon ducal authority. The appointment of the doge’s sons as co-regents, which risked the 
introduction of a hereditary aspect to the dogeship, was forbidden; a ducal oath called the 
promissione was introduced; and an increasingly complex system of election was established. 
This complex system of checks and balances spread to all aspects of the constitution until 
there was hardly an aspect of government that was not held accountable to another.  
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Besides the doge, the other main elements of the constitution were the Great Council and the 
Senate. The Great Council had been established in 1171 and from the start had been self-
electing. Although this naturally tended towards a closed system, for over a century it 
remained possible for anyone to sit on the Council regardless of their position in the country. 
However, from 1286 it was proposed that eligibility for the Council should be restricted to 
those whose fathers or more distant paternal ancestors had themselves been members. After 
initial resistance, the proposal was passed in 1297 and the Libro d’Oro – the Golden Book – 
which listed all Venetian citizens eligible for election was created. This event has traditionally 
been referred to as the Serrata, or closing of the great council. The next level of government 
was the Senate, which was a body of around three hundred men, predominantly elected by the 
Great Council for terms of one year. The senators, known as the Pregadi, exercised a general 
supervisory authority over the various other bodies of government.
37
 There were various other 
small councils, and predominant among them, but still standing somewhat apart, was the 
Council of Ten. The Ten was established in 1310 as a temporary institution with wide 
emergency powers in order to deal with the rebellion of Bajamonte Tiepolo and the continued 
subsequent unrest.
38
 However, by 1334 the Venetians recognised that the Ten acted as the 
efficient executive the republic lacked, and was able to respond quickly to potential dangers 
to the state. It was, therefore, made a permanent body, which although subject to 
characteristic checks and balances, was able to issues decrees with the same force as those 
from the Great Council itself. Over the centuries the Council of Ten became increasingly 
powerful – for instance, it began unconstitutionally appointing subcommittees that were 
responsible only to itself – and it became widely unpopular.  
The modus operandi of Venice was trade. With a central geographic location between East 
and West, the state was ideally positioned as a key global trade link. By the beginning of the 
fifteenth century, Venice was reaching its “Golden Age”. She was a European power in her 
own right, possessing a huge trading empire, and resplendent with the riches that position had 
wrought. She had established herself on the terrafirma, coming into possession of 
considerable mainland territories, although she had also learnt that defending these land 
territories, which often had imprecise boundaries and numerous powers interested in them, 
could prove inconvenient and expensive, especially because of Venice's dependence on 
mercenary soldiers.
39
 For these reasons, the Venetians favoured peace; war was expensive in 
                                                 
37
 William Bouwsma, Venice and the Defence of Republican Liberty: Renaissance Values in the Age of the 
Counter Reformation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), 61.  
38
 For Tiepolo’s rebellion see Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic, 115-116.  
39
 Norwich, A History of Venice, 268-279. 
 31 
that it threatened trade and they were forced to pay for mercenaries. Venice’s location and its 
policies meant that they were frequently pulled into wars against their will, not just as a 
buttress between east and west, but also as one of a multitude of city states in northern Italy. 
In the sixteenth century, numerous European powers entered into the League of Cambrai and 
declared war on Venice, as a means of curbing Venetian expansion and influence in northern 
Italy. The war threatened to subsume the tiny republic state, and in 1509 French forces 
defeated the Venetian’s mercenary army at the Battle of Agnadello, leading to the wholesale 
collapse of their terrafirma empire, a defeat that was summed up by Machiavelli: ‘in one 
day’s engagement, they lost what it had taken them eight hundred years’ exertion to 
conquer’.40 Although the city of Venice itself never actually fell, and the republic managed to 
regain all of their mainland territories, the memory of Agnadello lived on for the Venetians.
41
 
Although Agnadello was a disaster for Venice, its ability to recover quickly allowed the 
republic to continue to conceptualise itself as a significant European player, but in reality 
Venice never truly recovered.
42
 The War of the League of Cambrai represents the symbolic 
end of Venetian expansion and its position as a significant European power.
43
 She survived 
the war largely though good diplomacy, statesmanship and luck rather than military strength, 
and the resultant shift in the European order deprived Venice of the commercial hegemony 
and mastery of the seas. She was no longer a powerful player in European politics, and 
became unique more for her history and government than her exceptional power.  
It was in the years after Cambrai that the myth of Venice began to be formally and 
extensively conceptualised. After the shock of near defeat and its new position within Europe, 
Venice had to rethink how it portrayed itself to the world. Venetian apologists sought to 
formulate a vision of the commonwealth, its politics, and its history to present to the world, 
and transmitted it through a few key texts to a wide European audience. This self-
representation elevated Venice to one of the greatest and revered republics in both ancient and 
modern times, since it saw itself as:  
a city founded in liberty and never thereafter subject to foreign domination; a maritime, 
commercial economy; a unified and civic-minded patriciate, guardian of the common good; a 
society intensely pious yet ecclesiastically independent; a loyal and contented populace; a 
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constitution constraining disruptive forces in a thousand-year harmony and constancy of purpose; a 
republic of wisdom and benevolence, provider of fair justice and a high degree of toleration.
44
    
With such a portrayal of itself being diffused across Europe, it is hardly surprising that the 
Venetian Republic continued to be revered over the subsequent decades and even centuries. 
The myth and Venice’s reputation were also bolstered by Venice’s victory over Rome after 
the 1606 Interdict, as it reinforced across Europe the idea of Venice as powerfully 
independent.
45
 For the Venetians, the myth served a dual purpose. Not only did it unify the 
citizens of Venice, increasing their loyalty to the republic and ensuring their willingness to 
make sacrifices for its continued survival, it also allowed external observers to view the 
Venetian republic as a model for emulation and envy. It allowed them to paper over internal 
cracks that were perhaps visible to those within Venice, ensuring that from the outside the 
Venetian republic continued to appear as a paragon of virtue and prudence; a city that had 
never been, and perhaps never could be, invaded. As a tool, the myth became a means of 
protection from external forces that might otherwise have sought out Venetian weaknesses 
and utilised them to undermine the state.  
The myth was set out in several key texts, the two most influential of which were written by 
Gasparo Contarini and Donato Giannotti. Contarini’s De magistratibus et republica 
Venetorum was written in the mid-1520s but it was only published posthumously in 1543.
46
 It 
was widely printed outside Italy, in both the original Latin and translated Italian forms; these 
were in addition to the versions translated into French in 1544 and English in 1599 by Lewes 
Lewkenor.
47
 Contarini was a Venetian and came from a well-respected patrician family, while 
Lewkenor was an English courtier who was particularly noted for his translations of European 
literature.
48
 So while the former was very familiar with the Venetian Republic, the latter was 
not.
49
 Contarini’s book has become famous for being the first to fully articulate the 
idealisation of Venetian institutions and the republican style of life.
50
  
Lewkenor’s translation also included eighty pages of translated material from other sources 
that provided supplementary historical and political context, among them extracts from 
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Donato Giannotti and Bernardo Giustiniani. Giannotti’s classic text Libro della repubblica 
de’Viniziani appeared in 1540, around the same time as Contarini’s work, although it had 
been circulating freely in manuscript form in Florence in 1527-8.
51
 Giannotti’s background 
and the immediate context of the composition of the tract are of particular importance in 
understanding his work. Giannotti was a Florentine and had grown up when that city was a 
republic. However, after Florence fell to Charles V in 1530, he was forced to flee his home 
city and lived the remaining forty-three years of his life in exile, largely in Venice. Giannotti 
desired a Restoration of republican government in Florence that could be free from internal 
and external enemies, and achieve stability. Venice, with its longevity and stability, proved to 
be a useful tool for Giannotti and he therefore focused primarily on the way in which the 
Venetian constitution achieved such stability, where his native government had so evidently 
failed. His account also includes detailed descriptions of the political bodies, the powers of 
government, and the electoral systems.
52
 The purpose of Giustiniani’s writing was a little 
different. His work De Origine Urbis Venetiarum Rebusque ab Ipsa Gestis Historia was 
published posthumously in 1493, thus before Contarini and Giannotti wrote, and before the 
War of the League of Cambrai.
53
 The purpose of his writing was to reflect on the previous 
greatness of Venice to warn its inhabitants about the future of the republic, which he believed 
(with remarkable foresight) was endangered. He focused specifically on the decline in civic 
virtue among his compatriots, and what he perceived to be the increasing value placed on 
personal wealth.
54
 So while Giustiniani did not set out the myth in the specific terms that 
would come slightly later with Contarini and Giannotti, his work demonstrates that certain 
aspects of the myth – the exceptional virtue of the founders of Venice and its longevity in 
particular - were prevalent in the cultural understanding of Venetian history. Moreover, he 
used these aspects to demonstrate that the Venetian ideal had been deviated from; in 
understanding and explicating this, the corruption could be halted and Venice could continue 
as a strong, sturdy republic.  
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There are a few other thinkers that ought to be considered in any discussion of the myth of 
Venice.
55
 Two other Italian thinkers are to be considered in relation to the myth of Venice, 
although their significance is less than those outlined above. Francesco Guicciardini was born 
into a Florentine merchant family in 1483.
56
 During his lifetime, Florence saw considerable 
tumults, with the fall of the republican regime and the rise of the Medici. Many of his political 
writings commented on these upheavals within Florence, in an attempt to restore stability and 
prevent continual tumults. Thus in many ways his motivation was similar to that of his fellow 
countryman Giannotti. Like Giannotti, his model of republican government was Venice 
because of its stability. He favoured aristocratic government, and considered the Senate the 
most important element of the Venetian constitution, and that which was most in need in 
Florence. It would also be remiss not to at least mention Machiavelli here. Although far from 
mythologizing Venice as possessing an ideal pattern of government, even he could not help 
but praise them for the continuity of their government and ability promptly to resolve 
emergency situations.
57
 But his main objection was that the constitution, even though it suited 
people who lived in peaceful isolation, was unsuited for expansion or conquest of an empire, 
which Machiavelli held as fundamental political objectives.
58
 
One of the key themes of the myth of Venice was the fact that it had stood as an exceptional 
example of republican government ‘from the first building thereof, even until this time, being 
now a thousand and one hundred yeares, it hath preserved itself free and untouched’.59 This 
longevity was put down to two key factors: its liberty and its untouched, or unchanged, 
nature. The reason for this apparent unchanging nature was partly assigned to the Venetian 
use of the Polybian concept of mixed government, which could transcend the inevitable 
cyclical decline from one constitutional form to another. It achieved this by combining the 
three Aristotelian forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) in a perfect 
combination. In Venice, theoretically the doge represented the monarchical element, the 
Senate the aristocracy, and the Great Council the democratic element. The idea that the 
Venetian government formed a mixed constitution was only systematised in the work of 
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Contarini; it had however been abstractly theorised nearly a hundred years prior to this.
60
 
Both Giannotti and Guicciardini alluded to it, without explicitly defining Venice as a mixed 
government; Guicciardini described it as ‘the most beautiful and best government that any 
city, not only in our times but also in the classical world, ever possessed; the reason is that it 
embodies all three forms of government: those of the one, of a few, and of many’.61 It was 
Contarini who explicitly described it as such and therefore established it as part of the myth of 
Venice: ‘there is in this cittie of ours an excellent contrived mixture of the best and justest 
governments’.62 More specifically, he stated that in Venice ‘there is a mixture of the three 
governments royall, popular, & noble’.63 Although, the constitution is largely portrayed as 
immutable, in setting out the early history of Venice above, it is clear that the constitution of 
the young republic changed and developed in response to continued internal instability. 
However, since the closing of the Great Council it was generally perceived that the 
government of Venice had changed so little as to form an unchanging and stable form of 
government, contributing significantly to its longevity. 
This longevity was also achieved through the insistence that Venice offered a perfect and 
‘long-lasting liberty’.64 In the Venetian conception, liberty possessed several meanings.65 
Liberty could relate to the position of a state in relation to another state; in other words, 
whether or not a state was independent from the dominion of an external ruler. Core to the 
Venetian myth was the idea that it had never once been subject to external dominion.
66
 
Giustiniani stressed the original and perpetual liberty of Venice, denying that they had ever 
been subject to the empire of any other power, as did Contarini: ‘from the first beginning till 
this time of ours it hath remained safe and free…from the domination of Straungers’.67 The 
liberty of Venice was therefore intimately connected to her origins.
68
 After the miraculous 
turn of events after Agnadello, with Venice regaining all her land territory without the city 
itself ever being penetrated by external enemies, this idea was further reinforced. Venice 
seemed to be indestructible and immune from foreign attack, adding to the understanding that 
the Venetian republic was immortal.  
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But liberty could also refer to the political regime within a nation, indicating that a regime 
was not tyrannical. In Venice, they protected themselves from the danger of internal tyranny 
by establishing a complex system of checks and balances, including rotation of office, 
election, and a secret ballot. For Giannotti the complicated procedures were crucial since they 
formed the firm basis of Venetian liberty. By ensuring that each patrician in the Great Council 
reached his decision independently and in complete isolation, a government came about 
which united all the inhabitants in perfect harmony. Free from external pressures, patricians 
were able to make the most rational choice for the general welfare and in doing so raised the 
exercise of citizenship in Venice to unparalleled heights.
69
 Contarini too emphasized that the 
idea of collective administration, rotation and complex systems of election were key to the 
Venetian conception of liberty, since it ensured they were free from the tyranny of other 
people’s passions.70  
These checks and balances were also a means by which the Venetians could ensure internal 
political stability, which again would ensure the longevity of the republic. By rapidly rotating 
offices and having a secret ballot, the Venetians could prevent too much power building up in 
any given hands. In theory, this would prevent any faction or corruption from entering the 
system. Thus these constitutional systems ensured that the public interest was being served at 
all times and prevented any private or factional interests from influencing governmental 
policy. Moreover, by ensuring that every citizen had a vote in government, any accusations of 
faction could be prevented. Thus Contarini declared that by establishing a government of 
laws, the people could not ‘in reason blame any man’ and so would no longer live in fear of 
‘any sedition or rancour growne among the citizens’.71 Protecting the republic against internal 
sedition was therefore crucial to the republic’s continued survival. The fact it was still 
standing a millennium after its establishment suggested to its supporters that the electoral 
system was more than serving its purpose.  
A final aspect relating to Venetian stability concerns how Venice interacted with the world 
around it. Unlike the citizens of other great republics, particularly Rome, the Venetians 
‘alwaies with greater regard and reckoning applied their minds to the maintenance of peace 
then to the glorie of warres: tending alwaies their chiefest care and studie to the preservation 
of civill concorde and agreement of themselves’.72 War was neither practical for Venice, nor 
sought after. As a small island republic it did not have the capacity for great land wars, and 
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when war did descend, it relied heavily on mercenaries, because ‘our ancestors held it a better 
course to defend their dominions upon the continent, with foreign mercenarie soldiers, then 
with their homeborn citizen’.73 This connects back to the Venetians insisting on checks and 
balances on its government; it prevented ambition from dictating policy. Similarly, by 
preventing Venetian citizens from bearing arms, there was no danger of them pursuing their 
ambitions and seeking power through the military. However, because of its island lagoon 
location, the Venetians did build up a great naval force, which it put to use with trade. Trade 
had been a cornerstone of Venetian policy from its earliest days, allowing Venice to grow 
from a collection of stranded refugees into an established and influential republic. When it 
was necessary to use these ships for war not trade – a key reason why they preferred peace, 
since war directly impacted on trade – the republic’s location also protected them.  Moreover, 
the shallow sea and lakes surrounding Venice meant that any arriving enemy ships were 
denied an easy, efficient entrance, giving the Venetians sufficient warning of any approaching 
danger.
74
 The republic therefore almost seemed positioned in such a way that it could never 
be penetrated by enemies, and the distrustful nature of the Venetians meant that internal 
instability caused by ambition, faction, or private interests was next to impossible. 
Yet representations of Venice were not homogenous, and by the end of the seventeenth 
century the mythical conception of Venice was being counterbalanced by the rise of negative 
depictions of the republic. Though negative accounts began appearing as early as the fifteenth 
century,
75
 many historians have argued that the anti-myth of Venice as a coherent concept 
was not properly developed until the eighteenth century.
76
 Yet, Wootton has convincingly 
argued that a cohesive anti-myth began to be recognised as having ‘flourished’ from the mid-
1670s.
77
 On the basis of an examination of the mid to late-seventeenth-century texts that 
present a vilified version of the Venetian republic, I will suggest that there were already clear 
and distinct themes which created a coherent anti-myth of Venice.  
In the 1670s there was a sudden spurt of tracts published which encapsulate the key themes of 
the anti-myth of Venice. These texts largely came from the pens of French authors, but many 
of them were translated into English and were read on both sides of the Channel. The influx 
of criticisms of Venice by French authors at this time may be related to the increasing 
                                                 
73
 Ibid.,, 131. 
74
 Ibid., 3-4. 
75
 Shakespeare’s Othello and The Merchant of Venice, for instance, both used negative stereotypes surrounding 
Venice. See Maurice Hunt, ‘Shakespeare’s Venetian Paradigm: Stereotyping and Sadism in The Merchant of 
Venice and Othello’, Papers on Language and Literature, 39, 2 (2003), 162-84. 
76
 John Jeffries Martin and Dennis Romano, ‘Reconsidering Venice’, in Venice Reconsidered, 3.  
77
 David Wootton, ‘Ulysses Bound?’, 341. 
 38 
absolutism of the French monarch Louis XIV. Censorship and orthodoxy were strictly 
enforced, so directly criticising the monarch was not an option. As a means of circumventing 
this censorship, they may well have turned to studies of other states, for ‘historical studies 
allowed them [critics of absolutism] to comment on contemporary circumstances through 
parallel or contrasts…elements of criticism could be scattered throughout their writing so that 
points taken separately were anodyne but became sharp and destructive if the reader linked 
them in a pattern’. Criticism of Venice was therefore used to condemn the absolutism of the 
French king.
78
 We might speculate as to why these tracts were subsequently published in 
English: who was translating them, and why?  Although the ‘who’ is largely lost to history, 
we can suggest that Englishmen still sympathetic to republican thought and critical of the rule 
of Charles II similarly sought to use the Venetian anti-myth to criticise the English king. It is 
therefore worth setting out the key texts available to the English, as well as tracing the themes 
of the counter-myth.  
There were several texts initially published in French that outlined the anti-myth of Venice. 
Perhaps most popular and widely accessible was that of Abraham Nicolas Amelot de la 
Houssaie. Amelot spent time in Venice undertaking documentary research in the state 
archives.
79
 He therefore had both first-hand experience of the republic and unprecedented 
access to important historical texts. His first publication, The History of the Government of 
Venice, appeared in 1675 and took Gasparo Contarini’s History as its basis. Amelot framed 
his criticism around Contarini’s account of the constitution, and in doing so sought to tear 
down the celebrated Venetian myth. This method, ‘for the first time’ ‘offered to unveil the 
secrets of Venetian government and distill them into easy-to-use political maxims’.80 The text 
was incredibly popular, and in fewer than three years it appeared in at least twenty-two 
editions in Dutch, Italian, Spanish and English (into which it was translated in 1677 by an 
unknown author).
81
 A second tract published in France (in 1669) but promptly translated and 
published in English was De la Haye’s The Policy and Government of the Venetians (1671). It 
is unclear exactly who the author was, and all we learn of him is that the account is first-hand; 
he has both travelled in Venice and served in their militia.
82
 Alexandre Toussaint Limojon 
Saint-Didier’s work La Ville et la République de Venise was written in 1680 and translated 
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into English in 1699; it too outlined key themes in the anti-myth of Venice.
83
 Finally, César 
Vischard de Saint-Réal’s A Conspiracy of the Spaniards Against the State of Venice was 
originally published in French in 1674 but was translated and published in English in 1675. It 
provides an account of the 1618 conspiracy against the Venetians. The tract portrays the 
conspirators, of whom the leader was the Spanish ambassador to Venice the marquis of 
Bedmar, in a positive light and suggests that the professional soldiers who agreed to 
participate were undertaking a noble enterprise against a cruel, tyrannical republic that 
revelled in secrecy and oppression.
84
 This collection of tracts demonstrates that the anti-myth 
of Venice was an accessible part of a wider dialogue within England and beyond from as 
early as the 1670s. 
One earlier, English text is also worth including here. Although Robert Filmer is best known 
for Patriarcha, this was not published until after his death.
85
  During his lifetime he did, 
however, publish Observations upon Aristotle’s Politiques Touching Forms of Government in 
which he engaged with both the Dutch and Venetian republics. Given his strong support of 
divine right government, his rejection of these republics comes as no surprise. The text 
combined an avowed vision of absolutist government that simultaneously condemned the 
concept of mixed government.
86
 Filmer was obviously writing for a different reasons from the 
later French authors. As a committed royalist, Filmer simply sought to discredit the 
contemporary European models of republican government. The fact that he felt the need to do 
so perhaps suggests just how large these republics loomed in the wider political 
consciousness. It also demonstrates that the republic of Venice could serve many purposes; 
while the French used Venice to attack absolutism within their own country, Filmer used the 
same example to argue that an English republic could also be considered a form of 
absolutism.  
The myth of Venice argued that the constitution of its republic represented the ideal in mixed 
government. Advocates of the anti-myth, however, did not see it in these terms. Saint-Réal 
declared that ‘the World never had a Monarchy so absolute as is the Empire by which the 
Senate of Venice governs the Republick’.87 He implied that although the Senate may have 
appeared to others as one benign element of a mixed constitution, it was in fact the source of 
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absolute power in Venice, creating a narrow and tyrannical oligarchy rather than a virtuous 
aristocracy. Filmer also rejected the idea that Venice was a mixed government. He suggested 
that there was nothing of the monarchy in the Doge, nor anything popular in the Great 
Council. Filmer specifically calls out the myth of Venice, referencing one of its most 
prominent authors: 
That which exceeds admiration is that Contarini hath the confidence to affirm that present 
government of Venice to be a mixed form of monarchy, democracy and aristocracy. For whereas 
he makes the duke to have the person and show of a king, he after confesseth that the duke can do 
nothing at all alone...As little reason is there to think a popular estate is to be found in the great 
council of Venice… For the commons neither by themselves nor by any chosen by them for their 
representaters, are admitted to any part of the great council. And if the gentlemen of Venice have 
any right to keep the government in their own hands and to exclude the commons, they never had it 
given to them by the people, but at first were beholden to monarchy for their nobility.
88
  
Filmer stated that ‘though Venice and the Low Countries are the only remarkable places in 
this age that reject monarchy, yet neither of them pretend their government to be founded 
upon any right of the people, or have the common people any power amongst them, or any 
chosen by them’.89 The general theme of each of these writers’ criticisms is that in fact liberty 
in Venice was nothing more than a sham. The constitution of Venice afforded only a handful 
of patrician families liberty, while the rest of the population was condemned to slavery and 
oppression.  
The anti-myth also rejected the idea that the complicated voting systems of the Venetian 
republic acted as a means to preserve liberty. Instead, many of these authors argued that the 
natural jealousy and suspicion of the Venetians forced them to implement such designs. For 
instance, De la Haye considered the Venetian people to be particularly ambitious and jealous 
of the power of others. This, he suggests, is why they chose to create a head to their body of 
government. The first was that it would ‘frustrate the hopes of the ambitious’, the second ‘to 
cool and asswage that heat of dominion which reigns in the breast of most of the Gentry, by 
giving every man hopes of arriving one day at the Supremacy’, and the third ‘to satisfie and 
fix the volatil spirit of the Commons, giving them an appearance of liberty in their 
Republic’.90 De la Haye therefore presented the electoral system as a means of ensuring 
people thought they had a say in government, whilst in reality it was simply a means of 
neutralising the citizenry. Amelot argued along similar lines; his tract provided an account of 
the voting method in order to demonstrate that the Venetians were obsessed with frustrating 
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any personal ambitions. He also argued that the selling of votes, which was once forbidden, 
was a common and accepted form of corruption in their system. Filmer perhaps summed it up 
best when he stated that ‘no people in the world live in such jealousy one of another’.91  
These authors also argued that the Venetian population was deliberately corrupted as part of a 
political campaign to ensure their continued compliance. Of course, Venice as a den of vice 
was not necessarily new; travellers to Venice were frequently warned against the courtesans 
who were so prevalent there. The difference was that these new tracts identified an alleged 
conspiracy to remove the liberty of the Venetians by debasing them morally. So Amelot 
argued that ‘the Senat cajoles the People by suffering them to live idly and debauch’d, having 
no better way to debase them, and to render them obedient, than to indulge them their 
pleasures, and licentiousness of life’.92 This, the Venetian people believed, was how their 
liberty was defined. Amelot on the other hand asserted that this misguided belief and 
deliberate manipulation of the understanding of liberty was the ‘the greatest occasion of their 
slavery’.93 Saint-Didier also criticised the Venetian republic expressing similar concerns to 
those voiced by Amelot. He accused Venice of distracting the oppressed population from their 
unfortunate situation with ‘food and circuses’, or in other words, surrogate pleasures.94 He 
argued that the patriciate tolerated moral and sexual depravity for a similar purpose: to absorb 
their energies and direct them away from political concerns and as such to neutralise any 
threat they posed to the republic. This theme is again repeated by De la Hay: 
they never discourage their youth in their debauches, they seem rather to excite them by the 
permission of the Curtezans have to keen publick houses without being disturb’d…by this means 
these grave Senators suffer the inextinguishable flames of their youth, to evaporate betwixt the 
arms of these Idols, and with this sweet poison correct the boyling of those spirits, which uncajol’d 
might endanger, at least attempt the subversion of the State.
95
 
In arguing thus, each of these authors suggested that the republic could make no great claims 
to liberty. They accused the Venetian patriciate of actively enslaving the people by allowing 
them to follow their base passions and in so doing they undermine the very foundations upon 
which good government ought to rest. Worse, the oppressed people are satisfied with their 
false vision of liberty as it fulfilled their most superficial desires; as such they were blind to 
the very idea that they could be enslaved.  
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Not only were the people of Venice blind to their own complete lack of liberty, but they were 
also tyrannised over by another aspect of the government. The ruthlessness and repression of 
the increasingly maligned Council of Ten was one of the anti-myth advocates’ favourite 
themes, drawing their most creative and condemnatory criticism. Although the Ten was 
initially held accountable to the Great Council, by the mid to late seventeenth century it was 
considered ‘more sovereign, than their Soveraign himself’.96 The Ten were also compared to 
‘the Roman Dictator, who in times of publick calamity, had all the Power of the State in his 
hand’. The Council was now so powerful that ‘they stretched their Authority so far as to 
revoke and null the Decrees of the Grand Council; and to negotiate Leagues offensive and 
Defensive with Forreign Princes unknown to the Senat’.97 Indeed, ‘the great Power which 
they exercise makes them not only venerable, but dreadful, and their Prince himself not daring 
to contradict their Decrees, they have gotten such an Empire upon the spirits of all people, 
that the very name of the Counsel of Ten well make one tremble’.98 They also condemned the 
severity and speed with which the Ten acted against anyone it deemed to be a threat. Indeed 
Amelot asserted that ‘there is no Court in the World where the Judges proceed with more 
severity against Persons accused…for this Council is so inclinable to severity, the least 
offence in matter of State is unpardonable, and very appearance passes for a crime’.99 By 
‘unpardonable’, Amelot meant that a multitude of alleged crimes against the state resulted in 
the death penalty: ‘tis said that in Athens, Draco writ all this Laws in Blood; the same may be 
said as justly of this council, in which Clemency and Mercy are Virtues unknown, where 
jealousy is incurable, distrust eternal; where great reputation dangerous; great services odious, 
and commonly requited with banishment, or death’.100 Indeed ‘the Rigour of the Council of 
Ten has been so great, there is scarce a Noble Family but produces us instances of it, and 
many of them written in Blood’.101 It was therefore hardly surprising that Amelot concluded 
that ‘this Council has become so odious to the Nobles, that they have tried all ways 
imaginable to supplant them’. This however was proving impossible as ‘this council it is, 
upon which depends the whole Oeconomy of that Government’ so that ‘this Council is the 
Corner-stone of the State, not to be stirred without destruction to the whole Fabrick’.102 
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The suggestion here is that the Venetian state could only survive as a repressive, reactive state 
that tricked people out of their liberty, maintained order through fear, and violently punished 
any who stepped out of line. The Council of Ten probably attracted such vitriol from Venice’s 
detractors because it represented key themes of the myth they sought to undermine, namely 
stability and liberty. By critiquing the Ten, they demonstrated that both of these aspects were 
a sham, since both were only maintained in appearance by a tyrannical, unaccountable 
minority tricking, oppressing and enslaving the nation. The myth and the anti-myth are 
intimately connected in the themes that they chose to engage with; of stability, liberty and 
forms of government; and yet they remain opposite sides of the same coin.  
The History and Political Theory of the Dutch Republic 
While Englishmen were presented with the myth and counter-myth through the available 
textual resources, their understanding of the Dutch Republic was informed in a somewhat 
different manner. In his Memoirs, Sir John Reresby wrote that since the Dutch Republic was 
‘so near our own country, as to be known to most persons, either by sight or relation’ that a 
‘particular and long description’ of it was not necessary.103 In 1615 a French political writer 
Guez de Balzac stated that the Dutch Revolt had provided ‘all peoples with a memorable 
example of what they can do against their Rulers’.104 Later, Hobbes made a similar point: 
Oftentimes the example of different Government in a neighbouring nation, disposeth men to 
alteration of the form [of their own]… I doubt not, but many men have been contented to see the 
late troubles in England, out of imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more to 
grow rich, than to change, as they have done, their form of government.
105
 
These quotes highlight two important distinctions between the way in which the English 
learned about the Dutch and Venetian republics. The first demonstrates that the affairs of the 
Dutch Republic were widely understood throughout England, and that this knowledge did not 
come from reading political tracts or lengthy histories, but by first or second hand experience 
of visiting the Dutch Republic. It was, after all, much more accessible to the English, being 
just a short boat trip away, and the considerable trade connections meant that people and 
knowledge could easily transfer between the two countries.
106
 Thus, whilst the English 
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learned of Venetian political institutions largely through written histories, their knowledge of 
the Dutch Republic was more likely to have come through less formal paths. Secondly, the 
words of Balzac and Hobbes suggest that the experiences of the Dutch through the Revolt and 
under their newly established republican government had a considerable impact on the 
political consciousness of the English. Again, this differs from Venice, where the focus rested 
more heavily upon the political institutions they had built.  
It is also important to remember that the political thought of the Dutch Revolt, and indeed the 
republic, was the result of continual confrontation with political reality. Rapidly shifting 
political circumstances forced thinkers regularly to reassert and extend their arguments.
107
 So 
unlike Venice, which offered a very static political narrative, the political thought of the 
Dutch republic changed and adapted over the course of many decades. The following outline 
offers an overview of the history of the Dutch Revolt and Republic, alongside an account of 
the development of its political theory. This will not, of course, be a comprehensive account 
of Dutch political theory or its theorists, but is designed instead to highlight the aspects most 
relevant to the English republicans.  
Throughout the medieval period the Low Countries was made up of a number of provinces, 
counties, and bishoprics, all of which were under the supremacy of the Holy Roman Empire. 
Only in 1548, with the Pragmatic Sanction, did the territories that made up the Netherlands 
come to form a political unit, and even then, cultural and ethnic cohesion was low across the 
region.
108
 The Netherlands was an interesting contradiction; although ruled by a largely 
absent monarch - who when the Revolt broke out was the Spanish King Philip II - they had 
maintained a distinct understanding of their relationship with him that over the years had 
become enshrined in a few key documents, such as the ‘Great Privilege’ and the ‘Joyous 
Entry’, both of which confirmed and guaranteed the ‘liberties’ of the provinces, their separate 
customs and laws.
109
 These became known as ‘privileges’ and ought not to be underestimated 
in the history the Dutch Revolt and that nation’s subsequent government.110 Although 
tensions in the Netherlands erupted over issues of taxation and religion, the political 
justification for the Revolt came to centre around three key issues: privileges, liberty, and 
States. A number of pamphlets protested against the alleged violation of the privileges and 
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liberties of the country, and were infused with a more active call to resistance.
111
 For instance, 
in A Defence and true Declaration of the things lately done in the Low Country, which was 
translated into English and published in 1571, the author powerfully asserted that the 
foundation of the Dutch political order was a trinity of liberty, with privileges as the 
constitutional guarantees of liberty, and the States as the guardians of the privileges.
112
 This 
led to the conclusion that the prince should be regarded a ‘subject’ to the power of the States. 
It was also the first pamphlet openly to hold Philip II himself responsible for the trouble and 
tyranny afflicting the Netherlands.
113
 Eventually, this trinity of liberty, privileges and States 
was developed into a refined constitutional argument that concluded that the Netherlands was 
not a monarchy, but a republic; in particular the Address and Opening to make a Good, 




This early focus on the traditions and powers of each province, as well as on the specific 
limitations of the power of a sovereign, eventually developed into the commitment to 
provincial sovereignty and decentralised federal government that is evident in the Dutch form 
of republican government, set down most clearly in the Union of Utrecht in 1579.
115
 This was 
considered the founding charter of the United Provinces, and it was intended that the union 
should function as a league of several sovereign provinces, basically as a confederacy of 
states rather than a federal state. The closest thing the Dutch had to a written constitution, it 
proclaimed that the Dutch provinces should ‘form an alliance, confederation and union among 
themselves as if they constituted only one province’, and that ‘each province and the 
individual cities, members and inhabitants therof shall retain undiminished its special rights 
and particular privileges’.116 Subsequently, in July 1590, the States General was declared ‘the 
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sovereign institution of this country…[which] has no overlord except the deputies of the 
Provincial States’.117 
Moreover, the right of disobedience inherent in these political tracts evolved into the 
articulation of a political right of resistance, which allowed the inhabitants to disobey and 
oppose by force a prince who violated the privileges, and, by means of their representatives, 
the States, to replace him with a regent.
118
 In framing their political thought in such a way, the 
Dutch legitimised their actions against the Spanish king. In 1581 the Act of Abjuration was 
passed which formally rejected Philip II as ruler of the Netherlands. This is not to say that 
monarchy was completely rejected at this point; the Dutch continued to invite foreign princes 
or monarchs to take the position of sovereign. Most notably, the Duke of Anjou was invited to 
become Prince and Lord of the Netherlands in 1581, albeit with severely constrained powers. 
After Anjou’s failure, the Dutch approached Queen Elizabeth I of England, who chose to send 
the Earl of Leicester in her stead, accompanied by 7000 troops. This was also a disaster.
119
 
This final experience awoke the Dutch to the fact that they had no need for a foreign ruler, 
leading the way to the establishment of a sovereign republic. Maurice of Nassau, stadholder 
of Holland since 1585, and Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, advocate of Holland since 1586, 
became the leading figures in the United Provinces. Holland became the natural leader of the 
republic, and under its leadership, the Republic began functioning as a viable confederacy.
120
 
In 1609 the Twelve Year Peace was agreed, giving the Dutch Republic its first respite since 
its creation and allowing it to flourish and prosper without the threat of constant war.  
The abjuration had sparked a lively debate among pamphleteers regarding the form of 
government the new state should take. Proponents of an aristocratic republic looked towards 
Venice or Sparta, while those who envisioned more popular government looked towards the 
Swiss Cantons or ancient Athens.
121
 A 1590 pamphlet by Simon Stevin made the United 
Provinces a democratic republic, while Pieter Corneliszoon Brederode, a diplomat, argued in 
1607 that at present only the democratic aspect of government existed, and that the rest of the 
elements of a mixed constitution needed to be incorporated into the Dutch polity. Brederode 
believed that a proper aristocratic element – that is a Council of State, that could act 
independently of the States assemblies – over which Prince Maurice (then stadholder) would 
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preside as ‘head and perpetual dictator’, was still missing.122 Ultimately, the Dutch republic 
most resembled a tight-knit oligarchy. A closed ruling class known as regents governed the 
provincial towns in their States, with the nobility making up only a small minority of those 
termed regents; nonetheless, historians have often been at pains to suggest that the closed 
oligarchy still represented the voice of the people.
123
 The town councils sent delegates to the 
Provincial States, usually with strict instructions regarding how to vote and debate on issues. 
For this reason, there was often much back and forth between various political bodies, since 
the delegates could not make autonomous decisions beyond their prescribed remit. The same 
process applied at national level; delegates to the States General from the Provincial States 
were bound by the same limits. Although this decentralised system served the ideal of 
provincial sovereignty, it was not practical when decisions needed to be made in a timely 
manner. This applied particularly to financial and military matters during periods of conflict. 
As such, the stadholder took on an increased degree of executive power over such matters, 
while other tasks were delegated to experienced councils or ‘colleges’, freeing up the States 
General to deal with the everyday tasks of government.  
The Dutch Revolt and the subsequent establishment of the republic created a strong emotional 
need for examples and justifications from the past.
124
 The Batavian myth was the result of this 
search for legitimisation. The connection between the ancient Batavi people and the Dutch 
people was drawn in the early sixteenth century, when scholars sought to prove that the 
Batavi had, in Roman times, settled in various parts of the region: for instance, Cornelius 
Aurelius, a cleric from Gouda, composed Defensio gloriae Batavinae in 1516, outlined that 
the Batavi were exclusively from the Holland region.
125
 Later scholars like Paulus Merula 
found a prototype for seventeenth-century Holland in the ‘republic’ of ancient Batavians.126  
Of course, the most famous account of the Batavian myth was produced by Hugo Grotius in 
his Liber de antiquitate reipublicae Batavicae of 1610.
127
 Grotius was born in 1583 in Delft, 
Holland, into a regent family. He was directly involved in the political life of the Dutch 
Republic from an early age, and eventually became official historiographer for the States of 
Holland in 1601. In his account of the myth, Grotius outlined the exemplary way that the 
Batavi had organised their government. The timing of the publication was unlikely to have 
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been an accident. The twelve year truce had just been signed and the fledgling republic 
needed legitimisation from the best possible sources.
128
 Grotius theorised that since the Batavi 
were numerous enough to provide auxiliaries to the Romans, they would necessarily have had 
enough to settle in a number of cities. These cities, he suggests, like all other Germanic 
communities, were governed by the best citizens, elected for life to represent the mass of 
those whose daily work left them too busy for politics. Further, since there was a Germanic 
tradition of tribal assemblies (concillia) the Batavian communities must also have had their 
delegates settle between them the main issues of the nation. He therefore proposed an 
unbroken institutional continuity, from the Batavians through to the modern Netherlands and 
in doing so made the Batavi a symbol of genuinely republican government in the United 
Provinces.
129
 Grotius’s theory became widely accepted, particularly among the educated 
classes, to whom it furnished unexpected support for the belief that the regents’ rule in 
Holland was the best of governments because it was the oldest.
130
  
Grotius also produced de iure belli ac pacis in March 1625, in which he argued that the 
liberty of a republic was lost if it fell under the rule of a single individual.
131
 Later experiences 
of the Dutch would suggest there was some truth in this statement.   William II of Orange had 
succeeded his father Frederick Henry as stadholder in 1647, but his leadership was short 
lived. After an attempted coup d’état against Amsterdam in 1650, brought about over disputes 
regarding the Treaty of Münster and size of the army, his reputation suffered and considerable 
resentment brewed, especially in Holland, against the stadholderate. His actions had 
threatened the constitutional balance within the republic, which navigated a purposefully 
ambiguous line regarding the location of sovereignty, which overlapped between the States 
and the stadholder. In an unexpected turn of events, William died suddenly in November 
1650, leaving behind no living successor, just an unborn child to his widow, Mary Stuart. 
With the actions of the stadholder still fresh in their memory, the leaders of Holland decided 
that it was no longer preferable to elect a stadholder and the Orange family was essentially 
overthrown.
132
 Importantly, Dutch struggles with the figurehead of the Orange stadholder 
occurred almost simultaneously with England’s troubles with the Stuarts. 
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But the Hollanders still needed a leader to help unite a hugely diverse array of needs and 
interests both within Holland and across the Republic. They chose to make Johan de Witt 
Grand Pensionary of Holland. This position was very clearly as a servant of the state, and 
foreign diplomats regularly described him as the ‘prime minister’. He was not head of the 
government, since the States of Holland was his master.
133
 This is not to suggest that 
everyone was happy about the rejection of the Orange family, who had traditionally occupied 
the semi-monarchical, semi-hereditary position of the stadholderate. In fact, the provinces 
remained divided, both between themselves and internally regarding this shift in position. In 
order to justify and politically theorise the new form of republic, De Witt published his 
Deduction, or Declaration of the States of Holland in which he argued that true freedom 
rested on the principle that full absolute sovereignty is vested in the States of the respective 
provinces, together with the indisputable right and unlimited power to resolve all matters not 
explicitly reserved to the States General by the 1579 Union of Utrecht. It was the first 
elaboration of the theory of government without an ‘eminent head’, the term used by De Witt 
to describe the role of the stadholder rather than the title, which would become known by its 
adherents as ‘True Freedom’. 134 But alongside the theorising of the rejection of an ‘eminent 
head’, True Freedom also incorporated a theory of provincial sovereignty. Within this, 
government fell largely to the regents, the Dutch name for members of the town governments. 
They held their positions for life, and new entries after a death were made by cooptative 
election by the other regents.
135
 Legally, all could become regents but in reality it was only 
possible through marrying into established regent families, and it became increasingly 
oligarchic towards the end of the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century.
136
 
The De la Court’s two most famous works, Political Balance and Political Discourses, were 
both published after Johan’s death in 1660.137 They also produced The Interest of Holland 
(1662), which De Witt is also thought to have had a hand in composing. These are considered 
to be the first clear expressions of a distinctly Dutch republican theory.
138
 It was their 
foremost concern to show that it was possible for the republic to be governed without a single 
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figurehead and to show how such a regime could be given a degree of stability.
139
 As such, 
there was strong criticism of the House of Orange. The De la Courts also rejected the concept 
of mixed government in order to strengthen the position of the States against the 
stadholderate.
140
 Haitsma Mulier paints a picture of the De la Courts as emphatically in favour 
of a popular state with all citizens who were cultivated, virtuous and rich capable of being 
chosen for office. The great assembly of all male residents who qualified for citizenship 
possessed sovereignty. Group interests must not come to dominate; the ideal was that each 
individual decided for himself on behalf of the well-being of the state and thus displayed his 
‘virtue’ without representing the interests of a specific category.141 
The concept of interest was not entirely new; what the de la Courts offered was a 
reinterpretation of an older theory that was nonetheless distinctly Dutch. The use of interest as 
a moral and political concept was expounded by thinkers including Francesco Guicciardini, 
Giovanni Botero and the Duc d’Rohan, and became conceptualised as ‘reason of state’. It 
referred to the idea that the survival and well-being of the state was paramount, and all the 
actions of government should be directed to this end.
 
Moreover, it understood that human 
action was informed almost universally motivated by self-interest.
142
 For the ruler, interest 
was state interest, defined in opposition to the interests of other states, but more importantly 
to the particular preferences and passions of the ruler.
143
 However, it is with Machiavelli and 
in particular The Prince that reason of state has come to be associated. The Prince is famously 
known for arguing that in order to ensure the stability of the state, illegal or immoral actions 
might be undertaken. So in pursuit of the greater good and the survival and success of the 
state, almost any action appeared to become justifiable. It is worth noting, here, that despite 
the notorious reputation Machiavelli gained from this publication, recent work by Skinner has 
done much to offer a more complex and forgiving understanding of both man and text.
144
 
Scholars such as Haitsma Mulier have highlighted the evident influence of Machiavelli on the 
works of Dutch writers, particularly the De la Courts, but Arthur Weststeijn has argued that 
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his influence is more ambivalent than hitherto assumed.
145
 Furthermore, Wootton 
demonstrates that the concept of interest that existed in the Dutch Republic was presented by 
Traiano Boccalini as a new type of politics, one directly opposed to the reason of state 
advocated by princes; his politics represented an updated version of Machiavelli’s.146 Dutch 
interest theory was therefore more innovative than a simple borrowing of traditional European 
understandings of the concept; the ways in which this theory was put to use will be explored 
further in Chapter 5.  
Conclusions 
Setting out the ways in which knowledge about the Dutch and Venetian republics reached 
English republicans like Harrington, Milton, and Neville, demonstrates the value in the 
approach this thesis takes. For the most part, these republican figures had first-hand 
experience of either the Venetian or the Dutch Republics, and in some cases both. The 
influence of this should not be underestimated, even if it is difficult to pin down definitively. 
The histories of these governments and outlines of their political constitution set down in 
written form and transmitted to England further demonstrate that these republics were not 
isolated intellectually. They helped inform and influence English understandings of how 
republican government could function in different contexts in the contemporary world. There 
were differences between the English, Dutch and Venetian countries, peoples, and forms of 
government, but these did not prevent English thinkers from engaging with and utilising the 
lessons that could be learned from their European neighbours. The subsequent chapters will 
examine the various ways in which Harrington, Milton, Nedham, Neville and Sidney used the 
examples of the Dutch and Venetian models and ideas of republicanism to inform and support 
their own distinctive understandings of what English republicanism should look like.  
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Chapter 2: Debating Single Person Government 
 
In the ancient world, res publica was simply taken to mean one of the three good forms of 
government, one of which could of course be a monarchy.
1
 The position, role and powers of a 
king were increasingly debated over the course of the English civil wars; however, after the 
execution of the king the position of a single person within England’s republican constitution 
became even more crucial to the debates. Significantly, the two most powerful contemporary 
republics in Europe in the mid-seventeenth century both had individual figureheads. Venice 
had the Doge, an elected position that nonetheless was recognised in several political tracts to 
be the monarchical element of a mixed republican constitution.
2
 The Dutch had chosen to 
continue selecting stadholders even after the Spanish king had long since lost his power over 
the United Provinces; moreover, they continued to nominate from within the Orange family, 
giving the position a quasi-monarchical element. On the continent, then, the position of a 
single person within a republican government was a generally accepted norm. The English 
republican tradition therefore appears to have placed considerably more emphasis on the 
rejection of monarchy and single person rule than did its European counterparts.  
Evidence of this can be demonstrated by looking at John Milton’s republicanism. The 
sincerity of Milton's republicanism has been called into question, particularly by Worden and 
Thomas Corns, precisely because of his reluctance to commit to non-monarchical 
republicanism.
3
 As understandings of republicanism have evolved and diversified, so 
understandings of Milton's position have deepened. Martin Dzelzainis, for instance, has 
argued that Milton showed a ‘high degree of indifference to constitutional forms’ and that 
Scott’s understanding of republicanism as a moral tradition might provide a more enlightened 
approach to Milton’s political beliefs.4 In other words, a narrow, exclusionist definition of 
republicanism has undermined Milton’s republican credentials. By looking at Milton’s 
commitment to ‘a politics of virtue’, Dzelzainis has demonstrated that Milton’s commitment 
to republican thought was present from the mid-1640s, whereby Of Education can be viewed 
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as a ‘republican moment’ that brings together, for the first time in a political context, the 
themes that would dominate his future writings.
5
  
By defining republicanism in a more pluralistic manner and looking beyond the exclusionist 
narrative, we can make better sense of Milton’s place in the republican tradition. It will also 
enable a further contribution to the debates surrounding the consistency of Milton’s political 
thought throughout the 1640s and especially the 1650s. Questions of consistency have 
similarly been asked of Milton’s contemporary, Marchamont Nedham, a man who was able to 
change his political allegiances at an astonishing rate; writing first for the Parliamentarians 
during the First Civil War, switching to Charles’ cause in 1647 just in time for the monarch’s 
acceleration towards failure and execution, and finally coming back to writing for the 
Commonwealth and Protectorate. Even after the Restoration he attempted to switch sides 
once more, albeit with less success than he had previously found. Described by Anthony 
Wood as a ‘weather-cock’ who valued ‘money and sordid Interest rather than Conscience, 
friendship or love to his Prince’, it is then understandable that the interpretation of Nedham as 
disloyal and unscrupulous has stood as his ‘unofficial epitaph’.6 
However, Nedham's posthumous reputation has undergone a transformation in recent years 
from one of the flakiest propagandists of the mid-seventeenth century to being placed centre 
stage as one of the most important republican thinkers of the period. This shift began, as so 
many others, with J.G.A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment, which declared that in spite 
of his moral flexibility, Nedham was important for producing ‘the first sustained English 
exposition of republican democracy in classical and Machiavellian terms’.7 Joad Raymond 
also sees Nedham as a key figure in the history of republicanism, arguing that although he 
compromised his republican principles when he wrote for the Cromwellian Protectorate, he 
maintained certain republican positions throughout the 1650s, including ideas of freedom, 
religious conscience, and separation of the legislative and executive branches of government.
8
 
Worden went a step further, declaring that Nedham had been an avowed adherent to classical 
models of republicanism from 1647 through to the Restoration and perhaps even beyond. 
Whilst his public face might have been forced through circumstance to adopt unsavoury 
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positions, in private he remained true to his beliefs throughout the Interregnum.
9
 Whilst these 
views have been on the whole accepted by historians, Jonathan Scott’s suggestion that 
Nedham had been a committed republican and Leveller from as early as the closing months of 
1644 has received some criticism and has been described by Jason McElligott as 
‘unconvincing’.10 Thus, whilst there are limits as to how far we can push the interpretation of 
Nedham as a committed republican throughout his life, it is clear that Nedham has been 
increasingly read by historians as a committed republican at least from the later 1640s whose 
royalism has been invariably described as a ‘guise’ or a ‘phase’.11  
Harrington’s associations with royalism and monarchy have done little to undermine the 
interpretation of his thought as purely republican. In The Commonwealth of Oceana, he set 
out a formula that demonstrated how the form a government should take related directly to the 
distribution of land within a nation. In England, the ownership of land had shifted into the 
hands of the people, and subsequently the balance of power ought to rest with them.
12
 
However, in focusing too closely on this, Harrington’s earlier interactions with the Stuarts 
have been dismissed or, where acknowledged, have rarely been incorporated into an 
interpretation of Harrington’s political thought. Hammersley has been at the forefront of 
attempts to counter this trend; much of her recent work has argued that there was indeed a 
role for a monarchical element in a Harringtonian vision for England’s future.13  
This chapter will trace Milton, Nedham and finally Harrington’s attitudes to single person 
government through their references to single person rule in both the Dutch and Venetian 
republics. Paying attention to this aspect of their analyses of the Dutch and Venetian models 
will demonstrate that a narrow definition of republic as anti-monarchical is too simplistic; by 
tracing their attitudes to single person government, it is possible to see that not only were 
differing definitions of republic used - at some times to refer to an ideal mixed government 
with space for a single ruler, and at others to mean non-monarchical government - but that at 
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least some English republicans drew a distinction between ‘name king’ and ‘thing king’ prior 
to the execution of the king.  
Rejecting the ‘Name King’ 
While debates surrounding republicanism have come to rest on the binary distinction between 
republicanism as non-monarchical versus the broader definition of government for the 
common good, a second layer of debate has been added to this. With regards to the Levellers 
in the 1640s, Rachel Foxley has pointed out that there were divisions between those who were 
more alarmed by the person of the king and those who were more concerned about 
monarchical power.
14
 Similarly, John Gurney has shown that Gerard Winstanley developed 
the distinction between kingly office and kingly power, the latter of which had been allowed 
to survive the establishment of the republic.
15
 Indeed, Nedham made this distinction himself 
in Mercurius Politicus defining it as the difference between the ‘name King’ and the ‘thing 
king’.16 This is the distinction between the political office of monarch, and the more abstract 
notion of monarchical interest, a concept that is difficult to define because of the sheer 
diversity of opinions regarding what this kingly power or interest entailed. However, in 
considering the different ways in which kingly power and kingly office were conceptualised 
and by applying this to republican thought in the 1640s and 1650s, we can get closer to 
understanding their republican beliefs and, thereby, the nature of English republicanism.  
In February 1649, only weeks after the execution of Charles I, Milton published The Tenure 
of Kings and Magistrates. Milton was initially somewhat vague about his understanding of 
the position of a single person within a constitution in his early tracts. This is perhaps not 
surprising; the regicide was an unexpected and unprecedented occurrence, and the future of 
English government was by no means decided as Milton penned this tract. It was not until 
March that the government declared the official abolition of the monarchy, and not until May 
that England was declared to be a commonwealth or free state.
17
 Thus The Tenure was more a 
justification of England’s actions rather than any comment about a potential republican 
government. In order to legitimise their actions, Milton drew upon the experiences of other 
times and places that had faced similar circumstances. The Dutch Republic provided Milton 
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with examples of both contemporaneous and relevant political turmoil as well as 
constitutional ways in which such turmoil could be prevented and durable government 
established. Both the Dutch and English nations had recently dealt with a monarch 
overstepping the accepted boundaries of their power, resulting in protracted civil war in both 
nations. As a result, much of Milton’s admiration for the United Provinces centred on the fact 
that, like the English, they had overcome a tyrannical prince in the pursuit of liberty. In The 
Tenure, Milton argued that it was lawful to call tyrants to account, if necessary to depose 
them, and even put them to death. He outlined the achievements of the Dutch Republic in 
declaring its independence from the Spanish:  
In the yeare 1581. The States of Holland in a general Assembly at the Hague abjur’d all obedience 
and subjection to Philip King of Spaine; and in a Declaration justifie thir so doing; for that by his 
tyrannous government against faith so many times giv’n and brok’n he had lost his right to all the 




The Dutch had been subject to a tyrannical government and had fought to attain their 
freedom; having done so, they considered it entirely lawful to name another to take his place. 
The ‘name king’ did not therefore at this point cause any problems either to the Dutch or to 
Milton in terms of viewing that nation as a free commonwealth; this therefore sits with the 
wider understanding of republicanism as a mixed government that combined the best forms of 
rule. At this point in time, Milton had no reason to argue against monarchy in general; his 
issue was with tyranny. Although he did not draw explicit parallels between the way in which 
the Dutch and the English dealt with their tyrannical monarchs, the inclusion of them in his 
tracts suggests at least an implicit affinity with the Dutch and the struggles they had endured. 
Both were considered legitimate ways of holding tyrants accountable, and therefore their 
actions in overthrowing these monarchs were comparable. That Milton was perhaps aware 
that these parallels might not be well received is suggested in The Tenure when he 
encouraged the Dutch ‘not to look with an evil and prejudicial eye upon their Neighbours 
walking by the same rule’.19 
He was right to be cautious. In the 1640s, Parliament had been fairly successful in acquiring 
popular support in the Dutch Republic. However, the execution by the English of an anointed 
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monarch caused a radical turn in Dutch public opinion.
20
 Feelings of horror and distaste 
promptly turned to action when Oliver St. John and Walter Strickland, two English 
ambassadors, arrived in the United Provinces only to be attacked by Orangist crowds at The 
Hague. European distaste was put into words in Claudius Salmasius’s Defensio Regia (1649) 
and Pierre Du Moulin’s Regii Sanguinis Clamor (1652). Both offered a condemnation of the 
execution of Charles I, as well as a call to arms of the monarchies of Europe against the 
English Republic.
21
 Salmasius called the execution of Charles a parricide ‘committed by a 
nefarious conspiracy of impious men’ who had declared war on humanity itself. He 
condemned any comparison between the heinous acts of the English and the legal overthrow 
of Philip II, insisting that ‘what they [the English] did and what the Hollanders [did]…differs 
as ink differs from milk’.22 Du Moulin’s tract provided a less scholarly, more cutting attack 
on the actions of the English; he also referred to the regicide as a parricide, going so far as to 
state that ‘compared with this, the crime of the Jews in crucifying Christ was nothing’.23 
Feelings evidently ran deep across Europe at the execution of an anointed monarch; even 
implicit connections between the actions of the Dutch and the English were powerfully and 
efficiently condemned.  
But neither Salmasius nor Du Moulin settled for condemnation. They both sought to explain 
why the abjuration of Philip could not be equated to the regicide of Charles, and did so in a 
similar way. Salmasius argued that the Dutch actions during the Revolt were entirely justified, 
because the Hollanders had always been a free people, and had not deposed a king, but a 
Count of their own election, who simply happened to be sovereign of another country. The 
English, on the other hand, had always been subjected to kings, and had therefore revolted 
against the King’s lawful power.24 Du Moulin’s argument followed the same trajectory; he 
declared that: 
the greatest of all injuries was done to the Dutch Federation by this defection and parricide, 
especially when it did not shame the Independents to compare their foul deeds of the Dutch for 
liberty. If the whole matter were looked into the Dutch never had a king, but a count.
25
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Like Salmasius, Du Moulin argued that the Dutch experience was entirely different because 
‘supreme authority and the power of life and death were not in the possession of the count or 
duke, except as he shared them with the people’, whereas in England ‘the Parliaments have 
been called and dissolved at the will of the king; for the king had sole and solid power without 
the Parliament, but the Parliament without the king has no power’.26 Thus their distinction 
between the English and Dutch experiences ultimately came down to a distinction between 
the name of monarch and monarchical powers; Salmasius and Du Moulin both argued that the 
English monarch had possessed both, whereas they had elected a ruler for themselves, who 
had no sovereign power in and of himself within the United Provinces. This distinction 
therefore made any parallels between the actions of the two nations fundamentally false and 
extremely offensive. 
After Salmasius’s tract, Milton published his first Defence of the People of England, in which 
he sought to rebut the arguments of his antagonist. Published in 1651, the circumstances had 
evidently changed significantly since The Tenure; England had been a commonwealth free of 
single person rule for two years. In the Defence, Milton continued to imply that the actions of 
the English and the Dutch were related: ‘Could you forget the Dutch, whose republic, after 
they had driven out the Spanish king in long wars successfully waged, by glorious courage 
won her freedom?’.27 Here, however, there is no suggestion of any other legitimate form of 
king for the Dutch; indeed, the distinction appears to be drawn quite clearly between the name 
of the ‘Spanish king’ and the ‘freedom’ of the commonwealth that had since been established. 
How Milton feels about the ‘thing king’ is still not clear, but he appears to have rejected the 
idea of the name king from as early as 1651.  
However, while events in England had transpired to allow Milton to reject the name of king 
and draw a distinction between the office of king and free government, relations between the 
English and the Dutch also developed in such a way that Milton had to deny explicitly that the 
English were following in the footsteps of the Dutch. In his first Defence Milton actively 
rejected the claim that the English had ‘attempt[ed] to justify’ their actions ‘by the example of 
the Dutch’, and in the Second Defence he denied denying that the English ‘considered it 
necessary to emulate’ the Dutch.28 Placing these Defences in their context goes some way to 
resolve the contradiction between the implicit connections between the English and Dutch 
actions in Milton’s writings and his explicit rejection of such connections. When he wrote the 
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first Defence, tensions between England and the Dutch Republic were escalating, particularly 
after the Dutch had rejected the idea of a political union between the two commonwealths 
proposed by the Rump parliament.
29
 War was on the horizon, and Milton may have realised 
that continuing to draw comparisons between the abjuration and the regicide could only 
exacerbate the conflict between the two commonwealths. After all, the Dutch Republic was 
the most likely potential ally for the English, considering the similarities between the two, 
namely their republican nature, their Protestantism, and their mutual reliance on maritime 
affairs. By the time he came to publish the Second Defence, the war was drawing to a close, 
and antagonising the Dutch would again be far from prudent. Thus Milton’s attempt to 
distance himself from his initial use of the Dutch as a tool of justification may have 
represented political prudence in difficult international circumstances. This is further 
supported by the fact that Milton took his denials too far, claiming that ‘the English see no 
need for them to justify their own deeds by the example of any foreigners whatever’.30 He 
continued these denials in his Second Defence, stating that ‘he is mistaken who supposes that 
we depend upon anyone’s example’. He also argued that ‘if any brave deed must be done on 
behalf of liberty, we are our own exemplars, accustomed to lead, not to follow others’.31 This 
was demonstrably not true; Milton’s political tracts were full of examples - biblical, ancient 
and modern - of other nations resisting tyrants and establishing commonwealths. It is by 
acknowledging that Milton was protesting a little too much that we are able to reconcile his 
two positions with regards to the Dutch.  
Rejecting the ‘Thing King’ 
The Dutch Republic did not just have the Spanish king to contend with in regards to single 
person government. They also had a stadholder, a position traditionally held by the House of 
Orange, who acted as a figurehead that could unite the seven diverse Provinces that made up 
the Dutch Republic. Politically and military, his position was somewhat vague and 
undefined.
32
 Also significant was the fact that there were strong familial connections between 
the Houses of Orange and Stuart that led to natural comparisons between the two. Charles I 
and William II of Orange were, after all, related by marriage. The marriage of Charles’s 
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daughter Mary to William, who at the time was simply the son of the presiding stadholder 
Frederick Henry, in 1641 had significantly improved the prestige of the House of Orange in 
the courts of Europe, as it was the first time they had married into a major royal line. Later, in 
1644, the Stuarts proposed yet another marriage between the two families.
33
 However, the 
Dutch had made only minor gestures of support for the royalist cause during the first civil 
war. England’s queen, Henrietta Maria, had fled to the Netherlands in search of financial and 
military support for her husband’s cause in the civil war.34 The Dutch were characteristically 
reluctant to get involved in a foreign war, particularly considering their continuing conflict 
and negotiations with Spain; even after William II became stadholder in 1647 and a peace 
treaty with Spain had been signed, William was far more interested in resuming the fight than 
supporting his father-in-law. However, in 1648, Charles II had sought refuge with his brother-
in-law at The Hague, and was still residing there when the news reached him of his father’s 
execution. Even without really getting involved in England’s civil war, the familial 
connections between the Houses of Orange and Stuart meant that connections continued to be 
drawn between the two republics. 
Nedham’s first foray into political writing came about in his parliamentarian newsbook 
Mercurius Britanicus.
35
 It was in this newsbook that Nedham demonstrated that he did not 
view the position of stadholder as the ‘name King’ within the Dutch constitution, arguing that 
it was ‘false…that the Prince of Orange is King of the Netherlands, or that he intends to make 
himselfe’.36 He recognised that the stadholderate did not possess sovereignty in the same way 
as the English king did. Nonetheless, he drew distinct connections between the political 
positions of the houses of Stuart and Orange. He argued that the Dutch people shared the 
‘same common interest with them, and fights against the same tyrannie and popery’. 
Although this reference to tyranny could have been about Philip II, Nedham actually had a 
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different target in mind when he immediately warned the Dutch that ‘Oranges may do as 
much harme in Holland as Lemmons have done in England’.37 Nedham therefore anticipated 
the danger that the stadholderate might pose to liberty in the Dutch Republic. After all the 
Stuarts, or Lemons, had gradually sought to rule without parliament, increasing their own 
power and hampering the liberty of the people. The result was the messy civil war 
subsequently being fought all across England. So while the houses of Stuart and Orange were 
dissimilar in the fact that they were not both actually monarchs, their positions within their 
respective constitutions resembled the ‘thing king’ enough that they both posed a danger to 
liberty.  
What Nedham recognised from very early on was that abolishing the ‘name king’ was not 
enough to guarantee the freedom of the people. He perceived that retaining within the 
constitution any form of kingly power or monarchical interest was to the detriment of liberty, 
because it always had the potential to degenerate to such an extent that the office of king 
could in fact return, and tyranny be re-established over the population. As early as 1646, 
Nedham warned that the Dutch needed to open their eyes and recognise the danger that was 
facing them:  
So now they cannot choose but perceive also how much they are beholden to their kind Prince of 
Orange, and what eye they ought to have over him for the future, when for his own ambitious end, 
the greatening himself by alliance with a neighbour Monarch, he will steer his course in such a line 
as is absolutely Diametricall to the Publick Interest of that State.
38
  
He stated that the United Provinces ‘are free states, and know the miseries of tyranny and 
slavery, and are looking a little behind them at their Prince of Orange; and wish they had not 
let him into so deep an interest’.39 Nedham was therefore arguing that the position of the 
Prince of Orange represented the potential for tyranny. The very existence of this potential for 
tyranny was a threat to the liberty of the people, and to truly call themselves a commonwealth, 
this threat must be removed.
40
  Thus, he hoped that ‘Holland it self…may yet learn to be 
wiser, and never suffer their teeth to be set on edge any more with sowre Orange’.41  That 
Nedham perceived there was tyranny, or at the very least the potential for tyranny, in the 
Dutch Republic remained consistent into his royalist writings. After switching to support the 
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king in 1647, Nedham founded his second newsbook, Mercurius Pragmaticus.
42
 In this he 
sought to degrade the reputation of the parliamentarians; he accused them of trying to turn 
England ‘from a glorious Monarchy…in to Dutch modell, from the subjection of a King to the 
arbitrary vassalage of a free-state’.43 This perception of the Dutch is actually entirely 
consistent with Nedham’s political position in the 1640s regarding single person government. 
Although he described the United Provinces as ostensibly ‘free states’, he also recognised that 
the Dutch were fully aware of ‘the miseries of tyranny and slavery’ imposed by the House of 
Orange.
44
 Nedham consistently recognised that the Dutch were subjected to dangers within 
their republic that threatened the liberty of the people.  
The danger that Nedham recognised in the stadholderate was most expressly suggested 
through the family’s ambition, and how marrying into the Stuart family, his ‘neighbour 
monarch’, had increased the political prestige granted to the House of Orange across Europe  
due to it being bonded to a powerful royal line. He perceived that this would only lead to 
increasing danger for the Dutch, because now the passions of ambition would be lit under the 
Orange family – a remarkable bit of foresight considering William II’s actions only a few 
years later. The Prince of Orange had been ‘let into so deep an interest’ that he represented a 
position that was ‘absolutely Diametricall to the Publick Interest of that State’.45 By allowing 
the stadholderate to pursue its own ambition, they moved increasingly away from the public 
interest and towards the pursuit of their own private interest. Ambition was symptomatic of 
private interest, the pursuit of which would override the public good and endanger the 
existence of the commonwealth. The position of the stadholderate was therefore increasingly 
irreconcilable with the public interest. Nedham’s use of interest theory in the 1640s has only 
recently been acknowledged by historians.
46
 What it reveals is that even before the regicide 
and the establishment of a republic in England, Nedham was reflecting on the position of a 
single person within the constitution and finding it severely problematic. This therefore 
challenges Foxley’s assertion that Nedham only began to condemn the ‘thing King’ in the 
1650s
47
; rather, what my approach shows is that Nedham theorised the removal of an 
individual leader from a constitution several years before England was even contemplating 
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any such action against the English monarch.
48
 There is a general acceptance by historians 
that the execution of the king was a last resort, when negotiations had completely broken 
down and no suitable alternative monarch could be found to take Charles’s place.49 This has 
led scholars to present English republicanism as a consequence rather than a cause of the 
regicide.
50
 By examining Nedham’s approach to single person government through his 
attitude to the Dutch and House of Orange, we can suggest that for Nedham at least, 
republican thought was evident from considerably before the king lost his head. 
Kingly Power: A Time and a Place 
To demonstrate his assertion that kingly power degenerated into kingly office, or the ‘name 
king’, Nedham had to look no further than the example of the Orange family. More 
importantly, in order to prove that something degenerated, it was also necessary to prove that 
something had once been good. Nedham first demonstrated this through his representation of 
the Orange family. In his third newsbook, commissioned by the English government in 1650, 
Nedham actually outlined a positive description of the Orange family, the only one anywhere 
in his political writings. It features in a discussion of the correlation between wealth and 
tyranny, in which he argued that government in free states was ‘less Luxurious, than Kings or 
Grandees use to be’ and that ‘where Luxury takes place, there is as natural a tendency to 
Tyranny’.51 He then proved this maxim with reference to the Dutch: 
If we look nearer home to such Free-States as are now in being, we find the United Provinces, 
while under a Tyranny, to abound in luxurious Govenors and people, but much alter’d upon the 
very first appearance of Liberty, insomuch that Luxury and Tyranny flying both away together, 
they have livd ever since in a sober parcimonious condition (yet wealthy) under a grave and serious 
Government by the people. And the Family of Orange it selfe (before it grew corrupt) was in every 
respect suited unto this popular Form.
52
  
Nedham followed this with a lengthy extract from Fulke Greville’s life of Sir Philip Sidney, 
published in 1652, which gave an account of the sober nature of ‘Prince William the founder 
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of their liberty’, including his humble mode of dress and personality. Showing ‘no outward 
signe of degree of merit, [none] could have discovered the inequality of his worth or estate 
from that multitude’. The lesson to take here, is that ‘an outward passage of inward 
Greatnesse, which in a popular state is worth the observing’.53 William the Silent had 
therefore been suitable to the Dutch constitution, with its sober commitment to liberty, 
because its stadholder and founder also possessed that characteristic.  
Again this attitude mirrors a similar comment Nedham had made in Mercurius Pragmaticus 
in which he accused the parliamentarians of unleashing a devastating civil war just ‘to bring 
the King into the same posture with a Dutch burgomaster, as if there could be no good 
fellowship in the Kingdome unless he go in and out before us, as one of our companion’.54 
Although from a royalist perspective this would have been considered most likely as a 
comedic and almost farcical position to envisage a monarch in, viewed from the perspective 
of Nedham the republican, it appears to reinforce a consistency in his political beliefs. He 
praised the only member of the Orange family whom he believed demonstrated inward 
greatness and virtue, rather than a gaudy display of outward wealth, which corrupted the 
position of ‘thing king’, through the pursuit of private interest, into the ‘name king’. In this 
way, Nedham was able to argue that ‘the Family of Orange it selfe (before it grew corrupt) 
was in every respect suited unto this popular Form’.55  
Through tracing the degeneration of the stadholderate from ‘thing king’, and by 
understanding how Nedham conceptualised this degeneration, we can draw three hypotheses. 
Firstly, that single person government can start off as good rule, and that a person of 
exceptional virtue in a time of exceptional political circumstances might be exactly what a 
nation needs to thrive. Secondly, that the perpetuation of this single person government 
contributes to the likelihood of its corruption, since personal interest gradually erodes concern 
for the public good, leading in turn to tyranny. Thirdly, that this degeneration into private 
interest could be most visibly perceived through excessive material consumption. 
Nedham was proved right in 1648. In the months and years immediately following the Peace 
of Münster, the Dutch continued to battle with William II and his ambition; William wanted 
to restart the war with Spain and also sought to increase his own personal power. He acted 
upon this desire in an attempted coup d’état on Amsterdam. After Nedham’s return to the 
parliamentarian cause, he invoked the attempted coup to continue his warnings against  the 
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Orange family: ‘if the Prince had seiz’d upon Amsterdam, an infinite Treasure would have 
come into his hands; whereby he would have recruited his own sinking estate, settled his 
Tyranny over those people, and make them bear that yoke which they so tamely received 
from his Father and Himself’.56 Indeed, before William’s death, he went so far as to warn 
Orange to ‘look to his head too, if the Dutch once bring in a charge for his disuniting the 
Provinces’.57 Nedham therefore drew clear and direct parallels between the behaviours of the 
two single person leaders. Both were tyrants who could be justifiably resisted, overthrown or 
punished. In a way, William’s actions at Amsterdam proved to be something of a ‘told-you-
so’ moment for Nedham. He now had ‘no doubt, [that] the Dutch will see now how near they 
were to the brink of danger, and put him in to a like capacity of doing the like again’.58 
Thereafter he unleashed acidic attacks on the Orange family - specifically William II - and the 
tyranny he saw inherent within them: ‘Orange makes shift to leade them all in a String, and 
causes them to bite upon the Bridle. He hath enslaved them with their owne Army, and now 
they much thank him for being Slaves…fine Feats of Tyranny that he plaid at Amsterdam’.59 
The Dutch ‘do not so easily see a defence against his Tyranny. By what he hath done, they see 
what he can do when he pleases, and they have no ground to be secure upon the hopes of his 
good nature’.60 This final statement fully expressed what he had been hinting throughout the 
1640s; that by having to rely on the continued good nature of a monarchical interest, the 
liberty of the people is endangered and the potential for tyranny ever present.  
Once the immediate danger posed by both Orange and Stuart had passed and single person 
rule seemed to have been ousted from both commonwealths, Nedham’s depiction of both 
softened. In the months after the death of William in November 1650 (which led to the 
dismantling of the stadholderate) and the decisive defeat at the battle of Worcester, which 
seemed to end the hopes of the Stuart family, he no longer needed to launch such bitter 
diatribes in their directions. Thus prior to Worcester, Nedham had taken to calling Charles 
Stuart the ‘young tarquin’, in doing so emphasising the tyrannical nature of hereditary 
kingship.
61
 After his defeat, Nedham knew that Charles and the royalists stood little chance of 
retaking England, and as such the way he was depicted changed. From a tyrant, Charles was 
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demoted to merely an unfit monarch and a disrespected king.
62
 Similarly, the threat Orange 
posed to Dutch liberty had been removed and therefore such harsh invective was no longer 
necessary. Nonetheless, the example of the House of Orange continued to serve as a useful 
example of the danger of a single person within the constitution of an allegedly free state.    
William II’s actions at Amsterdam also featured in Milton’s work. In A Defence of the People 
of England, he reminded his readers of William and in doing so, indicated that there had been 
a development of his attitude from 1649. As mentioned above, in A Defence Milton had 
drawn a clear distinction between the rule of the Spanish kings and a free commonwealth, but 
had not, as before, suggested the benefit of naming another ruler. But he went on to consider 
the position of the stadholderate: 
Consider now, most illustrious council of the Federated Netherlands…who it was that latterly 
began to act the king amongst you. Consider what plots, attacks and disturbances followed 
throughout Holland, and what the case would now be, how slavery was prepared for you and a new 
ruler, and how that liberty which had been won by so many years of toil and battle would now have 




King was used here as a synonym for tyrant, since the people would have been forced back 
under the ‘slavery…prepared for you’. The stadholderate, by beginning to act ‘the king’ 
began therefore to take the ‘name king’; this suggests that the single person government of the 
stadholderate was perceived by Milton as having previously taken a position resembling that 
of kingly power. William had then degenerated through his personal ambition into a kingly 
tyrant, who sought to cause the liberty of the Dutch to perish. This mirrors the attitude that 
Nedham had to single person government more generally - that it could easily deteriorate into 
tyranny and enslavement.  
Tentative Support for Oliver Cromwell 
Oliver Cromwell had risen to a position of considerable prominence during the course of the 
civil wars and was named Lord Protector in 1653. However, it has been suggested that 
Cromwell was seeking monarchical power from as early as 1649, and moreover, that Nedham 
knew it. Benjamin Woodford has demonstrated that Nedham connected Cromwell to kingship 
as early as 1649: ‘witness Nol Cromwell, who…is crept up to be a Prince of the Last edition, 
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and now is taking care to settle the Government in his Family’.64 Kevin Sharpe has shown that 
even ‘before 1653 he [Cromwell] was being written and visually represented as a king’.65 
Indeed, in late 1651 Cromwell allegedly proposed the Restoration of a monarchical element to 
the constitution and during the next year, there seemed to be genuine fears he would make 
himself king.
66
 The spectre of single person government had barely been laid to rest before 
the threat of a Cromwellian monarchy began to rear its ugly head. It was to warn against this 
danger that Nedham now put the example of the House of Orange to use.  
From October 1651 to August 1652 Nedham published a series of editorials in Mercurius 
Politicus in which he ostensibly sought to condemn the oligarchical government of the Rump. 
In June 1656 Nedham republished these editorials in edited and revised form, to create The 
Excellencie of a Free-State. When the Protectorate was eventually established, Nedham – as a 
government propagandist – had remained ostensibly loyal to the new Lord Protector, and had 
initially justified Cromwell’s ascension, differentiating it from a quasi-monarchy by defining 
it as ‘elective’.67 However, by 1656 it was clear to Nedham that the Cromwellian Protectorate 
was playing out exactly as he had feared, in spite of his earlier warnings about the dangers of 
raising one man to a position where he could pursue his private interests at the expense of the 
public good.  He saw that Cromwell was becoming increasingly dictatorial through the 
dissolution of the first Protectorate parliament and the instigation of the Major-Generals, and 
subtly edited his earlier editorials in order to reflect the new political circumstance. In the 
original Mercurius Politicus editorials, the purpose was primarily to condemn the Rump 
parliament whereas the Excellencie manipulated these editorials to change them into a 
condemnation of the Cromwellian Protectorate. However, by looking at the examples and 
language used regarding the Orange family, I posit that in fact this criticism of single person 
government was already a present, but previously under acknowledged aspect of the initial 
editorials, and that it was simply brought more clearly to the fore in the Excellencie.
68
 
In his Politicus editorials, Nedham’s use of the Orange family harked back to the 1640s, thus 
representing a continuation of his arguments in which he had claimed that single person 
government always offered the potential for ruin. Nedham showed how in Holland 
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‘permitting the Family of Orange to greaten a little more than beseemed a member of a Free-
State, they were insensibly reduced to the last cast, to run the hazard of the loss of their 
Liberty’.69 He went on to argue that: 
It hath bin usual not to suffer particular persons to Grandise, or greaten themselves more than 
ordinary…The not keeping close to this Rule, had of late like to have cost the Low-countries, the 
loss of their Liberty; for the Wealth of the House of Orange, grown up to excess, and permitting the 
last man to match into a Kingly Family, put other thoughts and designs into his head, than 
beseemed a member of a Free-State; which, had he not been prevented, by the Providence of God, 
and a dark night, might in all probability, have reduced them under the Yoak of Kingly Power.
70
  
This very clearly mirrored Nedham’s earlier arguments, whereby the personal ambition of the 
Orange family combined with their exceptional position within the constitution allowed them 
to hoard wealth and marry into powerful royal families and in doing so they moved closer to 
tyranny. That Nedham perceived that the ‘thing king’ could easily develop into the ‘name 
king’ was reinforced when he told his readers ‘nor can it be forgotten, how much of 
Monarchy (of late) crept into the United Provinces’.71 He therefore urged his readers to 
observe:  
what Effects the continuation of Power, in the Family of Orange, hath had in the United Provinces, 
is every mans observation… but certainly that People have wisely improved their opportunity, (the 




The warning is repeated to remind his readers of the possible consequences had Orange 
succeeded: ‘nor must it be forgotten what the Family of Orange would have done in Holland; 
for upon the very same account have Usurpations bin commenced in all Free-States 
throughout the World’, the implication being that such a usurpation could just as easily 
happen in England as it had elsewhere.
73
 
In The Excellencie of a Free-State these references to the Orange family remain 
overwhelmingly unchanged. Where alterations appear, these are usually minor cuts to remove 
year-specific references. In fact, he only deleted two references that were to the Dutch more 
broadly, and not specifically about the Orange family. The most significant of these was a 
passage in which he talked about England and Holland’s ‘high achievements [which] may 
match any of the Ancients, since the extirpation of Tyranny, and a re-establishment of our 
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Freedom in the hands of the People’.74 This was likely eliminated because of the rising danger 
of tyranny after the establishment of the Protectorate; under the Commonwealth, when liberty 
was considered to have been in the hands of the people, the country had proven its power and 
greatness on the European stage, whereas under the Protectorate victories had rarely been 
forthcoming. The establishment of the Protectorate also eliminated the illusion that the people 
possessed complete liberty. In removing this passage, Nedham indicated not just that England 
was creeping back under tyrannical government, but that the greatness of the commonwealth 
was being directly impacted as a result of that tyranny. Nedham also removed a passage 
specifically referencing the Rump and standing powers that had been the focus of his initial 
editorials but which was less relevant by 1656: ‘add to the former instances, the consideration 
of the former sad condition of Switzerland, and Holland, under standing Power, with the 
flourishing state they have bin in ever since the expulsion of those powers, and a setling of 
those Governments in the Peoples Successive Assemblies’.75 These alterations hardly 
changed the ultimate presentation of single person government; both in their original and 
edited format, Nedham sought to warn against the monarchical interest that Cromwell 
represented, and the danger that any perpetuation of his position would descend into private 
interest and tyranny.  
Unlike Nedham, Milton never drew connections between the stadholderate and the 
Protectorate. Nonetheless, Milton was critical of the Cromwellian Protectorate, though he did 
not publicly speak out against it during its existence. He did not reject monarchy outright until 
a few months prior to the Restoration, and even then there remained a small part of him that 
clung to the ideal of single person rule: he argued that ‘ther may be such a king who may 
regard the common good before his own…but this rarely happens in a monarchy not 
elective’.76 Milton therefore drew a distinction between hereditary and elective monarchy. 
While the Stuarts fell decisively into the first category, the positions of Cromwell and the 
Orange family were more complex, and can at best be described as having evolved into 
something resembling a quasi-hereditary position.
77
 The Venetian Doge, on the other hand, 
fell squarely into the elective monarchy category; the position was filled through a 
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complicated system of lot and ballot, and was protected from hereditary tendency by several 
laws.
78
 Moreover, the Doge was so constrained by councils and advisors that it was almost 
impossible for him to work against the common good.  Following Milton’s own arguments 
then, a single figurehead following the Venetian model could potentially offer a viable 
alternative to single person rule for a man who was extremely reluctant to completely reject 
monarchical forms of government. However, there were two problems with this model. The 
first was the disappointment with the personal virtue that Charles, but particularly the Doge 
and Cromwell, exhibited when raised to positions of influence. The second was that by 1660, 
although he might have believed in the possibility of an elective monarch of exceptional civic 
virtue ruling for the common good, he no longer had any faith that the people of England 
were capable of recognising and subsequently electing such a person.  
Milton made a very pointed and enlightening reference to the Doge in The Readie and Easie 
Way – a tract that was written in early 1660 with the express intention of dissuading the 
English people from restoring the English monarchy – when he condemns the ‘fond conceit of 
something like a Duke of Venice’.79 This is the only reference to the Dogeship as a political 
institution anywhere in Milton’s prose works, which makes its purpose here particularly 
significant. By ‘fond conceit’ I suspect that Milton was condemning those who embraced the 
outward, material trappings of monarchy. That Milton was critical of this trait is clear when 
he reflected on the potential reestablishment of the Stuart monarchy, Milton mocked courtly 
pretensions, and demonstrated how the outward appearances of monarchy could gradually 
erode the liberty of the people and enhance the power of the monarchical figurehead. He 
criticised kings who had to be ‘ador’d like a Demigod’, setting a ‘pompous face upon the 
superficial actings of State’.80 This ‘pompous face’ was a ‘vast expence and luxurie’, allowing 
a monarch to ‘pageant[s] himself up and down’. Moreover, this paegentry was considered by 
Milton to be the ‘price of our subjection and their debausherie’.81 This criticism mirrors that 
of Nedham on single person government, that the pursuit of personal wealth represented a 
lack of concern for the public good and by extension the loss of liberty of the people.  
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If Milton found this sort of behaviour distasteful in a sovereign monarch, he would likely 
have found it intolerable in one who was no more than a chief magistrate, as both Cromwell 
and the Doge ought to be. Nonetheless, Milton had expressed support of Cromwell in the 
early 1650s. He wrote a sonnet to Cromwell in 1652
82
, and defended him in his Second 
Defence, and Robert Fallon and Laura Lunger Knoppers have both argued that Milton’s 
earlier positive view of Cromwell survived the Protectorate.
83
 However, this view has been 
attacked by numerous historians; for instance, Worden and Elizabeth Sauer have both 
suggested that these compliments were also warnings, a view that is supported by Sharpe’s 
work which outlined how in the seventeenth century praise was well understood to also 
communicate advice, guidance and criticism.
84
 Both Worden and Sauer argued that Milton’s 
attitude towards Cromwell throughout the 1650s and into 1660 can be viewed as consistent, 
perceiving Milton’s initial praise of Cromwell to have been conditional, and insisting that the 
Lord Protector failed to achieve the expectations Milton placed upon him.
85
 The advice that 
Cromwell had rejected concerned encouraging him to admit good counsellors, to allow 
freedom of expression and more importantly, to listen to their ideas on how to maintain 
liberty. 
A further respect in which Cromwell failed to meet Milton's expectations was in his inability 
to resist the trappings of monarchy, a profound disappointment that led Milton to reject single 
person rule by 1659.
86
 Thus Milton’s criticism of the Doge’s ‘fond conceit’ can also be 
extended to the Cromwellian Protectorate, which had increasingly begun to embrace the 
material trappings of monarchy and the power associated with them. Even at the beginning of 
the Protectorship, there is evidence of a gradual shift towards a Cromwellian monarchy. In 
1654 Cromwell moved into the royal residence at Whitehall, which was viewed by his 
enemies as evidence that Cromwell’s motive regarding his new position was pure kingly 
ambition.
87
 Even the Venetian envoy considered the move as Cromwell having ‘exercise [of] 
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regal sway under the royal roof, leaving out the royal title until he takes a fancy to it’.88 The 
most explicit indication of Cromwell’s move towards monarchy and its material trappings, 
however, was reflected in his second inauguration as Lord Protector. Indeed, the ceremony 
was influenced by monarchical coronations, containing many of the theatrical and visual 
elements of those events, despite the fact Cromwell had rejected the crown offered to him in 
the Humble Petition and Advice. An account set down by John Prestwick describes the 
‘prince-like canopy of state’, under which the ‘chair of Scotland’ (upon which, historically, 
British monarchs were crowned) was located. Cromwell himself was ‘richly dressed, habited 
with a costly mantle of estate, lined with ermines, and girt with a sword of great value’. After 
he was ‘enthroned’ on the chair of state, ‘his highness, Oliver Cromwell’ was presented with 
‘a rich and costly robe of purple velvet, lined with ermines; a Bible, ornamented with bosses 
and clasps, richly gilt; a rich and costly sword; and a sceptre of massy gold’. These items, the 
sword and sceptre in particular, provided strong monarchical symbolism, although the 
Speaker emphasized their civil, rather than royal or monarchical power.
89
 The image of 
Cromwell portrayed to the world was one of increasing regality and symbolic power.
90
  
This interest in the material trappings of monarchy indicated to Milton a lack of civic virtue 
and a level of self-interest that indicated corruption, and as such by 1660 Milton’s anxieties 
about single-person rule were deeper than in 1654, and it was the experience of the 
Protectorate that had deepened them.
91
 In 1654 Milton had praised Cromwell for his ability to 
resist the temptation of monarchy: 
The name of king you spurned from your far greater eminence, and rightly so. For if, when you 
became so great a figure, you were captivated by the title which as a private citizen you were able 
to send under the yoke and reduce to nothing, you would be doing almost the same thing as if, 
when you had subjugated some tribe of idolaters with the help of the true God, you were to 
worship the gods you had conquered.
92
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From early on in the Protectorate, then, Milton warned Cromwell about embracing the very 
monarchy they had just overthrown. He specifically warned Cromwell ‘to yield to no 
allurements of pleasure, to flee from the pomp of wealth and power’.93 His support of 
Cromwell at the start of the Protectorate was not therefore without strings attached, and 
Milton was clearly conflicted with the ‘sometimes strained efforts to distinguish Cromwell’s 
majesty from regality’.94 Milton therefore condemned the Doge and Cromwell for shrouding 
their rule in monarchical trappings, despite their lack of sovereign power. Moreover, this 
tendency signified a lack of virtue, whereby they sought to materially distinguish themselves 
and as such it ‘elevated them above thir brethren’. Perhaps worse, though, this pageantry bred 
in the nobility and gentry ‘hopes not of public, but of court offices’.95 Thus the ‘demigod’-like 
single figurehead was not only himself corrupt, but corrupted those around him, who would 
no longer look to the common good, but rather would pander to his interests and ambitions. 
Under such rule, Milton believed, the common good could not hope to prevail.  
The second problem with installing an elected figurehead like a Venetian Doge was that 
Milton no longer trusted a large majority of the population to make any sensible decisions in 
such elections. Milton’s disillusion with the people of England becomes increasingly apparent 
throughout his tracts of 1659 and 1660. He opened The Readie and Easie Way with 
immediate references to this. He refers to the ‘unsound humour of returning to old bondage, 
instilld of late by some cunning deceivers, and nourished from bad principles and fals 
apprehensions among too many people’.96 He emphasised this problem repeatedly throughout 
both editions of the tract, condemning the people who want ‘to creep back so poorly as it 
seems the multitude would, to thir once abjur’d and detested thraldom of kingship…argues a 
strange degenerate corruption spread among us, fitted and prepar’d for new slaverie’.97 He 
finished his second edition of The Readie and Easie Way with a stark warning: ‘what a 
precipice of destruction the deluge of this epidemic madness would hurrie us through the 
general defection of a misguided and abus’d multitude’.98  Milton’s turn away from single 
government had a twofold motivation. Firstly, he saw how Cromwell had ignored warnings 
against making himself too great through the pursuit of the material trappings of monarchy, 
demonstrating ambition for more power and a disregard for the public good. Secondly, even if 
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there were a man who possessed such exceptional virtue that they could avoid falling into the 
same traps as Cromwell had, the people of England would be incapable of recognising and 
electing him. Milton’s hand was forced; by 1660 he could no longer advocate single person 
government for England.  
It was only in 1660 that Milton was able to reject both the name and the thing king. By 1660 
Milton had moved from these more focused attacks to a broader denunciation of monarchy 
and single person rule, declaring that ‘a free Commonwealth without single person’ is ‘by far 
the best government’.99 However, it seems even then he did not truly believe that. He had, of 
course, become disillusioned with the Protectorate and with the people, but part of him still 
believed in a leader of exceptional virtue who truly could distinguish himself to such a degree 
that the people had to sit up and take notice. What he rejected in The Readie and Easie Way 
was the name and thing king in only a very limited sense. Specifically thinking about the 
rejected Stuarts, Milton also declared it ‘pernicious’ to invite monarchy back into England 
since ‘never forgetting thir former ejection’, the people will be ‘kept so low’ that ‘they never 
shall be able to regain what they have now purchasd and may enjoy, or to free themselves 
from any yoke impos’d upon them’.100 ‘After all, ‘a Family once ejected’ ought ‘not to be 
trusted with the power of Revenge’.101 His references to the Dutch supports this limited 
rejection of single person rule; he declared that ‘this facilitie we shall have above our next 
neighbouring Commonwealth that our liberty shall not be hamprd or hoverd over by any 
ingagement to such a potent familie as the house of Nassaw of whom to stand in perpetual 
doubt and suspicion, but we shall live the cleerest and absolutest free nation in the world’.102 
Milton’s rejection of single person rule in 1660 was based on circumstance and necessity; he 
genuinely believed that any remnants of the Stuart or Orange families, in either name or 
monarchical interest, ought to be cast out of their nations in order to save the liberty of the 
people. However, in a broader sense, Milton never truly seems to abandon his belief that the 
‘thing king’, if possessed by a virtuous leader, could stand atop an English republican 
government. 
Harrington and the Lord Archon 
One republican who has long been held firmly to have rejected any notion of a single virtuous 
leader for the English republic is James Harrington. His argument that England was not 
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suitable for a monarchy because of the shift in the balance of land, and as such power, into the 
hands of the people meant that only a commonwealth could ensure political stability and 
national prosperity. However, such a reading has meant that any monarchical elements of the 
Oceanic constitutional blueprint have been overlooked by historians. A closer reading of The 
Commonwealth of Oceana demonstrates that in fact Harrington too saw a place in Oceana, 
and England, for an individual leader or figurehead.  Moreover, just like Nedham and Milton, 
Harrington was writing in the context of the Cromwellian Protectorate, and therefore Oceana 
must be read as part of the same tradition as that of his contemporaries, as a means of both 
flattering the Protector and influencing the way he might choose to wield his power.  
Although Harrington argued that England was not suitable for monarchy, Oceana constantly 
had its own figurehead in the form of Olphaus Megaletor who is ‘created, by the universal 
suffrage of the army, Lord Archon, or sole legislator of Oceana’.103 It is the Lord Archon who 
designs the orders and institutions of Oceana, based on his learning and experience, which 
demonstrates just how important a role one exceptional person could play in a 
commonwealth. Constitution established, Archon abdicates his role and retires, but he is soon 
persuaded to come back and reclaim his role.
104
 Consequently, there was a role in Oceana for 
a single person. However, there are two different positions here: the founding legislator and 
the returning ruler. The rest of this chapter will look at these two governing figures, exploring 
in particular their relation to Cromwell, as well as the influence that the Venetian Doge might 
have had on Harrington’s conceptualisation of the Lord Archon.  
With regards to the necessity of a single person as legislator, Harrington was Machiavellian in 
his attitude.
105
 He accepted the possibility that a single man should undertake the founding of 
a stable and long-lived republic. Harrington quoted and paraphrased Machiavelli’s Discourses 
in order to support his arguments and demonstrate that a legislator founding the government 
would lead to longevity and stability: ‘Thrice happy is that people which chances upon a man 
able to give them such a government at once…seeing it is certain that Lacedaemon, in 
observing the laws of Lycurgus, continued about eight hundred years without any dangerous 
tumult or corruption’.106 Indeed he went on to declare that ‘it is certain, saith Machiavelli, that 
a commonwealth is seldom or never well turned or constituted, except it hath been the work 
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of one man’.107 This is a clear suggestion on Harrington’s part that commonwealths founded 
by a legislator were most durable, and as such, the tract was an appeal to Cromwell to become 
the benevolent legislator England needed at this time. Indeed, the tract itself is dedicated to 
‘His Highness The Lord Protector of The Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland’. 
Historians have argued over whether to interpret this dedication as genuine. Worden has 
argued that it is in fact an ‘anti-dedication’ since the figure of Archon is intended to be an 
‘anti-Cromwell’; Archon achieves what Cromwell has not or could not, and Oceana is an 
attack on the Protectorate.
108
 However, subsequent historians have argued this is too 
simplistic, and that the dedication is in fact genuine. Both J.C. Davis and Woodford argue that 
whilst Oceana may have served as a criticism of Cromwell, Harrington, like Milton, intended 
his words to be used almost as an instruction manual for the Lord Protector in order to guide 
him and the Commonwealth to greatness.
109
 He was likely thinking of Cromwell too when he 
sang the praises of this virtuous legislator who is ‘able to do harm and doth none may well be 
called honest, what shall we say unto my Lord Archon’s highness, who, having had it in his 
power to have done us the greatest mischief that ever befell a poor nation, so willing to trust 
such as they thought well of, hath done us so much good as we should never have known how 
to do ourselves’.110 He would therefore be: 
a wise legislator, and one whose mind is firmly set not upon private but the public interest, not 
upon his posterity but upon his country, may justly endeavour to get the sovereign power into his 
own hands, nor shall any man that is master of reason blame such extraordinary means as in that 
case shall be necessary, the end proving no other than the constitution of a well-ordered 
commonwealth. The reason of this is demonstrable; for the ordinary means not failing, the 
commonwealth hath no need of a legislator, but the ordinary means failing, there is no recourse 
to be had but to such as are extraordinary.
111
 
Harrington argued that in extraordinary times, as England found themselves experiencing in 
the 1650s, when such a sudden and dramatic shift had occurred in the political landscape, 
extraordinary measures, such as a single person seeking to gain sovereignty in his own hands 
was not just permissible, but was the only way in which to constitute a well ordered 
commonwealth.  
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In accepting the necessity of a legislator in England, Harrington diverged from the myth of 
Venice. Part of the historical narrative of the Republic of Venice was that due to the vast 
wisdom of its ancestors, it had never needed a legislator to create its ideal constitution. As 
Contarini outlined, it was ‘our auncestors, from whome wee have receyved so flourishing a 
commonwealth, [who] all in one did unite themselves in a consenting desire to establish, 
honour, and amplify their country, without having in a manner any the least regarde of their 
owne private glorie or commodity’.112 In Aphorisms Political Harrington demonstrated that 
the Venetians, collectively recognising that their existing constitutional orders were causing 
seditions and tumults, were able to reorganise their system to bring about their current, stable 
system of government:  
The Venetians, having slain divers of their dukes for their tyranny, and being assembled by such 
numbers in their great council as were naturally incapable of debate, pitched upon thirty 
gentlemen who were called pregati, in that they were prayed to go apart and, debating upon the 
exigence of the commonwealth, to propose as they thought good unto the great council; and from 
thence first arose the senate of Venice, to this day called pregati, and the great council; that is, 




That Harrington admired this about the Venetians was evident; however, he warned ‘that a 
people of themselves should have such an understanding, as when they of Venice did institute 
their pregati, is rare’.114 This ability of the Venetian people to create their own perfect 
constitution without a legislator therefore placed that republic even higher in Harrington’s 
estimation. It is not however an option for England, as experience had proven. Since the 
people lacked the virtue and wisdom to redesign their own constitution, it was necessary that 
a legislator step in and do this for them. Here Harrington fundamentally diverged from the 
myth of Venice, despite acknowledging the history of that republic. It is also worth noting 
that although Oceana has been defined as ‘utopian’, Harrington here was pragmatic in his 
movement away from the myth.
115
 Harrington understood that the Venetian example was a 
rare exception, because he believed he understood human nature.  
Although Venice did not need a legislator, Hammersley has suggested that Harrington’s 
Archon, after his abdication and subsequent Restoration, became a single figurehead ‘perhaps 
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not too dissimilar from a Venetian doge’.116 She does not however explore this observation in 
any further detail. It is certainly an interesting notion and as such is worthy of further 
examination. How much do we learn about the role and powers of the Lord Archon after the 
position is restored? How does this relate to the balance of mixed government in Oceana? 
And how similar are the positions of Archon and Doge in relation to the constitutional 
systems in their respective states?  
The first question to ask is why Archon was invited back, and how this relates to the 
justification behind the establishment of a Duke in the Venetian system. The answer in both 
cases is, perhaps unsurprisingly, stability. The purpose of the Doge was to prevent ‘homebred 
discord and civill dissention’.117 According to Contarini, in the early days of the Venetian 
Republic, it was constituted of twenty-two small towns each of which was self-governing but 
weak and vulnerable to attack from enemies. For mutual security they settled on electing one 
person from each city, who was given the title of ‘Tribune’ to, on a certain day, meet and 
consult with other Tribunes to treat on common business. This proving inconvenient due to 
the variety of opinions between the Tribunes, the Venetian settlers decided to ‘lay the whole 
charge of the general and common affaires uppon some particular man, whom all the rest 
should acknowledge as their prince and ruler’.118 Thus it was not until the establishment of the 
Doge in Venice that the republic really came into being as the secure and stable 
commonwealth it was still perceived to be in the seventeenth century.  
Harrington’s explanation for the people’s desire for the return of the Lord Archon was 
similar, due to the instability that was being caused in Oceana from ‘dangers abroad and 
parties at home’. Archon must return because ‘so long as they should have need of a standing 
army, his work was not done’.119 Internal instability was therefore cited as the fundamental 
motivation behind the justification for the return of Archon, as ‘they durst not trust 
themselves without a standing army, nor a standing army in any man’s hands but those of his 
highness’.120 Thus one of the ‘particulars’ in relation to Archon’s return was ‘a standing army 
of twelve thousand men, defrayed upon a monthly tax during the term of three years, for the 
protection of this commonwealth against dissenting parties, to be governed, directed and 
commanded by and with the advice of the council or war’.121 
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However, it must be remembered that when the Venetians created the Doge it was as a crucial 
part of the constitution that has survived, albeit with some changes, throughout the centuries. 
Archon’s position is not so clear. Harrington did not really make clear how the figure of 
Archon related to the constitution or the idea of mixed government. Is it a position that will 
continue after the death of Olphaus Megaletor? If not, it hardly seems as though the position 
can be considered as a part of a mixed constitution. Harrington does not address this issue, 
rather ending the tract with the death of the current the Lord Archon with no hint as to what 
might occur next. On the other hand the Venetian commonwealth was considered a mixed 
government and as such the Doge inevitably represented the monarchical element. However, 
there were strict controls on the power of the Doge so that he was ‘deprived of all means 
whereby he might abuse his authoritie or become a tyrant’.122 The benefit of the magistracy of 
the Doge was that it was largely ceremonial and any real level degree of power was 
constrained by law and numerous balances and checks; Harrington was certainly aware that 
the actions of the Doge were severely constrained: ‘though without the Counsellors he have 
no power at all while they can perform any function of the Signiory without him’.123 
The complex relationship of Archon to the constitution of Oceana was similarly mirrored by 
that of Cromwell to England. The Commonwealth of Oceana was published in the months 
preceding the offer of the crown to Cromwell under the Humble Petition and Advice in 
February 1657. When Cromwell had become Lord Protector in December 1653 his power had 
been limited by a constitution (the Instrument of Government) and a council. Although his 
power was limited he did adopt some aspects of monarchy; for instance he was referred to as 
‘Your Highness’ and signed himself ‘Oliver P’ in a similar way to kings who had styled 
themselves ‘R’ or ‘Rex’. However, his power had become increasingly unconstrained as he 
began dissolving parliaments and establishing military rule in England. Whispers of the 
possibility of Cromwell being offered the crown in order to restore him to an understood legal 
position were therefore undoubtedly in circulation prior to the official offer, and Harrington 
would likely have been aware of this.
124
 We might therefore read Harrington’s elevation of 
Archon as an attempt to prevent the monarchical element of Oceana from simply becoming a 
monarchy. After all a King Cromwell ascending the throne of England would destroy the 
English commonwealth, undermine the balance of power and land, and force the country back 
into turmoil and chaos.  
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What Harrington appears to do is present Archon, and therefore Cromwell, as he ought to be, 
as an individual capable of being ‘no seeker of himself in the way of earthly pomp or 
glory’.125  However, what proves that Archon was this particularly virtuous man was the very 
fact that he had voluntarily stepped away from government. Indeed he asks: 
if he who is able to do harm and doth none may well be called honest, what shall we say unto my 
Lord Archon’s highness, who, having had it in his power to have done us the greatest mischief that 
ever befell a poor nation, so willing to trust such as they thought well of, hath done us so much 
good as we should never have known how to do ourselves?
126
 
It therefore appears as though Harrington is advocating that Archon be trusted because he was 
that rare exception: the selfless virtuous man. Indeed the adulation that is heaped upon 
Archon in ‘The Corollary’ is quite exceptional:  
Ah, my Lord Archon shall walk the streets (as it be for his ease I mean) with a switch, while the 
people run after him, and pray for him; he shall not wet his foot, they will strew flowers in his 
way; he shall sit higher in their hearts, and in the judgment of all good men, than the kings that 
go up stairs unto their seats…he has two or three hundred thousand men that, when you say the 
word, will sell themselves unto their shirts for him and die at his foot.
127
 
However, what Harrington may have been doing was pandering to Cromwell’s desire for 
glory. In expressing that the glory he could expect would be this excessive and reverent after 
his abdication, Harrington appears to be actively encouraging the Protector to stand down. 
The purpose of this abdication appears to represent some sort of test of Cromwell’s personal 
virtue and commitment to the public good.  Having proven that he was more interested in the 
public, than his own personal, interest, Harrington raised the position of the Lord Archon 
above that of any other monarch or prince in the world. He is also described as ‘the greatest 
prince in the world; for in the pomp of his court he was not inferior unto any, and in the field 
he was followed with a force that was formidable to all’.128 With regard to the pomp of the 
office, there are certainly similarities to the Doge who was possessed with all the outward 
ornamental trappings of monarchy. However, there was justification for doing so: the 
‘limitation of authoritie is on the other side recompensed with an exterior princely honour, 
dignitie, and royall appearing shew’.129 Although Harrington does not describe in any detail 
the ‘pomp’ with which Archon would be surrounded in his position, as Contarini does for the 
Doge, one can imagine that to ensure it was superior to all other princely courts, it would have 
been quite spectacular. In order to assist him in achieving this level of pomp, in another of the 
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‘particulars’ the senate grant Archon ‘three hundred and fifty thousand pounds per 
annum…for the said term and to the proper and particular use of his highness’.130 In outward 
trappings then, the Doge and the Lord Archon were fairly similar in that they both possessed 
the ornamental and decorative appearance of monarchical government.  
This places Harrington in quite distinct contrast to Nedham and Milton, both of whom 
considered pomp and excessive material wealth to be a corrupting force on power. It is worth 
asking, then, why this is not the case for Harrington. In part, this might be explained by the 
example of the Doge; despite the grandeur of his place and position, the actual powers he 
possessed were severely limited. Furthermore, in having stepped down, Archon gave the 
people chance to elect him officially to a position of government. Even though Cromwell was 
given the title of Lord Protector through a written constitution, he had risen to power initially 
as part of what was essentially a military coup. The Corollary demonstrates that it was the 
people's will that Archon return to power, just as it was the people in Venice who elected the 
Doge. There were further similarities between the positions of the Doge and the Lord Archon. 
Both were held for ‘the term of his natural life’.131 Archon also had to work in conjunction 
with the Councils of War and State, and he took one of three magistracy seats in the senate, 
all of which suggest that, like the Doge, there were mechanisms in place that prohibited 
Archon from being able to act on his own on important issues.  
However, it is important that we do not push this comparison too far. Harrington is distinctly 
unclear on any other kinds of controls on Archon’s power. He is given control (albeit in 
conjunction with the Council of War) of a large standing army. And despite being brought 
back specifically to manage the standing army, after two years the army is disbanded, 
suggesting that the instability that had been threatening Oceana was no longer a danger, 
Archon does not then re-abdicate, instead going on to remain in power for fifty years. This is 
a long time for a man who insisted on such a complex system of rotation in all other parts of 
his constitutional blueprint. 
So how can we explain the Harrington’s vagueness in this respect? It may have been a 
deliberate ploy to encourage Cromwell to step down. If Harrington genuinely feared that he 
might accept the crown and make himself King, the limited powers that he could offer him as 
a Doge-like figure in Oceana might not have been enough to encourage him to reject it. 
However, we should perhaps not take a lack of explicit restraint as a tacit acceptance of a 
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powerful, monarch-like prince. Although some have read The Commonwealth of Oceana as a 
utopia, Harrington was actually fairly pragmatic as we saw in his acknowledgement of 
England’s need for a sole legislator. We could therefore perhaps suggest that Harrington was 
being deliberately vague here. There were enough references to a Doge-like figurehead for 
Cromwell to have recognised the similarities, but Harrington was vague enough on the 
specifics regarding the limitations of his power that it might have been possible to convince 
his readers to forget just quite how controlled and restrained the Doge really was. Harrington 
could be seen to be tempting Cromwell with the best parts of the Dogeship to persuade him to 
reject the crown, whilst conveniently leaving out the limitations that would be placed upon his 
power if he chose to model himself on the Doge of Venice. Harrington may therefore have 
been utilising the myth of Venice in order to manipulate Cromwell to fulfil his own particular 
vision for England.  This demonstrates that the fundamental issue for Harrington was not rule 
by a single person. He unequivocally defined England as a commonwealth whilst 
simultaneously incorporating into his proposals not just a legislator, but a ruling figurehead 
that appears to represent the monarchical interest. 
Conclusions 
An examination of Harrington therefore undermines the argument that exclusivist 
republicanism predominated after 1649. Similarly, Milton and Nedham’s engagement with 
the contrast between kingly power and kingly office demonstrates that by defining English 
republicanism as narrowly anti-monarchical, as Skinner and Worden have done, we have 
prevented a more nuanced understanding of what it meant to be a republican in the mid-
seventeenth century. We are instead faced with a fluid and shifting view of republicanism that 
supports a more pluralistic interpretation, and can see distinct languages of republicanism that 
intersected and diverged according to a given context; moreover, when it suited them, 
individuals could change language, as for instance Milton did as the threat of the Stuarts’ 
return appeared increasingly imminent. There was no one form of republicanism that was 
suitable for all times and all purposes; rather, people switched between them in order to serve 
specific purposes or agenda in different political contexts.  
Suggesting that these figures switch between republican languages further allows us to 
contribute to discussions regarding the consistency of both Milton and Nedham’s political 
thought. Milton in particular becomes a much more consistent political thinker when 
interpretations of his republicanism are not limited to his rejection of monarchy. Similarly, by 
tracing Nedham’s thought against, (in particular) the example of single person rule in the 
Dutch Republic, he remains remarkably consistent in spite his numerous changes of 
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allegiance. Small shifts in his portrayal merely represented a shift in the political atmosphere 
of either the Dutch or English Republics, emphasising or downplaying themes such as tyranny 
where they suited the change. This reading therefore rejects recent work by historians such as 
McElligott, who seek to undermine the consistency of Nedham’s republican thought.132 
Examining Milton, Nedham and Harrington through the lens of the individual figureheads of 
other European republics serves to further highlight Harrington’s distinctiveness from his 
contemporary republicans. Although each of them understood English republicanism to allow 
for an element of single person government, this was to differing extents.  Furthermore, the 
predominant influence of the Dutch or Venetian republic appears to have also impacted the 
way in which they each envisioned an individual figurehead in England. Milton and Nedham 
made much more of the comparisons between the English and Dutch experiences, and 
therefore looked to their interactions with single person government. Nedham saw that a 
sober, parsimonious figurehead in the form of William the Silent had been a force for public 
good in the fledgling United Provinces, while Milton actively rejected the material luxury of 
the Venetian Doge. As such, they rejected the Cromwellian Protectorate when it began to 
betray the ideals they both held to sit at the centre of public minded government. Harrington, 
on the other hand, admired Venice, and as such his point of reference for single person 
government was the Doge, in his gilded cage. Harrington saw that wealth and luxury could 
not be a threat if the power of the figurehead was sufficiently restrained.  
This approach also offers specific revelations for certain individual republicans. Examining 
Nedham’s attitude to the Dutch in the early 1640s demonstrates just how much more radical 
his thought was, and how much earlier he made bold comments on the role of monarchy and 
single-person government in well-ordered republics than his contemporaries. This approach 
therefore supports Scott’s assertion that Nedham’s republicanism was present from the mid-
1640s and that in fact, Nedham was reflecting on government without monarchical interest 
from considerably before the regicide.
133
 In doing so, it challenges Worden and Woodford, 
who both attribute Nedham’s distrust of single person rule to his 1651 to 1652 editorials in 
Mercurius Politicus.
134
It also demonstrates that an exclusivist understanding of republicanism 
in some cases pre-dated the regicide and abolition of the monarchy in 1649, thereby throwing 
doubt on the validity of using this date as a turning point within the wider republican 
tradition.   
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Chapter 3: Harrington and the Importance of Contemporary Republics 
 
The methodological approach undertaken by Harrington in formulating The Commonwealth 
of Oceana reinforces the significance of modern, contemporary republics on the political 
thought of seventeenth-century English republicans. In the ‘Council of Legislators’, 
Harrington set out his intention to explore the specifics of various constitutions. Featured 
most heavily throughout Oceana was the Venetian Republic, Harrington’s understanding of 
which was strongly informed by the accounts of the myth outlined by Contarini and 
particularly Giannotti. This chapter will consider why Harrington favoured Venice, a small 
city state, over the large, predominately agrarian state of the Dutch Republic, which was 
much more similar to England. In many ways, he found the success of the Dutch extremely 
admirable, which accounts both for its inclusion in Oceana as well as Harrington’s attempts 
to manipulate certain aspects of the Dutch constitution in order to justify his admiration for 
them. Ultimately, however, Harrington did not find the Dutch approach to government 
suitable to English circumstances. 
That Harrington both venerated Venice and followed its myth is clearly reflected in this 
statement from Oceana: ‘we behold her [Venice]…at this day with one thousand years upon 
her back, for any internal causes as young, as fresh and free from decay or any appearance of 
it, as she was born’.1 In one sentence, he encapsulated several of the important themes of the 
myth; namely, its longevity, its stability and its continued freedom from any internal or 
external corruption. This was the essence of Venice that Harrington sought to recapture, and it 
was for this reason Harrington viewed Venice as the greatest teacher England could have: ‘if I 
be worthy to give advice unto a man that would study the politics, let him understand Venice; 
he that understands Venice right shall go nearest to judge (notwithstanding the difference that 
is in every policy) right of any government in the world’.2 Harrington’s admiration for Venice 
was based on the fact that the republic has always ‘had her eye fixed upon ancient prudence’ 
– meaning an empire of laws not men - and as such had ‘attained to a perfection even beyond 
her copy’.3 In order to achieve such perfection and longevity for Oceana, Harrington had to 
deconstruct the Venetian constitution, in order to understand how they had been able to 
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achieve such a remarkable position in history. In this way, Venice and its myth informed 
Harrington's constitutional blueprint for England.  
Harrington’s understanding of Venice was particularly informed by the work of Giannotti, 
‘the most excellent describer of the commonwealth of Venice’, whom he references by name 
immediately upon getting to the core of his text.
4
 It is worth considering why Harrington 
favoured Giannotti over Contarini - whom he used, but cited less frequently – particularly 
since the latter would have been more accessible considering its English translation in 1599 
by Lewkenor. The answer perhaps lies in the backgrounds of these two Italians; whilst 
Contarini was a native Venetian, Giannotti was a stranger to that republic. So too was 
Harrington and as we have seen, Harrington advocated travel beyond one’s own national 
borders in order to truly understand forms of government. He perhaps therefore believed that 
a stranger could better interpret Venice than a native. Moreover, Florence was a city-state that 
had undergone numerous political upheavals, and Giannotti’s primary purpose was to use the 
model of Venice to find a solution to Florentine instability. Harrington wanted to use the same 
model to achieve the same ends in England; it therefore makes sense that he turned to 
Giannotti for guidance.  
Defining Democracy 
Political stability was the keystone of Harrington’s political thought; everything he proposed 
contributed towards this ultimate goal. In England, as has been outlined above, Harrington 
believed that the only form of government that could ensure ongoing stability in the existing 
circumstances was a commonwealth, or democracy, since the balance of land had shifted into 
the hands of the people. Both Venice and the Dutch Republic were presented by Harrington as 
democracies, although Venice was declared to be by far the ‘most democratical or popular of 
all others’.5 But what did Harrington actually understand by democracy? This in an important 
question to ask, since, the narrative of English republicanism in the mid-1650s has tended to 
overlook any commitment to democracy. Often, only the Levellers are seen as having 
promoted proto-democratic proposals, such as parliamentary sovereignty and equality before 
the law; and they continued to distance themselves from the term ‘democracy’. However, 
recent work by Foxley and Hammersley has begun to correct this narrative. Both have taken a 
closer look at the attitudes of English republicans, in particular James Harrington, to both the 
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term ‘democracy’ and its conceptual underpinnings.6 Taking a closer look at Harrington’s 
republicanism through the Dutch and Venetian republics further demonstrates his 
commitment to a democratic republicanism that is much more complex and deeply held than 
traditionally understood.. Furthermore, in order to define both the Dutch and Venetian 
Republics as democratic required manipulation and engagement with their national myths. 
The most straightforward definition of democracy followed the ancient division of the three 
kinds of government: ‘the government of one man, or of the better sort, or of the whole 
people; which by their more learned names are called monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy’.7 Combining these forms of government created the Polybian ideal of mixed 
government, which was said to prevent the cyclical corruption of each form of government. 
Venice was thought to be the proof of this concept: each of these types of governments were 
represented through the superstructures of government; the monarchical element was linked 
to the Doge, the aristocracy with the senate, and democracy with the Great Council. Venice 
could be defined as a democracy with a mixed government if the preponderance of 
sovereignty lay with the people.  
Harrington explained how the Great Council was made up of all those in Venice who were 
classed as citizens, as opposed to servants: ‘The Great Council is the aggregate body of the 
whole People, or Citizens of Venice, which for the paucity of their number, and the antiquity 
of their extraction are called Gentlemen or Noble Venetians, every one of which, at five and 
twenty years of age hath right of Session and Suffrage in this council’.8 Members of the Great 
Council then elected those who would become members of the Senate. The commonwealth 
was therefore structured in such a way that ‘the few depend upon or are included in the many, 
as the senate of Venice depends upon, or is included in the great council, by which it is 
annually elected in the whole or in some part’.9 This was all clearly influenced by the myth of 
Venice, as outlined in Chapter 1. However, if democracy was defined as the government of 
the whole people, then suggesting Venice was a democracy was somewhat difficult. Indeed 
Harrington recognised this issue, acknowledging that even though the entire citizenry held all 
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the power, this still only amounted to ‘the three thousand now governing’.10 In practise, this 
meant that the majority of those who resided in Venice were not eligible to play a role in 
governing the republic. Moreover, these citizens made up, more or less, a closed group, 
meaning that social mobility was next to impossible.  
Harrington, however, was able to explain this problem away, and in doing so demonstrated 
that his understanding of democracy was also connected to his fundamental assertion that 
‘empire is founded upon dominion’.11 He described how ‘at the first institution’ Venice ‘took 
in the whole people; they that now live under the government without participation of it are 
such as have either voluntarily chosen so to do, or were subdued by arms’.12 In the beginning 
then, all the people possessed all the land, and as such held all the power, creating the ultimate 
democratic commonwealth. Indeed to demonstrate his point he goes into the history of Venice 
in order to demonstrate that Venice had always been a democratic government: 
For many retiring into those islands where that city is now built, from the inundations of barbarians 
that overwhelmed the Roman Empire – when they were increased unto such a number that to live 
together it was necessary to have laws, they ordained a form of government whereby, assembling 
often in council upon affairs, and finding their number sufficient for government, they put a bar 
upon all such as, repairing afterwards to their city, should become inhabitants, excluding them 
from participation of power. Whence they that were included in the administration had right, and 
they that were excluded, coming afterwards and being received upon no other conditions to be 
inhabitants, had no wrong, and therefore had no occasions – nor were they trusted with arms, and 
therefore had no means – to be tumultuous.13  
This could easily be read as a closed oligarchy perpetuating their own power, and indeed 
subsequent scholars have argued that this event, the Serrata of 1297, constituted just that.
14
 
But, as Harrington does here, it was also possible to equate this narrow patrician class with 
the ‘many’. The myth suggested that those who established Venice possessed exceptional 
virtue and liberty, and that even without a single legislator, they had been able to create an 
ideal commonwealth. Thus, Harrington argued the government of Venice was ‘usually 
mistaken; for Venice, though she do not take in the people, never excluded them’.15 He 
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therefore followed the myth by equating the closing of the Great Council with the 
establishment of the democratic element of the Venetian commonwealth.   
Harrington’s definition of democracy also had another aspect, one that reached beyond the 
question of where sovereignty, power, and empire lay, and this is one that has been often 
overlooked by historians. Hammersley and Foxley are the exception to this rule.
16
 In this, he 
placed emphasis on the orders and superstructures of a commonwealth and the role they play, 
which themselves dictated whether a government was an oligarchy or a commonwealth; so, 
for instance, ‘A single council, having both the right of debate and result, never was nor can 
be esteemed a commonwealth, but ever was and will be known for mere oligarchy’.17 As 
such, his definition of a commonwealth was thus: 
where the people have the election of the senate, not bound unto a distinct order, and the result, 
which is the sovereign power, I hold them to have that a share of government (the senate not 
being for life) whereof, with the safety of the commonwealth, they are capable in nature, and 
such a government for that cause to be a democracy.
18 
Democracy therefore lay in the bicameral system which divided the legislative functions of 
debating and resolving between the senate and popular assembly: ‘the true form of a 
democracy or free state consisteth in this: that as to lawgiving, the wisdom of the nation 
propose and the interest of the nation resolve’.19 The importance of this division was 
emphasised in several of Harrington's works, demonstrating its significance to his conception 
of democracy. For Harrington, the ‘whole mystery of a commonwealth…lies only in dividing 
and choosing’.20 This separation would ensure that those in power governed in the public 
interest, with a wiser, ‘natural aristocracy’ to engage in the debate, and subsequently 
presenting to the rest of the people ‘things that they never thought on, or are cleared in divers 
truths which had formerly perplexed them’.21 In this formulation, he believed he had created a 
commonwealth in which everyone was able to participate according to the quality of their 
parts. So it was that in Venice stability was derived from ‘the Senate proposing and the Great 
Council resolving’.22  
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Harrington was aware that there would be those who rejected his vision, and this idea of a 
silent council voting on essential matters was one of these areas of potential contention. In 
order to pre-empt criticism, he included within his narrative dissenting characters, whose 
purpose was to raise these issues so that Harrington could immediately address potential 
concerns. In one speech, Epimonus de Garrula explained that he had observed the Great 
Council of Venice and was unimpressed because it conducted all of its business in silence, 
claiming that ‘a council, and not a word spoken in it, is a contradiction’.23 He stated that he 
‘came from among them as wise as I went thither….set the wisest man of your house in the 
great council of Venice, and you will not know him from a fool’. Harrington however 
virulently defended the need to prevent the people from engaging in debate. He argued that 
‘the greatest part of her steadiness’ rested on the ‘great council, which is with her people, by 
the authority of my lord Epimonus, never speaking a word’ for ‘debate, by the authority and 
experience of Lacedaemon and Venice, is not to be committed unto the people in a well 
ordered government’.24 In arguably the most relatable metaphor that Harrington used in The 
Commonwealth of Oceana he used sport to demonstrate his point: ‘Venice plays her game as 
it were at billiards or nine-holes, and so may your lordships, unless your ribs be so strong that 
you think better of football; for such sport is debate in a popular assembly as…was the 
destruction of Athens’.25 What we have here then is a very specific vision of democratic 
government that was more complex than the relationship between the balance of land and 
power. It was also defined by the specific superstructures established as well as the way in 
which legislative responsibilities were divided between the two houses.  
Ballot and Rotation 
Having established the superstructures for Oceana, Harrington then turned his attention to the 
practises of this government, and the ways in which it could ensure the citizens of Oceana 
continually sought the public good. It was in this aspect that Harrington adhered most closely 
to Venetian practises. He believed that they had found a way to harness man’s natural self-
interest via constitutional means; this was a key aspect of Harrington’s political belief, that 
properly ordered and controlled, man and government could work in unmistakable harmony 
together.
26
 This vision was termed by Pocock as “mechanised virtù”, a means through which 
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to create an overarching public good out of corrupt individual citizens.
27
 Two key aspects had 
aided Venice in achieving this: the secret ballot and the rotation of office; combined these had 
allowed Venice to master human nature and in doing so had allowed that republic to maintain 
her ancient prudence into the modern world.  
Of all the aspects that Harrington copied from Venice, the ballot was borrowed most closely. 
Harrington had visited the Great Council of Venice and it obviously made a significant impact 
on him. He studied it in immense detail and put the system to work in The Commonwealth of 
Oceana. He also wrote a pamphlet in which he used an annotated diagram to describe in exact 
detail, [Appendix 1], the system of balloting used in the senate of Venice.
28
 When John 
Toland published his edition of Harrington’s works, he inserted this pamphlet seamlessly into 
Harrington’s Oceana, in order to further clarify how the ballot system worked in Venice. In 
the Venetian system, the ballot was ubiquitous; the right to vote was given ‘in all debates and 
election’ by a system which is ‘called the right of balloting, whereby this Council, being the 
Sovereign power, createth all the rest of the Orders, Council, or magistracies; hath 
constitutely the Ultimate result, both in cases of Judicature, and constitutions of Laws’.29 In 
fact, he used the balloting system of Venice so extensively in The Commonwealth of Oceana 
that he declared: ‘I have not stood upon a more particular description of this ballot, because 
that of Venice, exemplified in the model, is of all others the most perfect’.30  
The importance of allowing the people to vote was crucial to the stability of the Venetian 
republic, as it established a system of impartiality which subsequently prevented faction. It 
was the ‘purity of the suffrage in a popular government’ which was ‘the health if not the life 
of it’, and the ‘soul is no otherwise breathed into the sovereign power than by the suffrage of 
the people’.31 In Venice the elections were ‘most of them made in the Great Council, and all 
by the Ballot, which is the most equall and impartial way of Suffrage’.32 The secret ballot 
therefore ensured impartiality by preventing any one man’s vote from influencing another’s. 
Thus the people were able to resolve following their own self-interest, which in sum would 
equate to the public interest, and prevent the government from becoming factional or 
oligarchical. An extra benefit was that he considered this to be an efficient system, and he 
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assures his readers that it takes little time to learn ‘for as in practise it is of small difficulty’ 
and uses his experience of observing the Venetian vote to assert that ‘the great council of 
Venice, consisting of a like number, begins at twelve of the clock, and elects nine magistrates 
in one afternoon’.33 Harrington here was being deliberately and uncharacteristically vague; 
the Venetian system of ballot was extremely complex, a fact he well knew, since he stated 
that to demonstrate the manner of the Venetian ballot was ‘a thing as difficult in discourse or 
writings, as facile in practice’.34  
However, as with all areas of his constitution building, Harrington again saw fit to pre-empt 
criticism of the ballot. Harrington’s character Epimonus spoke out against it: ‘but there is 
such a pudder with their marching and countermarching as, though neer a one of them draw a 
sword, you would think they were training’. He went on to mock the ballot and its 
achievements: ‘a pretty sum for urns and balls, for boxes and pills, which these same 
quacksalvers are to administer unto the parishes; and for what disease, I marvel? Or how does 
it work? Out comes a constable, an overseer, and a churchwarden’.35 Harrington, as Archon, 
defended  the ‘Venetian boxes’ as ‘the most sovereign of all the remedies against this same 
cogging’ declaring it a ‘strange thing that they should be thrown first unto the fire by a fair 
gamester’.36 For ‘men are naturally subject unto all kinds of passion; some you have that are 
not able to withstand the brow of an enemy’. Therefore if the suffrage be not secret ‘you shall 
not have one fair cast in twenty’. The secret ballot ensured that whether successful or not, a 
man ‘neither knoweth whom to thank nor whom to challenge’.37 These criticisms against the 
Venetian system were quickly brushed off by Harrington, who continued to emphasise its 
virtues. He had such faith in the Venetian system that he declared that ‘the great council of 
incomparable Venice, bowling forth by the self-same ballot’ convinced him of her position as 
an ‘immortal commonwealth’.38 No doubt he hoped it would have the same effect in Oceana. 
The ballot was carried out as a means to vote new members to the Senate, and it was by this 
method that the Venetians achieved the ‘exquisite rotation of the senate’.39 Harrington 
considered the system of rotation in Venice to be the best in all of history, for he said: ‘the 
great council of Venice, like the statue of Nilus, leans upon an urn or water pot, which 
poureth forth the senate so pure and perpetual a stream as, being unable to instagnate, is 
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forever incapable of corruption’.40 In fact, it is the example of Venice and its system of 
rotation that led Harrington to believe that ‘neither by reason nor by her experience is it 
impossible that a commonwealth should be immortal’ for ‘seeing the people, being the 
materials never dies, and the form, which is motion, must without opposition be endless’.41 
This is a very clear commitment to the myth of Venice and the idea that the commonwealth 
could be immortal. Like Giannotti before him, Harrington believed that the complicated 
system of rotation and ballot secured Venetian liberty indefinitely.  
The purpose of rotation was to ensure that governors also became the governed, and as such 
they would never enact legislation that would be detrimental to themselves when they were no 
longer an active member of the magistracy. Thus ‘the Magistracies in Venice (except such as 
are rather of Ornament then of power are all Annual, or at most biennial. No man whose 
terme is expired, can hold his Magistracy longer, but by a new election’.42 Moreover the 
rotation, like the ballot, was an essential way of avoiding faction building up within the ruling 
elite. Harrington describes the senate of Venice as a ‘rolling stone’ which ‘while it continues 
upon that rotation, ever shall gather the moss of a divided or ambitious interest’.43 By 
continually changing the people in positions of authority, they never had time to build up 
sufficient power to become a dangerous influence in government. Suffrage in the hands of the 
people, with the magistracies elected through the secret ballot and rotated frequently 
ultimately became one of the cornerstones of Harrington’s constitutional blueprint, thanks 
largely to the example of the Venetian republic. 
Again, Harrington acknowledged problems with the Venetian system in an attempt to stave 
off criticism, agreeing that ‘her superstructures by virtue of her ballot or rotation’ were not 
‘exactly librated’.44 The greatest problem that they faced was, as has been noted above, that 
‘through the paucity of her citizens, her greater magistracies are continually wheeled through 
a few hands’. The sheer number of elective positions coupled with the limitations placed on 
how much responsibility the younger members could take on, meant that the most powerful 
positions could only be shared between a very small number of citizens. Harrington explained 
that Giannotti had already noted this problem:  
he saith that if a gentleman come once to be savio di terra ferma, it seldom happens that he faileth 
from thenceforward to be adorned with some one of the greater magistracies, as savi di mare, 
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savi di terra ferma, savi grandi, counsellors, those of the decemvirate or dictatorian council, the 
avvocatori, or censors, which require no vacation or interval.
45 
This was problematic since it meant men did not experience the outcomes or implications of 
the legislation that they enacted, by living as ordinary citizens, and therefore risked becoming 
disengaged or disconnected from the public interest. The problem lay in the fact that although 
the Magistracies: 
are all confer’d for certain terms; yet those terms do not necessitate vacation, that is, ther term of 
a Magistracy being expired, the party that bore it, is capable upon a new Election of bearing it 
again without interval or vacation; which doth not altogether trash the Rotation of the 
commonwealth, though it render the same very imperfect.
46 
 
For Harrington this was a considerable problem with the Venetian system, as it undermined 
the fundamental purpose of rotation. It was not a problem, however, that prohibited 
Harrington from borrowing the fundamental concept and putting it to use in Oceana. He 
simply recognised what the problem was, and demonstrated how this would be corrected and 
improved upon by putting this system to use in a larger country such as England. For Oceana, 
Harrington decreed that a man ‘having fulfilled his term of three years, shall not be re-elected 
unto the same or any other tribe, till he hath also fulfilled his three years vacation’.47 He 
described this problem as an ‘infirmity of Venice’ which was of no ‘incident into a 
commonwealth consisting of many’ meaning Oceana.48 Although he evidently admired 
Venice and the way in which they had constructed their constitution, he seems to believe that 
it was actually better suited to a large nation state as opposed to small city-state, since the 
former provided enough people who could be considered citizens to have a well sized 
franchise base for a properly functioning democracy. 
So if Harrington believed that large nation states could encompass a broader spectrum of the 
population and therefore run as a more effective democracy, then the Dutch Republic ought to 
have been a useful model for him also. In fact, the Dutch Republic as a commonwealth 
contained similar complications to that of Venice. Like Venice, which after the Serrata was 
often conceived as an aristocracy or oligarchy, the Dutch Republic too has been described as   
‘the closest and most uncontrolled oligarchy in Europe’.49 But again, Harrington manipulated 
Dutch history and its myth in order to suggest that this republic too was a democratic 
commonwealth.  
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He achieved this by indicating that Philip II, their ‘potent prince’ had usurped the natural 
government of the United Provinces. Having overthrown him, the Dutch had simply 
undertaken ‘the restitution of the popular government’.50 The word ‘restitution’ in this 
indicates that the government has restored back to the hands of the people, and that the 
normal form of Dutch government had always been self-government under a commonwealth. 
To support this, Harrington engaged with the Batavian myth, most popularly propagated by 
Grotius. He did this most explicitly in The Prerogative of Popular Government when he 
discussed the ‘liberty of Holland’ which is ‘in many cities more ancient than any records or 
other monuments there can witness, and in itself than that of Tacitus, whereby Civilis born of 
princely blood, is affirmed to have vindicated the Batavian freedom’.51 The Batavian myth 
drew parallels between the Dutch people and the ancient Batavians, both of whom had led 
revolts against the injustices of external dominion.
52
 The Revolt against the Spanish was 
therefore conceived not as a means to create more freedom, but rather a defensive movement 
to restore traditional liberties that had always existed.
53
 It was a fight to defend the antiquity 
of Dutch liberty and restore self-government.
54
 Post-revolt, they were back under ‘their 
ancient and accustomed form’ ‘under the orders of popular government’.55 In defining 
Holland as a popular government with regard to its ancient form of government, Harrington 
embraced the Dutch understanding and justification of their polity.  
As a popular republic, Harrington placed the Dutch Republic as comparable to England and 
Venice. But where Venice proved almost perfect to Harrington as a model of political 
institutions, the Dutch Republic was found wanting. In Venice, the Great Council was 
considered by Harrington at least to consist of the whole people of Venice. In Holland, 
however, the popular assembly consisted of ‘a representative of the people’ who ‘may be for 
life, as in the particular cities or sovereignties of Holland, improperly called senates’.56 While 
the members of the Venetian Grand Council were for life, it consisted of the entirety of the 
people; the town governments of Holland were made up of only representatives of the people, 
the regents, who, being sat for life, could become corrupt without the panacea of rotation.  
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Not only did the Dutch system of government lack the rotation Harrington deemed necessary, 
he also considered ‘the proceeding of the commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland’ as 
being of an ‘obscure manner’.57 He was alluding to the decentralised federal system that both 
these republics embodied, outlining how:  
the sovereignties, whether cantons, provinces or cities, which are the people, send their deputies 
commissions and instructed by themselves (wherein they reserve the result in their own power) 
unto the provincial or general convention or senate, where the deputies debate, but have no other 
power of result than what was conferred upon them by the people, or is farther conferred by the 
same upon further occasion’.58 
Harrington was here referring to the way in which national government functioned, with 
delegates sent from each province with specific instructions of what they could and could not 
agree to. This ensured the principle of provincial sovereignty, but was often seen as a slow 
and cumbersome approach to government. Moreover, this meant that the division within the 
legislature between debating and resolving was not distinct enough. Those who were 
dispatched to the States General had the ability to debate, but so did the Provincial States and 
town councils who also possessed the power to resolve.  
Moreover, the ‘senate’ in this situation, the States General, was not granted sufficient powers 
of debate. Those who sat in the senate were supposed to be the ‘natural aristocracy’ whose 
wisdom to debate important issues could be recognised by the people, who would 
subsequently elect them to that body. As such, another perspective is added to the earlier 
comment that the nobility in Holland were ‘but few’. 59  By lacking a senate of the sort that 
was favoured by Harrington, that could freely debate on issues, the Dutch system seemed to 
be lacking this sort of natural aristocracy as well, since it was essentially conflated with the 
people in their popular assemblies. Harrington declared that an aristocratic element is 
therefore necessary ‘or how else can you have a commonwealth that is not altogether 
mechanic? Or what comparison is there of such commonwealths as are to come nearest to 
mechanic, for example, Athens, Switzerland, Holland, unto Lacedaemon, Rome and Venice, 
plumed with their aristocracies?’.60 The Dutch system was therefore to be considered inferior 
because, by depriving themselves of a proper senate, they also deprived themselves of having 
a wise minority who could guide the people towards the best options for the public interest. 
Although he did criticise the theory of provincial sovereignty because of this deprivation, he 
also saw some benefits within it. When he discussed the issue of veto, particularly the 
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negative voice of the nobility, within the Dutch system, ‘an example which I am far from 
commending’, he suggested that high level of decentralisation was the main reason that it did 
not destabilise their commonwealth:  
if those governments were not cantonised, divided and subdivided into may petty sovereignties that 
balance one another…would be the most dangerous that ever was but the Gothic, of which it 
savours. For in ancient commonwealths you shall never find a nobility to have had a negative but 
by the poll, which, the people being far fewer in number, came to nothing; whereas these have it, 
be they never so few, by their stamp or order.
61
   
Dutch decentralisation was therefore both a benefit and a problem according to Harrington, 
but he saw no benefits in importing federalism into England.  
Agrarian Law 
In a speech responding to the attack on the agrarian law by Lord Philautus – another of 
Harrington’s fictional characters – Archon defends the proposal. One of Philautus’s (meaning 
“self-love” in Greek) arguments was that ‘an agrarian is altogether unnecessary’ and that 
there can be no clearer testimony of this fact than ‘that the commonwealths which are our 
contemporaries…have no such thing’.62 This was, for the most part, a fair statement; not only 
did they have no such thing, but the economic foundations of both Venice and the Dutch 
Republic were considerably different from that of England. Nonetheless, Harrington sought to 
demonstrate that in both cases, something resembling an agrarian law existed to ensure that 
the balance of power remained in the hands of the people in order to maintain the government 
as a commonwealth. Again, he manipulated these commonwealths to allow him to portray a 
vision of each that suited his own agenda. This is not to say that, having done so, he 
necessarily found utility in the way in which Venice and the Dutch found this economic 
equality. However, his agrarian law was such an unusual proposal amongst his republican 
contemporaries that it was necessary for him to demonstrate that it had an equivalent in 
contemporary as well as ancient republics.  
In this respect, Harrington acknowledged that Venice was somewhat lacking. This is because 
‘her laws, supplying the defect of an agrarian, are not so clear nor effectual at the 
foundation’.63 Thus ‘she hath not in my judgement arrived at the full perfection of equality’. 
However, the character Philautus pushes this further, arguing that in fact an agrarian law was 
necessary; he asks ‘what clearer testimony can there be, than that the commonwealths which 
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are our contemporaries (Venice, whereunto your highness giveth the upper hand of all 
antiquity, being one) have no such thing?’. He continues, arguing that it is ‘in the sovereign 
power [of the Venetians] at any time to establish such an order’; that they do not further 
demonstrates that ‘they need it not’.64 The Lord Archon responds by admitting that ‘at first 
sight of them there is some appearance but also states that they are to be ‘no precedents unto 
us’. He explains that the lack of agrarian law in Venice is ‘not a point that she is to fear’ 
because ‘seeing she consisteth of nothing else but nobility; by which whatever their estates 
suck from the people, especially if it come equally, is digested into the better blood of that 
commonwealth, which is all or the greatest benefit they can have by accumulation’.65 By this 
Harrington is referring to the fact that all of the citizens, who terminologically were ‘called in 
respect of their subjects nobility’, own all the land.66Therefore the political actions of the 
nobility have the most immediate ramifications on themselves and therefore those who are 
considered citizens (not subjects) equally reap the benefits of their own decisions.  
However, Venice was not totally without equalising measures to ensure the equilibrium of 
dominion and empire. He referred to both the Council of Ten and the ‘Officers of the Pomp’ 
whose responsibility it was to ensure economic equilibrium within the republic. So however 
‘unequal soever you will have them [the people] to be in their incomes, they have officers of 
the pomp, to bring them equal in expenses, or at least in the ostentation or show of them’.67 
Thus, ‘if the best of them appear with other state or quipage, then is allowed unto the meanest 
he is obnoxious unto the officers of the pomp’.68 The Council of Ten served a similar 
purpose: ‘if a Venetian should keep a Table, or have his house furnished with retainers, he 
would be obnoxious unto the Council of Ten’.69 This suggests that in Venice, the concern was 
less related to the incomes of the nobility, than their external expenditure.  Between the 
Officers of the Pomp and the Council of Ten, these ‘two orders in a Commonwealth, where 
the Gentry have but small Estates in Land, are as much as need be in lieu of an Agrarian’.70 
Although this was not quite the guarantor of stability that Harrington desired, he seems to be 
suggesting that these measures served that purpose in a city-republic that was very different 
from Oceana.  
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The Dutch situation was more complicated due to its size and diversity. Its provinces vastly 
differed in terms of economic power as well as the basis of their economic activity. It would 
have been very difficult for him to talk in general terms about an agrarian law applying to the 
entirety of the United Provinces; it is for this reason that he predominantly refers to ‘Holland’ 
specifically, rather than the ‘Dutch Republic’ more generally. This therefore simplified his 
analysis of the Dutch Republic. Holland was uniquely powerful among the provinces, leading 
the union both politically and economically. It had built up its power through the rapid 
expansion of trade and commerce, which by the seventeenth century had led to it becoming 
the foremost trading power in Europe.
71
 This economic power had enabled Holland to take on 
effective political leadership of the United Provinces after the death of William II and their 
failure to elect a new stadholder. But although it was the most powerful of the seven 
provinces, it was hardly the most directly comparable to English circumstances. England was, 
after all, a large agrarian nation-state, and Holland a small commercial province. Other Dutch 
provinces may have had more in common with England; the eastern provinces for instance 
remained reliant on agriculture, and subsistence agriculture at that.
72
 Choosing Holland 
therefore seems like an odd choice for a man who declares that ‘Agriculture is the bread of 
the nation…wherefore I am of Aristotle’s opinion, that a commonwealth of husbandmen (and 
such is ours) must be the best of all others’.73 Holland’s political and economic power, 
however, were so much more considerable than the other six provinces combined. 
Throughout the seventeenth century, for instance, Holland was responsible for meeting at 
least sixty per cent of the Republic’s expenditure on common affairs), which provided that 
province with considerable political power, being able to use money as a tool of leverage over 
the rest of the provinces.
74
 As such, Holland was a natural source of interest and comparison 
for Harrington.  
What Holland lacked above all was land, which might lead us to believe that the agrarian law 
would not apply to them. However, Harrington suggested that in Holland they have an 
‘implicit agrarian’ which makes them ‘not obnoxious to a growing nobility’.75 In this context, 
‘obnoxious’ should be defined in the sense most common before the nineteenth century of 
‘liable, subject, exposed, or open to a thing (especially something actually or possibly 
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harmful)’.76 By this he seems to be referring to the lack of land that was available in Holland. 
There was simply not enough land for people to gain vast tracts of it, as opposed to in 
England where it was perfectly possibly for people to gain vast swathes of land and thus cause 
an overbalance which could threaten the commonwealth. It is also important to remember that 
society in Holland was largely urban; within the States of Holland nineteen votes were cast, 
eighteen of which represented towns, and the nineteenth went to the nobility, who were 
supposed to represent not only their own interests but also those in the countryside.
77
 Thus the 
proliferation of towns and urban society meant that there was not the danger from big landed 
estates that existed in England. As such, Harrington argued, Holland was ‘of no example unto 
us, whose experience in this point hath been unto the contrary’.78  
Pocock has suggested that Harrington was largely dismissive of the Dutch Republic exactly 
because it was a ‘republic founded upon trade rather than land’ and suggested that Harrington 
actually had no interest in ‘showing how the balance of property works where property is in 
moveable goods or money’.79 Indeed, Harrington did state that in republics in which ‘property 
producing empire, it is required that it should have some certain root or foothold, which, 
except it in land, it cannot have’.80 The relationship between power and an economy based on 
land ownership was therefore the best way in which to ensure political stability. Indeed, when 
he considered the Dutch situation specifically, he continued his argument that a 
commonwealth of people who owned and worked their own land was superior to one whereby 
the people traded the goods of others:  
at the long run it will be found that a people working upon a foreign commodity doth but farm the 
manufacture and that it is entailed upon them only where the growth of it is native; as also that it is 




In lacking the land and natural resources to trade in native commodities, the Dutch were 
dependent on, and at the mercy of, other nations. The Dutch vulnerability to the political 
agendas of their neighbours would have been clearly demonstrated to Harrington through the 
Navigation Act imposed upon the Dutch by the English, which prohibited the import of goods 
to England other than in a vessel of either the country of origin or of England.
82
 Although the 
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reasons for the outbreak of the first Anglo-Dutch War are more complex, the imposition of 
the Navigation Act, which had a significant impact on Dutch trading ability, was certainly one 
important factor.
83
 This perhaps emphasised to Harrington the vulnerability and continued 
danger posed to a commonwealth whose foundations were not grounded in her own land.  
It was, however, unfair of Pocock to suggest that Harrington had no interest at all in the 
impact of moneyed goods on his political theory. Harrington acknowledged that the Dutch 
had developed much further with regards to trade than the English: ‘in manufactures and 
merchandise, the Hollander hath gotten the start of us’.84 This showed a begrudging respect 
for the inhabitants of the province of Holland for their industry and work-ethic, but more 
importantly suggested a level of competition; Harrington evidently saw a place for England as 
a trading power and believed that they would be much more successful that the Dutch. 
Moreover, in relation to his agrarian law, he suggested that there may be a way to apply a 
similar law to city-state commonwealths who lack land. He stated that ‘in cities such as 
subsist most by trade and have little or no land, as Holland or Genoa, the balance of treasure 
may be equal unto that of land in the cases mentioned’.85 The acknowledgement of this 
possibility was made without any further clarification. However, the fact that Harrington did 
at least consider the role that trade might play in England has been overlooked. He criticised 
the Dutch for having to rely on trading in foreign goods, but, he suggested that a 
commonwealth like England, which had enough land to produce goods both for the people 
and for international trade, would be ideally suited to expand its commercial enterprises: 
‘wherefore, nature having provided encouragement for these arts in this nation above others 
where, the people growing, they of necessity must also increase, it cannot but establish them 
upon a far more sure and effectual foundation than that of the Hollanders’.86 Despite his 
insistence of the centrality of land and agriculture, Harrington appeared, at least superficially, 
to be encouraging the development of commerce within England.  
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Unfortunately Harrington provided little detail regarding what effect the development of a 
strong moneyed economy might have upon the agrarian balance on which his eternal 
commonwealth ought to rest. Harrington’s failure to consider this is quickly noted by his most 
vociferous and astute critic, Matthew Wren with whom Harrington engaged in a lively 
pamphlet debate.
87
 Wren argued in Considerations upon Mr Harrington’s Commonwealth of 
Oceana that ‘the assertion will appear too positive that property producing Empire consists 
only in land’.88 Instead, he suggested that ‘experience instructs us that it is not a large 
possession in lands, but an Estate in ready money which is proper for carrying on a great and 
sudden Enterprise’.89 Harrington responded by suggesting indeed that ‘the balance in money 
may be as good or better than that of land in three cases’. One of these references the Dutch 
situation specifically: ‘in cities of small territory and great trade, as Holland and Genoa, the 
land, not being able to feed the people, who must live upon traffic, is overbalanced by the 
means of that traffic; which is money’.90 This clear statement has led C.B. Macpherson to 
suggest that Harrington supported a bourgeois commonwealth where the landed gentry 
supported and actively participated in market society, and to overestimate Harrington’s 
interest in moveable property. Moreover, he argued that the gentry’s involvement in financial 
capitalism actually had a stabilising effect on the republic.
91
 In perhaps an even stronger 
assertion, Constantine Vassiliou has argued that Harrington believed in a reconciliation of 
commerce and ancient prudence, ultimately concluding that Harrington sought to reconcile 
ancient republican virtue with modern commercial society.
92
  
This is an exaggeration. For Harrington, ownership of property was everything. The capacity 
of citizenship was exclusively defined by the possession of land; it was only this that marked 
an individual out from a servant. He did not believe that social power could long be held by 
money, or that a flood of money into a country could bring about a permanent redistribution 
of lands, and so he did not believe that the fiscal or financial resources of a society could be 
mobilised to make a permanent paid army.
93
 Thus while for Holland, lacking in land as it was, 
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a ‘balance in money’ was a better system, for England a political theory of property could 
only ever be based on land and not on labour.
94
 Government is more easily preserved if the 
‘foundation of property be in land; but if in money, lightly come, lightly go’.95 It is interesting 
to note that Venice too was a commonwealth that depended heavily on trade, but that this fact 
went largely unacknowledged by both Harrington and Wren, perhaps because its trading 
influence was declining, particularly compared with the rapid commercial expansion of the 
Dutch Republic.  
Internal stability 
One of the things that Harrington sought most ardently was a commonwealth devoid of 
tumults. The correct balance of political to economic power, combined with effective political 
institutions and practises ought to produce commonwealths ‘of the most prudent and serene 
spirit, and the voidest of intestine discord or sedition; as the Venetians, the Switzerland, and 
the Hollanders’.96 Venice was the epitome of this ideal, and was conceptualised as ‘the most 
equal in the constitution’ of any commonwealth.  The benefit of an equal commonwealth was 
that it was capable of ‘domestic peace and tranquillity’ whereas ‘to make a commonwealth 
unequal is to divide it into parties, which setteth them at perpetual variance, the one party 
endeavouring to preserve their eminence and inequality, and the other to attain unto equality’. 
Harrington believed that by creating a constitution that was perfect in all aspects, that the 
people would be satisfied and therefore have no need to rebel: ‘the government which, if it 
have been anything near equal, was never seditious; or let him show me what sedition hath 
happened in Lacedaemon or Venice’.97  
Wren challenged Harrington’s assertion that Venice lacked dissension noting that he was not 
‘put upon any difficulty in the retriving of Instances to prove she hath been subject to Tumults 
and Faction’.98 He noted that there were ‘continual Disorders to which she was exposed 
before the settlement of the commonwealth upon the Election of her Dukes’.99 He gave 
accounts of several conspiracies and rebellions against the state that occurred during the time 
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, and Marin Falerio. 102 
After that in the year 1355 the Health of the Commonwealth became her Disease, I mean the 
power of the Dukes by which she gained so much order, Grace, and Formness, was made an 
Instrument to the ambition of Duke Marin Falier for dissolving the Frame of the Government; 




Wren demonstrated that between 697 and 1172, Venice had been subject to continual tumults. 
What Wren demonstrated here was the value he placed on the ducal element of the Venetian 
system, which he credits with the ‘health’ of the commonwealth. As a monarchist, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that in his work, Wren placed great emphasis on the role that the correct 
formulation of the ducal position played in bringing order to the republic, rather than the 
impact of the Serrata. Although Wren did somewhat begrudgingly acknowledge, that ‘of late 
days indeed the commonwealth of Venice hath enjoyed tranquillity enough at home’, his 
testimony undermines Harrington’s mythical interpretation of Venice as free from tumults.  
Similarly, Wren argued that even if Venice now seemed peaceful, the potential for internal 
dissent remained, since the ‘partialities and factions be kept up between the Old and New 
families of Noblemen’.104 This perception that factions and tensions still exist within Venice 
challenged the view that Harrington and the myth puts forward.  
In his response, The Prerogative of Popular Government, Harrington dismissed these 
rebellions, denying that these seditions represented ‘a disease in the bones of the 
commonwealth’.105 He argued that the revolts to which Wren referred did not constitute 
dangerous sedition but rather the sort of standard criminal acts any nation could be subject to, 
asking: ‘there passeth not a month but there die rogues at Tyburn; is the government therefore 
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seditious?’ These rebellions that Wren mentions were merely ‘sudden flashes’ that ‘no sooner 
appeared or broke out…than it fell off like a scab’.106  Harrington also rejected the value 
Wren placed on the power and role of the doge, instead emphasising the significance of the 
closing of the Great Council; he asserted that ‘since the Reformation there hath not been a cut 
Finger upon this score, save onely through the conspiracy of Baiamonte, which indeed came 
to blows’.107 He therefore argued that only ‘for the space of about four hundred years from the 
present day’ had Venice been ‘an Example of an equal commonwealth’. Prior to the Serrata 
the commonwealth was ‘not bound by sufficient orders to give her self security of her native 
Liberty, her Dukes on the one side did what they pleased, and the inrage people on the other 
side banished, condemned to death or murdered them’.108 In Harrington’s formulation it was 
therefore the enacting of the correct orders in the senate and great council that led to the 
stability and peacefulness of Venice, and not any changes that had been made to the ducal 
position.  
Even within Harrington’s perfectly balanced commonwealth, however, there was space for 
dictatorial power. After the Querini-Tiepolo rebellion of 1310 the Council of Ten had been 
introduced into the Venetian constitution, and Harrington recognised that even in a 
commonwealth like Venice ‘there are sometime wicked and disloiall citizens, that are causes 
thereunto of great troubles and calamities’. Harrington recognised that its principal 
responsibility was to ensure the safety of the commonwealth: ‘the power which they now 
exercise…consists in the punishment of certain heinous crimes, especially that of treason, in 
relation whereunto they are as it were sentinels standing upon the guard of the 
commonwealth’.109 This important responsibility again contributed to the stability of the 
Venetian republic and the ‘important speed and secrecy’ granted to them ‘the full and 
absolute power of the whole commonwealth, as Dictator’.110 In Oceana there is also space for 
a council with dictatorial powers for in situations or ‘emergencies requiring extraordinary 
speed or secrecy’.111  
Harrington described the constitution and orders of the Council of Ten at length in The 
Prerogative of Popular Government. He described how the council is established and the 
system of rotation it utilises: 
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The consiglio de’ dieci, or council of ten, being that which partaketh of dictatorian power, is not 
a limb of her, but as it were a Sword in her hand. This council (in which the signiory hath also 
Session and Suffrage) consisteth more peculiarly of ten annual magistrates, created by the great 
council, who afterwards elect three of their own number by lot, which so elected are called capi 
de’ dieci, their Magistracy being monthly.112  
Through the tight control of ballot and rotation, Harrington argued that the Venetians had 
little to fear from ‘the arbitrary power of their courts, as the constitution of them; whereby 
that arbitrary power, being altogether unable to retard or do hurt unto business, produceth and 
must produce the quickest dispatch and the most righteous dictates of justice that are perhaps 
in human nature’.113 The Venetians were therefore protected from their own councils and 
those potentially seditious citizens who could endanger their safety and stability.  
Nonetheless, the Council of Ten was widely considered problematic.  Even before the anti-
myth of Venice became a coherent narrative, the Ten were perceived to have grown 
increasingly authoritative and oppressive, and in some cases tyrannical. Harrington hinted 
towards an awareness of these types of criticisms in Oceana through, as he was wont to do, 
the voice of one of his characters. In Epimonus’ speech against the use of Venice as a model 
for Oceana, he complains about the reliability of the intelligence they have received from Mr 
Peregrine Spy who ‘should make such fools of us here, when I know that he must have had 
his intelligence from some corncutter upon the Rialto; for a noble Venetian would be hanged 
if he should keep such a fellow company’.114 This suggested that Harrington was aware of the 
culture of secrecy that was innate in the Venetian patriciate, as well as the brutal retribution 
that was enacted against anyone who broke that secrecy. Harrington, however, does not 
address this issue. Instead, he focused on the ways in which Venice benefitted from the Ten: 
In the war (saith he [Giannotti]) which the Venetians had with Florence in Casentine, the 
Florentines, finding a necessity in their affairs, far from any other inclination in themselves, to 
ask their peace, sent ambassadors about it unto Venice, where they were no sooner heard than the 
bargain was struck up by the council of ten; and everybody admiring (seeing this commonwealth 
stood upon the higher ground) what should be the reason of such haste, the council upon the 
return of the ambassadors imparted letters unto the senate, whereby it appeared that the Turk had 
newly launched a formidable fleet against their state; which had it been known to the Florentines, 
it was well enough known they would have made no peace. Wherefore the service of the ten was 
highly applauded by the senate, and celebrated by the Venetians.
115 
In using this particular example of the way in which the Council of Ten provided Venice with 
stability, Harrington is also supporting his own interpretation of Venice. Rather than 
providing an example of how the Council of Ten had dealt with internal dissension, which 
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would undermine his portrayal of Venice as internally equal and non-seditious, he offered an 
instance that demonstrates their dealings with international problems. Indeed in offering this 
example, Harrington avoided explicit recognition of the criticism that the Council of Ten 
faced in relation to its swift, secret and often harsh justice.   
External Stability 
Dealing effectively with enemies from abroad was a yet further way in which Venice was 
considered admirable by Harrington. According to the myth of Venice, this commonwealth  
‘from the first beginning till this time of ours it hath remained safe and free this thousand and 
two hundred yeares…from the domination of Straungers’.116 This added to the ability of both 
Harrington and the Venetians to argue that the Serene Republic was the embodiment of 
ancient prudence as their liberty had never been infringed by domination.
117
 But although this 
was indeed true, it was on this subject that Harrington most struggled to reconcile the myth of 
Venice with his own political thinking and aspirations for England. Whilst Venice was a 
commonwealth for preservation and peace, Harrington sought to recreate the glory of Rome 
without the tumults this latter republic had endured. The myth of Venice, on the other hand, 
acknowledged that ‘there hath been many commonwealths, which have farre exceeded Venice 
as well in empire and greatness of estate, as in militarie discipline and glory of the wars’.118 
Thus he sought a way to marry the internal stability of Venice with his warlike, expansionist 
ambitions.  
This is not to say that Harrington was dismissive of Venice’s continued independence from 
any external dominion, which by any interpretation was no mean feat considering the 
powerful enemies surrounding the tiny city-state. In fact, part of Venice’s success was down 
to its unique geographic location. As an island, it had been protected ‘by virtue of her 
impregnable situation’.119 But Harrington took offence at the suggestion that it was only 
because of geography that Venice had survived: ‘it is true that a man in time of war may be 
more secure from his enemies by being in a citadel, but not from his diseases, wherefore the 
first cause, if he live long, is his good constitution, without which his citadel were to little 
purpose, and it is no otherwise with Venice’.120 Harrington argued that without the good 
foundations and orders that the Venetians have instituted, their island location would matter 
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little, because they would be constitutionally unequal and therefore vulnerable to seditions, 
tumults and invasion. 
Its success at staving off dangerous enemies was all the more impressive considering that 
Venice was constituted as a commonwealth for peace and preservation. Because of its unusual 
nature, the Venetian republic favoured peace, and found it ‘essential’ to rely on ‘Forraign or 
mercenary Forces’.  One of the reasons for this was also an issue that Harrington had 
elsewhere sought to circumvent, for he explained that ‘for Land services such a Constitution 
can have no other’.121 Harrington believed that only citizens should be permitted to bear arms. 
As much as he sought to argue that politically Venice represented a democracy, those who 
would be eligible to bear arms would make up a minuscule proportion of the population, and 
hardly constitute a forbidding army. After all she had only a few thousand citizens and ‘to 
make wars with small forces is no husbandry, but a waste, a disease, a lingering and painful 
consumption of men and money’.122 Following Machiavelli, Harrington lamented that this 
was the main ‘defect of Venice’: ‘her want of proper arms’ had ‘cut her wings and spoiled her 
mount unto heaven’.123 Although it was necessary for Venice to rely on mercenaries, 
Harrington did not like it. He believed that ‘in a government of citizens, if the commonwealth 
be not for increase, but preservation only, as Lacedaemon, Carthage, Venice, Forraign Arms 
are both necessary and dangerous’.124 Mercenaries were ‘Souldiers of Fortune’ who ‘of all 
others be the most pernicious; for what can we expect lesse of which whose Art is not 
otherwise so profitable, then that they should (as Machiavelli shews) be breakers of their 
faith, given unto rapine, Enemies of peace and government’.125 Thus in respect to Venetian 
military orders, Harrington stated unequivocally that ‘in this part of our government neither 
Venice, nor any nation that maketh use of mercenary forces, is for our instruction’.126  
Venice was also categorised as a commonwealth for preservation. One of the benefits of this 
type of commonwealth was it ensured stability:  ‘wherefore let a legislator consider with 
himself whether he would make his commonwealth for preservation, in which case she may 
be free from tumults; or for increase, in which case she must be infested with them’.127 
However, as Harrington recognised, this is not always the case, for ‘if he make her for 
preservation she may be quiet at home, but will be in danger abroad.’ This was because her 
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‘foundation must be narrow and therefore weak; as that of Lacedaemon, which lay upon thirty 
thousand citizens, or that of Venice, which lies but upon three thousand.’128 Thus, 
‘considering the paucity of citizens taken in and the number not taken in’ Harrington 
concludes that Venice as a commonwealth for preservation ‘is externally unequal’.129 This 
problem of the narrowness of the patriciate class, although Harrington can adapt it to suit his 
constitutional arguments and the concept of mixed government, is a repeated problem when it 
came to Venice’s military orders.  
Moreover, he argued that one should not attempt to transcend the ends of government that 
best suit your particular constitution. Thus he was critical of the Venetian attempt to partake 
in both war and territorial expansion. Thus a commonwealth for preservation that pursues war 
is at danger for ‘succeeding ill, she is an easy prey, or succeeding well, ruining by increase, a 
weight which her foundation is not able to bear’.130 In order to demonstrate this last point, 
Harrington points to the famous battle of Agnadello of the War of the League of Cambrai in 
which ‘Venice, having possessed herself of a great part of Italy by her purse, was no sooner, 
in defence of it, put unto the trial of her arms, than she lost all in one battle’.131 The 
possession of such an extensive Terrafirma therefore surpassed what the structure of the 
Venetian government was able to sustain.  As a result, her ‘progress, or increase, which by 
this means either cannot be great, must render her but the more infirm’.132 Indeed a republic 
like Venice was ‘planted in a flowerpot, and if she grow, she grows top-heavy and falls 
too…[for] you cannot plant an oak in a flowerpot’.133 As a commonwealth for preservation, 
Venice was therefore doomed whether she was for peace or war, which in turn was a result of 
the fact that her arms were only in the hands of the few.  
Furthermore, although it was considered a commonwealth for preservation, the Venetian 
republic had in fact undergone some expansion and possessed many island territories to 
accompany its Terrafirma possessions. It appears that this expansion was initially unintended: 
For though the citty being builded in the sea, and at the first for many years careless of extending 
their dominion and rule over the continent, did not apply themselves to land wars, yet did they 
with marvellous glory of success bend themselves to warres by sea, atchiving therewith many 
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notable exploits, as well in defence of their own liberty, as revenge of injurie done them by their 
enemies.
134 
From these wars at sea the Venetians gathered numerous islands that were taken into their 
empire. After this success, Contarini tells us how the Venetian’s eventually yielded to the 
petitions and pleas for help from the ‘oppressed bordering people’, sending forces into the 
mainland to expel the tyrants, and ‘with an infinite applause and willingness of the people 
receive[d] all those Provinces of their olde consideration into their protection, as though they 
have never been disunited thereby setting them free from out the servitude’.135 Thus, we are 
informed, this increase of dominion simply ‘added to the former greatness of the city’.136 
While the myth of Venice claimed that this territorial expansion added to the glory of Venice, 
Harrington did not see it as such. He argues that although ‘every commonwealth that holdeth 
provinces must in that regard be such [externally unequal], yet not into that degree.’137 The 
loss of the entire Terrafirma after the Battle of Adnadello has demonstrated that empire of 
Venice was extremely fragile. However, Harrington argued that the possession of these 
provinces did not actually make Venice more externally unequal by undermining the balance 
of power and dominion in the Venetian republic itself, for it was that the Venetians did not 
dare ‘take in their subjects upon this balance, lest the foreign interest should root out the 
national, which is that of the three thousand now governing, and by diffusing the 
commonwealth throughout her territories, lost the advantage of her situation, by which in a 
great part she subsisteth’.138 Thus by denying those in the provinces any access to the 
patriciate class, the internal balance of the commonwealth remained the same and the interests 
of the city of Venice remained secure.  
Harrington did, however, argue that the Venetian treatment of her provincial subjects helped 
ensure the republic’s safety and stability, and here he does come back to the myth of Venice. 
Harrington claims, that because of the ‘exquisite justice’ of the Venetian provincial 
government, their subjects ‘have no will to invade her’.139 This follows the myth of Venice 
which declares that after they had obtained these provincial territories the Venetian’s ‘desire 
and indeavour was not onely to comfort and cherish this new received people with wholesome 
and profitable laws, but also to finde out meanes, whereby to maintaine and preserve their 
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freedome and tranquillity’.140 As such the Venetians left ‘to every citty that commeth into the 
fellowship of our government, their own municipale lawes and statutes, and the Cittizens, 
every one in their owne citties, obtaine many great and honourable places, and not a few 
towns of those abroad in the countrie, are governed by magistrates of their owne, chosen 
among themselves’. For the Venetians it was a matter of: 
great honour and reputation, as also of great gaine and commoditie unto them, these manner of 
offices may not bee executed by any of the Nobilitie of Venice, but one eyther chosen from 
among the plebeians, or else, and that in a manner alwaies from out the citties, subjected to our 
fellowship. And therfore it may easily appear, that this our commonwealth is tempered with than 
moderation, which seemeth chiefly and nearest to imitate nature.
141 
Thus although those who lived under the subjection of Venice were not admitted to the 
patriciate of Venice, they were treated well enough that they did not feel the need to rebel or 
invade their rulers. In doing so, the Venetians ensured that they had nothing to fear either 
from their own people within the city of Venice, nor those under its subjection in its 
provinces.  
Harrington therefore did not see much value in the military orders of Venice, because it stood 
in opposition to the vision of the type of government he wanted to establish in England. He 
envisioned a commonwealth for expansion like Rome. When he considered expansion, he 
argued that there were three ways in which this provincial (as opposed to national) 
government could be structured: 
 ‘Commonwealths’, saith he [Machiavelli], ‘have had three ways of propagating themselves’; one, 
after the manner of monarchies, ‘by imposing the yoke, which was the way of Athens and towards 
the latter times of Lacedaemon; another by equal leagues, which is the way of Switz’ (I shall add of 
Holland though since his time);  ‘a third by unequal leagues, which to the shame of the world, was 




Pocock has suggested that by distinguishing the commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland 
as ‘leagues’ Harrington was ‘declining to treat the Swiss and Dutch confederacies as republics 
but as leagues on the Achaean or Aetolian pattern’.143 Machiavelli, however, does not make 
these mutually exclusive, and Harrington’s incorporation of them in the Council of 
Legislators suggests not either. As such, Harrington expanded upon each form of propagation, 
saying of equal leagues: 
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The second way of propagation or enlargement used by commonwealths is that of Switzerland or 
Holland, equal leagues. This, though it be not otherwise mischievous, is useless to the world and 
dangerous unto themselves, useless unto the world, for, as the former governments were storks, 
these are blocks, have no sense of honour, or concernment in the suffering of others.
144
 
In Aphorisms Political he continued upon this theme, arguing that in equal leagues ‘one 
commonwealth, under the league, is no more than another, and each one as to herself hath a 
negative; which kind of union is not only obstructive, but tendeth (as we have seen both in 
Holland and Switz) towards division’.145 On the other hand, in Harrington’s preferred form of 
unequal leagues, ‘the commonwealth uniting other commonwealths, retaineth unto herself the 
leading of the whole league, leaving under each of the rest her own laws and her own 
liberty.
146
 Rome, of course, followed this last method. However, Harrington did not provide 
much explanation as to why an equal league might be ‘dangerous’, ‘useless’ or tending 
towards ‘division’. For that we must turn to Machiavelli himself, and he appeared far less 
pessimistic about equal leagues, pointing out that they have some benefits: ‘first, you do not 
easily bring wars down on your own back; secondly, you can easily keep all that you take’.147 
Nonetheless, he too sees distinct disadvantages. He argued that under leagues which rely on 
alliances, ‘it is impossible to expand very much…because such a republic is disjointed and 
has several seats of power, which makes it difficult for them to consult and reach 
decisions’.148 For Harrington, expansion was essential to the immortality of a commonwealth; 
one that could not, or would not, expand was thereby unstable and dangerous. Understanding 
this makes sense of Harrington’s metaphors which hint at a similar explanation: ‘the senates 
of Switzerland and Holland…being bound up, like the sheaf of arrows which this gives, by 
leagues, lie like those in their quivers. But arrows, when they come to be drawn, fly some this 
way and some that’.149 He repeats this imagery later in The Commonwealth of Oceana: ‘that 
their cantons and provinces are so many arrows is good; but they are so many bows too, 
which is naught’.150 Since the leagues failed to allow sufficient expansion, and caused dissent 
among provinces who might have different agendas, Harrington rejected them in language far 
stronger than Machiavelli, from whom he had borrowed the idea.  
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Conclusions 
In exploring the various ways in which Harrington engaged with the Dutch and Venetian 
republics, we can offer fresh perspectives on both the political thought of Harrington and the 
republican tradition more broadly. We can see that Harrington’s admiration for the Venetian 
republic was far from ubiquitous, and that often he had to manipulate aspects of its myth and 
its history in order to make it serve his specific purpose. While Harrington’s engagement with 
Venice has long been recognised, his incorporation of the Dutch Republic has received less 
attention. What I have demonstrated is that even though the specifics of Holland and the 
United Provinces often proved counter to Harrington’s vision, he still sought to portray the 
specifics of that commonwealth in such a way that it could support the proposals he set out in 
his own constitutional blueprint.  
Moreover, this chapter continues the work done by historians such as Foxley and Davis, who 
are taking a closer look at the language and terminology utilised by Harrington. It supports 
their claims that Harrington was both specific and innovative with his use of language.
151
 I 
have shown here that Harrington’s definition of democracy was actually more complex than 
has traditionally been understood. It involved not just the people possessing sovereignty, but 
also related to the balance of land, the political infrastructure, and the division of legislative 
powers between political bodies.  
Moreover, this chapter contributes to wider arguments concerning the English republican 
tradition. Just as she has argued for a monarchical role within republicanism, so Hammersley 
has also been at the forefront of scholars arguing that some English republicans embraced the 
term ‘democracy’. Even the Levellers, who are often seen as the most proto-democratic group 
of the mid-seventeenth century, actively tried to distance themselves from the term. Here, 
however, we find Harrington deliberately manipulating history and terminology in order to 
present both Venice and the Dutch Republic as democratic. This builds on the work of 
Chapter 2, demonstrating a further element of a pluralistic understanding of English 
republicanism.  
We can also offer fresh insights into recent work that has re-examined the literary value of 
Oceana. Some historians have viewed Harrington, and Oceana in particular as ‘large, 
ponderous, and rather badly written’.152 However, as I have demonstrated, Harrington was on 
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the whole very specific with his language, using it to a specific purpose and often 
manipulating words. Harrington's tendency to redefine key terms for his own ends has also 
recently been acknowledged by Hammersley, who has reassessed Harrington’s use of the 
terms ‘monarchy’, aristocracy’ and ‘democracy’; and by Davis, with regards to the meaning 
of ‘equality’ in Harrington’s works.153 Davis has also been crucial in changing the way 
Oceana has been viewed. Rather than portraying it as an ungainly mess, Davis has 
demonstrated that the form and language of a prose romance narrative used in Oceana, rather 
than being a clumsy means by which to portray his ideas, actually serves a specific 
purpose.
154
 An examination of Harrington’s engagement with the Dutch and Venetian 
republic serves to reinforce this reading; Oceana did not use language lightly, instead 
showing a deftness with words that demonstrates both his linguistic ability and the 
distinctiveness of his political thought.  
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Chapter 4: Debating the Dutch and Venetian Constitutions 
 
In the historiography, and especially in the work of Fink and Pocock, Harrington has 
traditionally been placed at the centre of the English republican tradition.
1
 Harrington was 
described as not just a ‘classical republican’ but as ‘England’s premier civic humanist and 
Machiavellian’.2 Even recent work, such as Nelson’s on the Hebrew Republic, while 
challenging some standard assumptions about republicanism, places Harrington as a leading 
figure in English republicanism.
3
 There has, however, been a move away from this in recent 
years. Scott, Rahe and Hammersley have all argued that Harrington’s republicanism was 
highly atypical, although the ways in which they have distinguished him from other 
republicans has differed considerably.
4
 In taking a look at the way in which other republican 
thinkers engaged with the Venetian and Dutch Republics we can further ascertain 
Harrington’s distance from the conventional republican narrative and highlight some of the 
distinctions between various English republican thinkers.  
James Howell 
Although Harrington is often remembered as most strongly advocating the Venetian Republic 
as a model for English government to follow, there was another who set out a similar political 
agenda.  In 1651, James Howell published S.P.Q.V. A Survay of the Signorie of Venice, of Her 
Admired Policy and Method of Government. Although Howell has never been considered as 
part of the republican canon, his was one of the only tracts published in England in the first 
half of the 1650s outlining the myth of Venice. It has, for the most part, been described as ‘a 
straightforward presentation of the myth’.5 Howell picked up on several of the essential 
themes of the myth, adopting the panegyric tone of Contarini’s well-known text. He also 
emphasised Venice's position as a maritime power, and crucially highlighted its status as an 
island, in order highlight the comparison with England: ‘England hath reason to affect Venice 
more than any other, for in point of security ther is much resemblance between them, being 
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both seated in the sea, who is their best protector’.6 Moreover, although he was an admirer of 
antiquity and its authority, he was not inclined to accept the notion of the inevitable decay of 
the world.
7
 Howell showed that the Venetian republic had survived for a thousand years 
constant in its Christian faith, despite the constant threat from innumerable enemies from both 
east and west. In the face of these assaults from without ‘she hath continued a Virgin ever 
since, nere upon twelve long ages, under the same forme and face of government, without any 
visible change or symptome of decay, or the least wrinkle of old age’.8 If, therefore, it were 
‘within the reach of humane brain to prescribe Rules for fixing a Society and Succession of 
people under the same Species of Government as long as the World lasts, the Republic of 
Venice were the fittest pattern on Earth both for direction and imitation’.9 Harrington would 
express an almost identical sentiment only five years later.  
Howell also followed Contarini in acknowledging the aristocratic predominance in the 
Venetian mixed government. This favoured Howell’s personal political beliefs that distrusted 
the ‘mechanick’ sort of people; rather, he was an admirer of aristocracy for its potential to 
govern the realm in counsel with the monarch.
10
 Furthermore, like Harrington, Howell 
perceived that the decline in the power of the aristocracy had contributed to the political 
turmoil in England, although Howell blamed Charles I for this, while Harrington looked back 
to Henry VII and Henry VIII.
11
 Much of Venice’s success he ascribed to a collective political 
wisdom or ‘prudence’ embodied in the Senate, rather than in the doge.12 The Venetian model 
supported Howell’s conviction that a reassertion of aristocratic influence would be necessary 
in a new commonwealth if its descent into the chaos of a popular state was to be arrested.
13
 
Howell’s dedication of the tract to the ‘most noble senators’ of England provides further 
support for Howell’s preference for an aristocratic form of government. In publishing 
S.P.Q.V. he was encouraging the newly founded English commonwealth to reassert the type 
of aristocratic influence that was present in the Venetian republic in order to establish control 
over the newly founded commonwealth. 
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In many ways, Howell appears to anticipate Harrington’s arguments in The Commonwealth of 
Oceana. However, Howell and S.P.Q.V have not received much attention in recent years. 
Howell was a royalist and found himself imprisoned in the Fleet in 1643, ostensibly for his 
allegiance to the king and indeed he saw himself as ‘a martyr to the royalist cause’.14 
Released on bail in 1650, he quickly published S.P.Q.V and dedicated it to the Rump 
parliament. In his preface, Howell declared the purpose of the tract to be to exhort 
Christendom to come to the aid of the Venetians who were still engaged in a war against the 
Ottoman Empire: ‘it imports all Christian Princes to resent her Condition, She being both the 
Key, and Bulwark of Europe that way; And with humble leave I speak it, it may well becom 
England (now that she is more formidable at Sea than ever) to be sensible of Her case’.15 The 
content of the tract, however, barely mentions this conflict again; instead, it contains a whole 
section devoted to an elaborate description of Venetian institutions, the most detailed 
description, in fact, which had appeared that century.
16
 Wootton has warned that ‘Howell’s 
book is an object lesson in the danger of assuming there is necessarily a straightforward 
connection between the subject matter of a book and its author’s private convictions’. Instead, 
Wootton argues, the publication of this text was more than likely an attempt by Howell to 
reconcile himself to England as a republic, as well as an effort to convince the government of 
his loyalty.
17
 Daniel Woolf supports Wootton’s view, adding that in fact ‘it is difficult to see 
S.P.Q.V. as anything other than an attempt to impress his new governors by drawing parallels 
between the two republics’.18  
But it is unfair to dismiss Howell’s intentions entirely just because he had sought royal 
position and sought to reconcile king and parliament. After all, Harrington had been 
appointed as gentlemen of the bedchamber to Charles I whilst the latter had been imprisoned, 
and although employed by Parliament, he appears to have been on good terms with the king.
19
 
Aubrey stated that ‘Mr Harington passionately loved his Majestie’, of whom he spoke ‘with 
the greatest zeale and passion imaginable’.20 Therefore the possibility of reading Howell’s 
work as a republican offering ought not to be entirely dismissed. This is especially the case if 
we consider the works Howell published in the 1640s. Although much of his wartime writing 
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concerned the proper relation of king to parliament, he also wrote about Europe and travel.
21
 
As early as 1642, in his Instructions for Forren Travel, Howell praised Venice above all 
European states, describing it as ‘a rich magnificent city in the very jaws of Neptune’.22 He 
presented Venice as the very essence of a balanced state, apparently untroubled by its lack of 
a real monarchy.
23
 He was therefore consistent in this admiration of the Venetian constitution, 
and had even already declared that there were ‘many things in that Government worth the 
carying away’.24 Wootton has stated that it would ‘be surprising indeed if he was 
straightforwardly advocating Venetian institutions for England’; the evidence, however, 
shows that Howell’s relationship with Venice was one of continued admiration and a 
recognition of its potential utility.
25
 Moreover, looking at Howell through a broader 
understanding of republicanism puts him alongside Harrington in a way that he has not 
necessarily been before.  
Nedham’s anti-Venetian discourse in late 1651-2 can be read as a direct response to Howell’s 
praise of Venice. On several occasions in Mercurius Politicus Nedham referred to the 
publications of a ‘countreyman of ours’, which has been credibly assigned to be James 
Howell.
26
 Nedham’s attacks on the Venetian government reflect his broader commitment to a 
popular state that would allow the people to maintain their liberty against kingly or 
aristocratic influence or tyranny.
27
 He believed that ‘the People were the best keepers of 
Liberty’ and that the people ought to be ‘continually trained up in the Exercise of Arms, and 
the Militia lodged onely in the Peoples hands’ because ‘the Sword, and Soveraignty, ever 
walk hand in hand together’.28 However, while he recognised that popular sovereignty was 
the true foundation of government, since people generally defended their own interest, he also 
understood that the people were often misled by their pre-existing beliefs and so had to be 
educated in good citizenship. He published tracts such as The Case of the Commonwealth of 
England, Stated exactly in order to remind different groups what their specific interests ought 
to be. Under this guise he was able to justify his outward support for both the Rump 
parliament and the Cromwellian protectorate as necessary expedients providing a stable 
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government that was capable of teaching the people true liberty. Moreover, Nedham 
supported a warlike expansionist state and as such insisted that arms must be in the hands of 
the people.  
As a supporter of an armed popular state, it is perhaps hardly surprising that Nedham reacted 
so quickly and harshly to Howell’s presentation of Venice as a model for emulation, since he 
saw it as neither popular nor capable of allowing the people to bear arms. Much of the 
criticism that Nedham directed towards Venice focused on its oppression of the people and its 
tyrannical oligarchical Senate. He argued that the best governments are ‘setled in an equal 
mixture of both Interests, Patrician and Popular’. But in Venice: 'the Patrician is predominant, 
and the People a little too much kept under’.29 Nedham built on this to offer a complete 
condemnation of the aristocratic nature of the Venetian polity and the associated subjugation 
of its people. Soon enough the people ‘are little better than Vassals under the Power of their 
Senate’ and are ‘excluded from all interest in Government, the power of making and 
executing of laws, and bearing of Offices, with all other immunities, lies only in the hands of 
a Standing Senate, and their kindred, which they call the Patrician or Noble Order’.30 As for 
those people who lived beyond the city itself, they ‘are so extremely oppressed in their 
Territories, that they live by no law but the Arbitrary dictates of the Senate’. So oppressed 
were the people who had been conquered by the Venetians that Nedham repeatedly asserted 
that they ‘are ready still, upon any opportunity (as they have been ever) to revolt to the 
Turkish Government’ and ‘would rather subject themselves to the Pagan Tyranny of the 
Turks’ than continue under the oppression of the Venetian republic.31 The people were 
portrayed as being all but slaves under the power of the Senate, and as such it was the 
patrician order of Venice, responsible for that oppression, that was on the receiving end of 
Nedham’s harshest reproach.  
Nedham condemned the Venetian nobility on two fronts. First that the patriciate represented a 
tightly closed order: ‘none but the sons of the Senate are admitted to any dignity or power, but 
they all of them (without distinction) are admitted to the Helm, after they are once 25 years 
old; so that…the reasons and occasions of inconvenience are the same, as in the Kingly 
hereditary Form’.32 Indeed, the patriciate ‘proceeded so far as to debar the people from 
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marrying into their Families; and by this means (as they do now in Venice, for the most part) 
keeping a kind of State and Grandeur above the people, they the more easily made a shift to 
keep them out of all places of high trust and Authority’.33 The power of the Senate was so 
great that it was able to incorporate both the aristocratic and monarchical elements of the 
Venetian government, since it possessed the hereditary danger that was inherent in the kingly 
form. By contrast, Nedham appears to have had very little problem with the Duke of Venice 
because he was so heavily restrained and controlled. He comments on how ‘the People are 
Free from Domination of their Prince or Duke’ because he is ‘indeed restrained, and made 
just another Officer…differing from the rest of the Senate, only in a Corner of his Cap, 
besides a little outward Ceremony and Splendour’.34 Furthermore, while the Doge was held 
accountable to the Senate the ‘Senators are accountable to none, so the People are 
remedyless’.35  
The second reason that Nedham condemned the Venetian nobility was that they alone 
possessed all sovereignty and power. As such he criticises them for being ‘a standing senate 
of Grandees’, a ‘hereditary titular Nobility’, ‘a multiplied monarchy’ and accuses the republic 
of being ‘more a Juncta than a Commonwealth’.36 These pointed criticisms are intended to 
draw the reader’s attention to the parallels between the Senate and the Rump parliament of 
England. After Pride’s Purge had reduced the House of Commons to half its previous number 
of members, and the House of Lords had been abolished, a tiny minority of English Grandees 
had unprecedented legislative and executive powers.
37
 Since Nedham was writing in a state-
sponsored news-book, he could hardly directly criticise the Rump; by veiling his criticism of 
England within his commentary upon the Venetian Republic, he could superficially appear 
loyal whilst more astute readers would discern his real opinions. In his strongest criticism he 
stated unequivocally that the men in the Senate are ‘seated there in an hereditary, arbitrary, 
uncontrolable, unaccountable state of dominion over that poor people’.38  In the face of these 
criticisms, Nedham argued that in fact the Venetian Republic should hardly be defined as a 
commonwealth at all. He said that ‘Venice, though it bear the name of a Free-State, yet it hath 
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little of the substance’.39 In a later editorial, he stated that ‘Venice hath not so much as a Face 
of Freedom, nor so much as a Forme of a Real Republic’.40 Whilst the English government 
remained balanced precariously upon a narrow oligarchy, like the Venetian Republic, it was 
not deserving of the name “commonwealth”.   
Twinned with Nedham’s emphasis on the necessity of popular government was the need for 
them to possess arms. However, in Venice the people were so unhappy that they could not be 
trusted with arms: 
Were Venice a State, so free as it is called, we might then have seen them in another posture of 
Militia then now they are: For, the Nobility, as the grand secret of State to uphold their own power, 
do not intrust the Arms in the hands of the people, but hold an Army ever in pay, mixt partly with 
Natives, partly Foreiners, who depend onely upon themselves, being enabled thereby to do what 
they please with the people.
41
  
As an advocate of an armed popular state, Nedham was therefore critical of this reliance on 
mercenary forces. Indeed, the impression the reader forms is that under normal circumstances 
a republic relying on such forces would not last. He suggests that ‘you might wonder how this 
State hath held up for so long’ and states that it is merely because of its location: ‘we know 
the interest in Christendom being concerned with her security, she hath been chiefly 
supported by the Supplies and Arms of others’.42 By this he means that by acting, just as 
Howell suggests, as a bulwark between the pagan Ottoman Empire and western Christendom, 
it has long been in Christian princes’ interest to ensure that the Venetian republic continued to 
take the brunt of the Turkish onslaught. Despite attacking other elements of it, Nedham 
utilizes one of the key themes of the myth of Venice here, agreeing that its location was 
fundamental to its lengthy survival; but he also subverts it by portraying Venice as 
strategically useful to Europe and as such a mere pawn in European political and religious 
games. European powers provided the mercenary forces that propped up the Venetian 
republic and ensured its continued survival.  
The patriciate class did not trust the people to bear arms, and they had just as little trust in one 
another. Another theme that Nedham draws out is the distrust, jealousy and secrecy that 
existed both between and within the classes. In his 1652 editorials Nedham sets out his 
fundamental rules for the preservation of the public freedom, one of which is that ‘it be made 
an unpardonable Crime, to incur the guilt of Treason against the Interest and Majesty of the 
                                                 
39
 Mercurius Politicus, Issue 84, 8-15 January 1652, 1337.  
40
 Mercurius Politicus, Issue 89, 12-19 February 1652, 1412.  
41
 Mercurius Politicus, Issue 103, 20-17 May 1652, 1612.  
42
 Mercurius Politicus, Issue 86, 22-29 January 1652, 1368. 
 124 
People’.43 Venice features heavily in this editorial, demonstrating that the Venetians buy their 
mythical stability at the price of terror and oppression. He outlines how in Venice ‘it is, there, 
Death without mercy, for any man to have the least attempt, or thought, of conspiring against 
the Common-weal’. He also outlines how it is treason ‘in case any Senator betray Council: 
there it is an unpardonable Crime, and such a moral sin, that draws on Death without 
mercy’.44 Internal stability is not therefore a result of the perfect Venetian constitution, but 
rather an enforced peace, paid for with the blood of any man who dared step out of line.  
As well as fears of treason, the Venetian patriciate class were shown to be fearful of any one 
of their number becoming excessively powerful. The most explicit example of this was of 
course the Doge, who was dismissed by Nedham as ‘indeed restrained’, ‘made just another 
Officer’ and of ‘small power’.45 The Venetian Senate takes special care ‘to preserve 
themselves free from the usurpation of any of their Fellow Senators, as well as their Duke’.46 
Limitations on the Doge, though, were understood and well known; what was less commonly 
known was the distrust that was inherent within the patriciate. Nedham states that ‘it is 
attributed by a Countreyman of ours to be one main cause of the long life of that Republick, 
that is was never yet usurpt by the Power of Policie of any of its Members’.47 Howell 
evidently meant this as a positive point, demonstrating that the patriciate were content with 
their lot and as such had no desire to seek an increase in power. However, given the strict 
controls on behaviour and any deviation from the norm being punishable by death, it is likely 
that Nedham deliberately interprets this as a negative aspect suggesting that the patriciate had 
managed to oppress even themselves.  
What this demonstrates is that the themes of the myth and anti-myth of Venice were being put 
to use very early on in the English Republic. Moreover, neither the myth nor the anti-myth 
were being put to use in ways that we might expect, since it is widely remembered as a model 
for English republicans. Instead, here we have Howell, a man who was supposedly 
imprisoned during the civil war because of his royalism, who used the myth of Venice to 
support the Rump parliament. He wanted to bolster the position of the Rump Parliament, who 
were, in his conception, the embodiment of the virtuous aristocracy, and in doing so, prevent 
the people from playing a larger role in the government of the country. On the other hand, we 
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have Nedham, a widely accepted contributor to the English republican canon and employed 
by the newly established commonwealth, who portrayed a strongly negative vision of Venice 
as an oligarchical, oppressive anti-model for England. Representations of the Venetian 
Republic ought not therefore be interpreted as endorsement of it as the ideal model of a 
commonwealth.  
Responding to Harrington’s Venetian Principles 
The ways in which Venice was represented were therefore different depending on the political 
views and agenda of the author. Harrington and Howell used the myth of Venice to project 
their own positive, albeit different, images of that republic onto England’s form of 
government. Nedham, on the other hand, not only attacked the vision of government that 
Howell propounded; he also reacted against the Venetian principles outlined in The 
Commonwealth of Oceana. However, the way in which he responded to Harrington’s vision 
of Venice was very different to the visceral way in which he had attacked Howell.  
Nedham responded to Harrington’s constitutional proposals by condemning the creation of 
constitutional blueprints, on the grounds that one form of government cannot be appropriate 
to all times. Although Harrington also admitted this (in that he argued that when the balance 
of land favoured the monarch or the nobility a commonwealth was no longer a suitable form 
of government) Oceana was designed to ensure that now the balance of land in England is in 
the hands of the people it would remain so indefinitely. Nedham on the other hand argued that  
all Forms of Government are but temporary Expedients, to be taken upon Tryal, a necessity and 
Right Reason of State enjoins in order to the publick safety; and that as ‘tis madness to contend for 
any Form when the Reason of it is gone, so ‘tis neither dishonour or scandal, by following right 
Reason, to shift through every Form after all other Experiments made in vain, when the ends of 
Government cannot otherwise be conserved, to revert upon the old bottom and Foundation.
48 
In his perception then, political theorists like Harrington misunderstood the nature of 
government: ‘the Rules and Reasons of Government cannot always be the same, it depending 
on future contingents, and therefore must be alterable according to the variety of emergent 
circumstances and accidents; so that no certain form can be prescribed at all times’.49 Political 
modelling was as useful as building ‘Castles in the aire’.50 Nedham’s four editorials from 
“Utopia” demonstrate that he believed ‘it matters not what the Form be, so we attain the ends 
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of Government’.51 His disdain was not just limited to Harrington for his utopianism; he also 
listed ‘Doctor Ferne, Mr Hobbs, Mr White, Mr John Hall of Richmond, together with the 
High-Notionall-Knight, and the Author of the late Animadversions upon the Welsh’) as 
equally deluded.
52
 Rosanna Cox has suggested that utopian discourse flourished during the 
interregnum reflecting ‘their hopes and fears and their increasingly desperate attempts to 
fashion a constitution which could secure a long-lasting and suitably magnificent future’ for 
the republic.
53
 It seems several people started imagining an ideal government when political 
instability seemed to be worsening, as indeed it was when Harrington and Nedham were 
writing. Nedham recognised that the commonwealth was on the brink of a significant change; 
in the month prior to his letters from “Utopia” the first draft of 'The Humble Petition and 
Advice' had been presented to Cromwell, which offered him the crown. For Nedham this 
represented a constitutional crisis that could not be solved by political idealising and 
modelling but rather called for flexibility. This is not necessarily an about-turn from his 
earlier position, since Nedham had previously argued that the people often had to be educated 
into liberty rather than naturally embracing it. This argument conveniently helped Nedham 
adapt himself to the numerous shifts in constitutional form over the course of the 1650s, and 
although historians have tended to label him a ‘weathercock’ for it, this stance helped him 
embrace his core principles whilst maintaining the pragmatism that was necessary in such a 
rapidly changing political landscape.   
The last of Nedham's editorials differed from the previous four in that it was written from 
“Oceana”, rather than “Utopia”. Nedham recognised that many of the orders of Oceana were 
modelled upon the Venetian system, and in this letter he mocks not just the concept of 
political modelling, but Harrington’s use of the Venetian model in particular. Nedham 
focused his attention on Harrington’s dependence on and faith in the balloting box.54 Nedham 
criticized Harrington for his naïve belief that ‘very ordinary tools will serve the turn’ of 
ensuring liberty and stability within a commonwealth. He was referring of course to the twin 
pillars of rotation and the ballot which are so fundamental to the constitution of Venice and 
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Oceana. Harrington saw the balloting boxes as an infallible means by which to control human 
nature and prevent corruption in government. Nedham, on the other hand, disagreed, arguing 
that in fact the ballot could easily be manipulated. He stated that ‘a High-Constable is a Prime 
Office of the State amongst them if he Ken the Knack of Balloting, and can but tell Noses, by 
which means he may perchance amount to the Dignity of a non-sincer, whose Office it is to 
provide Boxes of all colours of the Rainbow’.55 He went on to declare that ‘If you go to 
Venice to learn to cog a Die with a balloting box, you will soon get money enough to 
purchase an island better than Utopia’.56 Nedham did not believe that Harrington’s solutions 
to the problems of inherent self-interest worked at all. For him, the ballot boxes were simply 
another means by which the Venetian system could be corrupted and the already powerful 
patriciate could maintain or increase its own power.  
For the most part, Milton had shown a similar disinterest in creating constitutional models or 
blueprints. However, this changed in his 1659 and 1660 political tracts, at a time in which the 
political climate in England was particularly chaotic and unstable. Although he never came 
close to a complete constitutional outline along Harringtonian lines, he did begin to consider 
how institutional structures and political practises might help consolidate republican 
government in England.  Moreover, by the time Milton had written a tract, the situation had 
often changed before it got to print, as happened with the first edition of The Readie and 
Easie Way, which is prefaced with the acknowledgement that ‘since the writing of this 
treatise, the face of things hath had some change’.57 It was within this tract that Milton first 
presented his constitutional proposals to the public, although he had outlined in less detail 
some of these ideas in his unpublished Letter to a Friend and Proposals of Certaine 
Expedients. Between the first and second editions of The Readie and Easie Way, Milton 
adapted and expanded upon the constitutional proposals as a response to continuing 
developments. Many of the additions were made as a reaction to the increasing influence of 
Harringtonian language and principles, which proposed a ‘democratic’ commonwealth, which 
stood seemingly in opposition to Milton’s oligarchic constitutional model.58 But, he was also 
responding to the criticism he had received, most notably in an anonymous, satirical, 
pamphlet The Censure of the Rota, in which the author condemned Milton for the oligarchy 
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he proposed and the meagre participation he allowed the people in government.
59
 As such, the 
rest of this section will largely focus on the two editions of The Readie and Easie Way 
wherein his most explicit constitutional proposals lay.  
While Nedham had directed most of his attention towards Harrington’s proposals for a secret 
ballot, Milton found Harrington’s system of rotation problematic. Like Harrington, Milton 
called for a ‘general council of ablest men’ who will rule ‘for the common good’, a political 
body he termed the Grand Council (perhaps after Venice’s Great Council), which was to be 
‘both foundation and main pillar of the whole State’.60  Milton, however, argued that ‘the 
Grand or General Councel being well chosen, should be perpetual’. Perpetual government 
could mean that the members of the Grand Council sat every day or that the members who 
were elected for the Council sat for life. It is likely that Milton meant both. It was important 
that the Council did not rotate since it was ‘the main pillar of the whole State; and to move 
pillars and foundations, not faultie, cannot be safe for the building. I see not, therefor, how we 
can be advantag’d by successive and transitorie Parlaments’.61 Successive parliaments, he 
believed were ‘much likelier [to] continually unsettle rather then to settle a free government, 
to breed commotions, changes, novelties and uncertainties’. One of the main reasons that 
Milton rejected rotation at this point was that he had become increasingly disillusioned by the 
people of England. As outlined in Chapter 2, he despaired at the rabble’s calls for the 
Restoration of monarchy. Opening positions of office up to a wider range of people therefore 
risked inviting into government those who might seek to reach out to Charles Stuart and bring 
about the end of the English republican experiment. 
Milton therefore not only proposed a standing senate, he also severely limited those who 
ought to be considered eligible for election to the Grand Council, to such an extent that he has 
been accused by historians of proposing an oligarchic government. Norbrook sees The Readie 
and Easie Way as a desperate combination of the ‘existing polity into a rigid oligarchy’, 
whilst Woolrych  claims that despite the virtue of those being elected, the narrowness of those 
allowed to vote creates an oligarchic system.
62
 With regards to the first edition, this is 
certainly true. He was advocating the perpetuation of the Rump Parliament, but justified it by 
declaring that it was the members of the Rump who ‘at first freed us from tyrannie, and have 
continued ever since’, and that subsequently they offered the greatest means through which to 
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‘secure and confirme the peoples libertie’.63 But a tightly closed group of people, defined as 
the ‘rightly qualified’ by Milton, was also advocated in the second edition. By the ‘rightly 
qualified’ he refered essentially to those who supported the Good Old Cause: those who 
continued to be committed to anti-monarchical government and a wide definition of liberty of 
conscience. 
Like Harrington though, Milton also perceived that there were potential problems with a 
standing senate, the main one being that of mankind’s ambition. In particular, he was wary of 
those whose desire for power meant that they ‘cannot stay till they be orderly chosen to have 
thir part in the government’. Only for this danger, does Milton suggest that some level of 
rotation might be acceptable:  
if the ambition of such be at all to be regarded, the best expedient will be, and with least danger, 
that everie two or three years a hundred or some such number may go out by lot or suffrage of the 
rest, and the like number be chosen in thir places; (which hath bin already thought on heer, and 




When examining the specifics of the rotation that Milton was prepared to consider, it becomes 
clearer that he was responding specifically to Harringtonian proposals. He stated that he was 
responding to ideas ‘lately propounded…that annually (or if the space be longer, so much the 
better) the third part of Senators may go out according to the precedence of thir election, and 
the like number be chosen in thir place’.65 This use of the figure of a third is strongly 
suggestive of an engagement with Harrington, who propounded the exact same figure. 
However, Milton immediately then stated that ‘I could wish that this wheel or partial wheel in 
State…might be avoided; as having too much affinity with the wheel of fortune’.66 
Milton recognised that he needed to respond to these concepts ‘lately propounded’, referring 
here to Harrington’s recent repackaging of his political theories and constitutional proposals. 
Harrington had stripped away the baroque flourishes of The Commonwealth of Oceana for the 
later tracts published in 1660, including The Rota or The Wayes and Means.
67
 Moreover, the 
Rota Club had been flourishing in the latter half of 1659 and Harringtonian proposals, had 
been presented to parliament in a petition entitled The Humble Petition of Diverse Well 
Affected Persons.
68
 In response, Milton doubled down in his insistence that the only way the 
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country could guarantee stability was through standing governments, not the constant rotation 
advocated by Harrington, as only by sitting for life, could each senator ‘become everie way 
skilfullest, best provided of intelligence from abroad, best acquinted with the people at home, 
and the people with them’.69 This essentially amounted to a perpetuation of the Rump, which 
was hardly amenable to the wider population, but, as we have seen elsewhere, Milton sought 
to argue that it was the members of the Rump parliament who had set the English people 
free.
70
 He continued to reluctantly concede that some level of ‘partial rotation’ might be 
acceptable, but he remained reluctant to truly adopt such rotation since successive 
governments ‘are much likelier continually to unsettle…to breed commotions, changes, 
novelties and uncertainties, to bring neglect upon present affairs and opportunities’.71  
That Milton felt the need to engage with elements of the Venetian Republic being proposed, 
despite appearing to be essentially opposed to them, suggests that Venice as a model 
commonwealth had at least some political currency or credence at the time. Thus we find him 
at pains to explain that the foundation and security of that republic rested upon a standing 
council, and not, as Harrington argued, upon the rotation of office. Having discussed the 
Jewish Sanhedrim, the Athenian Areopagus, and the Roman Senate, he went on to consider 
how: ‘in Venice, they change indeed ofter then everie year som particular councels of State, 
as that of six, or such others; but the true Senate, which upholds and sustains the government 
is the whole Aristocracy immovable’.72 While he accepted that there was rotation in the 
Venetian system, he argued that the strength of the Venetian constitution lay in its Great 
Council - the ‘true Senate’, which was made up of the ‘whole Aristocracy immovable’ - and 
was a closed, oligarchical, and perpetual body of patricians.  Milton therefore interpreted 
Venice in complete opposition to Harrington. Whereas the latter determinedly portrayed it as 
‘most democratical or popular of all others’, Milton believed that the small number of 
families that constituted the citizenry, all of whom were eligible to sit in the Great Council, 
amounted to a strong self-perpetuating aristocracy.
73
 It was this aristocratic, or perhaps 
oligarchic, aspect to the Venetian constitution that explained why it was so stable and durable. 
He may well therefore have made a conscious decision to build upon the popularity of the 
Venetian republic, as advocated by Harrington, to bolster support for his own proposals.  
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The Dutch Republic 
Defining a republic as democratic or aristocratic was therefore more of an art than a science. 
It was open to interpretation, depending on the agenda of the author. The fundamental 
fuzziness of the Venetian myth meant that there was significant scope for interpretation 
depending on the personal intentions of each person within a specific context. The Dutch 
Republic also proved to have enough ambiguity to enable multiple interpretations of its 
constitution.  While Nedham followed Harrington in deliberately and consistently portraying 
the United Provinces as democratic, Milton again engaged with the Dutch as an oligarchic 
nation. The rest of this chapter will explore these differences.   
Nedham chose to portray the Dutch Republic as a popular form of government, and this 
portrayal remains consistent throughout his writings. In the royalist Mercurius Aulicus, the 
author accuses the parliamentarians of wanting to ‘wave the word Councell and call 
themselves States’.74 Worden has argued that the implication here, which is played out in the 
subsequent paragraph which discusses instructions sent to the Dutch, is that Aulicus saw in 
parliament's use of the term ‘states’ an opportunity to charge the Roundheads with intending 
to introduce a republic on the model of the States of the United Provinces.
75
 Nedham, in 
Mercurius Britannicus, responded by asking ‘reader, why not States? Is not this Kingdome a 
State? Is not this the State of England? Have they no Freedome, no Power, no Privilege in the 
Legislative power of this Kingdome?’76 Nedham challenged those who railed against the idea 
of England as a republic styled like that of the Dutch, and asked why England should not  
follow in the path of those ‘that…are free States’.77 After all, their republican neighbours had 
freedom and power, neither of which the people of England possessed. In his later editorials, 
the benefits of England and the Dutch in having embraced the form of the free-state were 
expounded: ‘witness at present, the valiant Swiss, the Hollanders, and not long since, our own 
nation, when declared a Free-State, and a Re-establishment of our Freedom in the hands of 
the people procured (though not secured) what noble Designs were undertaken and prosecuted 
with success’.78 
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Even in his royalist newsbook, Nedham clearly stated that the Dutch Republic was a ‘free-
state’, although this time the English were simply trading the ‘subjection of a King, to the 
arbitrary vassalage of a free-state’.79 What Nedham may have meant here was that it was 
equally possible for democracy to descend into tyranny as it was for monarchy to do so. 
Foxley demonstrates two ways in which Nedham believed this: first that the licentious rule of 
the lower people following their passions was a tyranny in itself; and secondly that the 
people’s proneness to be gulled by anyone promising excessive liberty meant that a 
democracy could very easily tip into tyranny.
80
 Thus Nedham’s argument here - that the free 
states of the United Provinces could be portrayed as representing a form of tyranny - does not 
necessarily break with his arguments for popular government. This is because Nedham had a 
particular understanding of popular government, as did many of his contemporaries. He 
rejected the term ‘democracy’ despite favouring a popular element within the English 
government.
81
 Like Milton, Nedham’s conception of the ‘people’ was defined in a limited 
way, allowing him to reconcile his belief that the people had to be guardians of their own 
liberty with the republican exaltation of virtue and discipline.
82
 Thus it was easy for him to 
switch between condemning and praising popular government, simply by broadening or 
constricting his definition of the people. As such, Nedham’s royalist portrayal of the Dutch 
Republic was not a marked divergence from what came before or after, but can instead be 
seen as a typical sleight of hand. 
In his later editorials for Mercurius Politicus, many of which subsequently appeared in The 
Excellencie of a Free-State, Nedham grew more specific in defining the Dutch Republic as 
popular. Particularly he considered the proportion of power that was shared between the 
‘Patrician and Popular’ groups, arguing that a ‘Commonwealth ever thriv’d best, when the 
People had most Power’.83 This was the model he saw formulated ‘by our Neighbours the 
United Provinces…the best part of their Interest lies deposited in the hands of the people’.84 
In fact, he credited the endurance of the Dutch to the fact that this was so: 
in Holland it may be observed as one principall cause of their long subsistence against the Spanish, 
that the main authority hath been reserved in the peoples hands, and not much allotted to the 
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Nobility, so that they have been the less considerable for effecting any design against the public 
liberty, their power being small, and they but few in number.
85
  
Although the influence the nobility had in the States Provincial varied from province to 
province, for Holland this was decidedly accurate, with the eighteen towns having one vote 
each, and the nobility as a collective only having one vote. We can therefore see Nedham 
defining the popular element as those who were eligible for election to the town governments 
and the States Provincial, namely those who were more influential as burgomasters, guild 
members and the like. In reality these represented local oligarchies, but Nedham chose to 
represent them as the popular element of government, again indicating his limited definition 
of ‘the people’. 86 The idea that this form of Dutch government came closest to popular 
government as opposed to any other was highlighted by a report printed by Nedham in 
Mercurius Politicus, composed by a Dutchman which declared: ‘our Government was never 
so Democraticall as now’.87  
While Nedham highlighted the popular elements of the Dutch Republic, Milton in 1660 
tethered his understanding of Dutch liberty to their narrow political ruling elite, a group of 
regents who together more or less constituted the ruling party of Holland and by extension the 
Republic itself. It has already been demonstrated that by 1660 Milton was advocating rule by 
an increasingly narrow group of the ‘rightly qualified’. By this definition, he still wanted a 
rule of the virtuous, but that definition of virtue was limited to those who were opposed to any 
form of single person rule and who also advocated liberty of conscience. In The Readie and 
Easie Way, Milton essentially advocated the perpetuation of the Rump, a proposal which was 
so unpopular and unrealistic that Milton knew he would be forced to defend it. As he had 
done before, Milton looked towards the Dutch and borrowed aspects of its constitution that 
could both support his narrow oligarchy and ensure stability in England.  
As indicated above, Milton preferred a perpetual Grand Council. In order to justify his 
political inertia, the Dutch Republic provided him with a much more useful example than 
Venice. He declared how ‘the States of every citie…are a standing Senat, without succession, 
and accounted chiefly in that regard the main prop of their liberty’, whereas by contrast, ‘the 
States General, which are indeed but a councel of state deputed by the whole union, are not 
usually the same persons for above three or six years’.88 Milton’s Grand Council may 
therefore have been informed by the States Provincial, which were composed of a standing 
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body of regents who co-opted new members when another died (or was removed for 
corruption), rather than the States General. Although the States General was the central 
governing body of the United Provinces, it was more truly a gathering of ambassadors. 
Sovereignty lay in the Provincial States: it stands to reason then that Milton’s Grand Council, 
to whom sovereignty would be delegated (although only by those who continued to uphold 
republican liberty in England) was based on these States.  
The idea of perpetuating the Grand Council, to whom sovereignty would be transferred, was 
not a widely appreciated solution; even less so because it created an impression of an almost 
completely disenfranchised population. The powers that were committed to the Grand 
Council were huge: they would have ‘the forces by sea and land in thir power, must raise and 
manage the Publick revenue, make lawes, as need requires, treat of commerce, peace, or war 
with forein nations’. For affairs of state that required ‘more secrecie and expedition’ a 
Council of State was to be elected out of their own number. Only on the occasion that a 
senator died or was removed for corruption would the people get to exercise their vote. 
Although Milton briefly discussed the concept of local government in the first edition of The 
Readie and Easie Way, the overwhelming impression left on his contemporaries was of a 
narrow controlling oligarchy who had massive power and very little accountability ruling over 
a people who had almost no control over their political destiny.  
For Milton, though, this narrow oligarchy did not amount to a renunciation of republican 
political thought because he still upheld the idea that these people made up an aristocracy of 
virtue. Only the most virtuous people in the country, admittedly by 1660 numbering fewer 
than ever, could successfully lead the country towards liberty. Since the death of William II of 
Orange in 1650, the regents of Holland, who had been so pro-active in persuading five of the 
seven provinces not to name a new stadholder had effectively governed the Republic. 
Moreover, under the leadership of Johan de Witt, this oligarchic form of government had been 
manipulated as a basis for the first real republican theory of Dutch government (historians 
agree that Dutch political theory was almost non-existent until the mid-seventeenth century in 
the United Provinces).
89
 De Witt’s ‘Deduction’ was the first elaboration of the theory of 
government without an ‘eminent head’, the term used by De Witt to describe the role of the 
stadholder rather than the title, which would become known by its adherents as ‘True 
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Freedom’. 90 But alongside the theorising of the rejection of an ‘eminent head’, True Freedom 
also incorporated a theory of provincial sovereignty. Within this, government fell largely to 
the regents. Legally, all could become regents but in reality it was only possible through 
marrying into established regent families, and it became increasingly oligarchic towards the 
end of the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century.
91
 The narrow regent body was now at 
the helm of a successful, prosperous and stable government. For Milton, the Dutch regent 
system demonstrated that government by an oligarchy would be effective, and particularly an 
oligarchy who were so passionately trying to resist popular demands for the Restoration of the 
traditional position of the Orange family. Similarly in England, Milton hoped that a small 
perpetual Grand Council committed to the Good Old Cause would be able to manage the 
hopes of many Englishmen regarding the Stuarts. Only by keeping this small group of 
virtuous men in charge did Milton believe that, like the Dutch, England could achieve liberty 
and stability.   
Thus what we see in Milton’s writings is an admiration for the way in which the Dutch had 
established a stable republican government which was so successful that from its 
establishment ‘no State or Kingdom in the world hath equally prosperd’ like the Dutch.92  
Milton reminds his readers that ‘our neighbours the United Provinces’, although in 
comparison to the English ‘inferior in all outward advantages’ had ‘courageously, wisely, 
constantly’ established new government and were subsequently ‘settld in all the happie 
injoyments of a potent and flourishing republic to this day’.93 By 1660, when England was at 
its most politically changeable, Milton began to consider the way in which the Dutch 
constitution was formulated, and whether any facets of it might aid the English in their quest 
for durable government. He settled on two key aspects. The first built on his continued 
pessimism towards the English people; he observed the narrowly oligarchical Dutch system, 
and the institutional bodies by which it functioned, which informed and justified the 
constitutional proposals he outlined in The Readie and Easie Way. The second aspect focuses 
on the Dutch decentralised federal system, a system that was widely criticized by non-Dutch 
commentators, but within which Milton found unexpected utility. Milton viewed both of these 
aspects as essential to the maintenance of Dutch stability. Unfortunately, due to the 
Restoration, Milton was never able to build on these constitutional proposals; what he does 
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provide, however, demonstrates that at the peak of Milton’s panic regarding England’s future, 
he turned to a contemporary republic, whose experiences could provide immediate guidance 
for the political problems of the day.  
What is perhaps even more unexpected than Milton using the narrow Dutch oligarchy to 
support his own constitutional proposals, is that he also finds use for the highly devolved 
federal system of the United Provinces. The principle of provincial sovereignty was embodied 
in the very foundations of the Dutch Republic. The Union of Utrecht, widely considered to be 
the foundation of the United Provinces and the closest thing to a written constitution, declared 
that the provinces formed an ‘alliance, confederation, and union among themselves…to 
remain joined together for all time, in every form and manner, as if they constituted only a 
single province’, but more importantly it stated that ‘each province and the individual cities, 
members, and inhabitants thereof shall each retain undiminished its special and particular 
privileges, franchises, exemptions, rights, statutes, laudable and long practiced customs’.94 
However, almost universally, the Dutch federal system was interpreted as a pitfall of an 
otherwise effective republican system. Its main problem was alluded to by Milton; the 
delegate system between the States General, States Provincial, and the town councils was 
inherently slow, with delegates having no scope for negotiation or decision making without 
first consulting their parent institutions.
95
  
Milton, however, also saw in the federal system two key benefits that he could adopt for his 
own constitutional proposals, both through the introduction of local assemblies. The first was 
that by proposing country assemblies Milton could respond and react to the prevailing 
republican mood at the time, which was leaning towards a more democratic commonwealth.
96
 
Accordingly, Milton therefore injected a superficial element of public participation in an 
attempt to counterbalance the strong oligarchic flavour of the rest of his tract. In order to 
ensure the ‘civil rights’ of those in the republic, and ‘prevent all mistrust’ by the people of the 
powers of the Grand Council, Milton suggested: 
if every countie in the land were made a kinde of subordinate Commonaltie or Commonwealth, and 
one chief town or more, according as the shire is in circuit, made cities, if they be not so call’d 
already; where the nobilitie and chief gentry from a proportionable compass of territorie annexd to 
each citie, may build, houses or palaces, befitting thir qualitie, may bear part in the government, 
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make thir own judicial laws, or use these that are, and execute them by thir own elected judicatures 
and judges without appeal, in all things of civil government between man and man.
97
 
There were two main roles for these local assemblies. The first was that in large nation-states 
like the Dutch Republic and England, they provided chains of communications in both 
directions, from national to local and vice versa. Such a model was not necessary in city-
states like Venice, and therefore the Dutch system of decentralisation came closest to a 
natural comparison for Milton. The second was that the local assemblies decentralised 
administration and justice. They may make their ‘own judicial laws’, but as Woolrych 
highlights, these were likely only bylaws, only binding in the counties that enacted them. For 
those national issues that were ‘of any great concernment to public libertie’, ‘these 
commonalities, or in more general assemblies, could gather to ‘declare and publish their 
assent or dissent by deputies within a time limited sent to the Grand Councel’.98 However, 
unlike the Dutch system, which was slowed down by its system of veto, Milton suggested that 
‘thir judgment declar’d shall submit to the greater number of other counties or commonalities, 
and not avail them to any exemption of themselves, or refusal of agreement with the rest, as it 
may In any of the United Provinces’.99 By recognising where in the Dutch federal system its 
problems lay, and adapting his own constitutional proposals accordingly, Milton was able to 
circumvent them and build what he believed was a more effective system. The Dutch system 
of veto meant that even urgent issues could be subject to lengthy delays and negotiations, 
which Milton clearly saw as unacceptable, since the business of government is ‘oft times 
urgent’ with ‘the opportunitie of affairs gaind or lost in a moment’.100 By accepting the 
principle of the decision of the majority, Milton ensured that any crisis that threatened the 
stability of the country could be promptly dealt with.  
The second use for local councils was that they proved useful to Milton as a means to address 
the criticism he had received regarding the oligarchic nature of his first edition of The Readie 
and Easie Way. Several satirists targeted Milton for the arguments he propounded, including 
royalist Roger L’Estrange, who published Be Merry and Wise a mere ten days after The 
Readie and Easie Way. In it, L’Estrange taunted Milton for the fact that the model of a 
commonwealth was already defunct, as well as dismissing the proposal to perpetuate the 
Rump in the Grand Council.
101
 The best known of the tracts, however, was the anonymous 
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The Censure of the Rota. Within The Censure, the author attacks the lack of popular 
participation that Milton allows the common people stating that: 
though you bragge much of the Peoples Manageing their own affaires, you allow them no more 
share of that in your Utopia (as you have ordered it) then only to set up their throats and Baul 
(instead of every three years of which they might have done before) once in an Age, or oftener, as 
an old Member drops away, and a new one is to succeed, not for his merit or knowledge in State 




Milton’s proposed oligarchy of perpetuated Rump members therefore resulted in ‘the most 
ready and easie way to establish downright slavery upon the Nation that can possibly be 
contrived’.103 Although it is often overlooked, William Collinne’s brief comments in The 
Spirit of the Phanatiques Dissected demonstrate that Milton’s contemporaries also noticed his 
use of the Dutch Republic, since Collinne asks ‘whether J. M. his ready and easie way to 
establish a Common-wealth without re-admitting of Kingship….be not borrowed in copy 
from the States of Holland’.104 Unfortunately Collinne fails to expand on this theory, but as 
we have demonstrated above, there is certainly a sound base for this accusation. Moreover, as 
shall be suggested below, the Dutch Republic also proved its utility when he came to address 
these accusations of oligarchy.  
We can also see that Milton’s introduction of these local councils was a direct response to 
Harrington. He states that his proposed local councils offered a better solution that the larger 
popular assemblies proposed by republicans such as Harrington, since they could be 
convened: 
 in the chief towns of every countie, without the trouble, charge or time lost of summoning and 
assembling from far in so great number, and so residing from thir own houses or removing of thir 
families, to do as much at home in their several shires, entire or subdivided, towards the securing of 




Furthermore, these councils were proposed as a means through which to assuage the 
accusations that the people would have little power to check the Grand Council, since he 
stated that ‘the people well weighing and performing these things, I suppose would have no 
cause to fear’. 106 But it is worth considering here who exactly constitutes ‘the people’ at a 
local, rather than national, government level. Although Milton still desired that these men be 
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‘rightly qualified’, there is also a hint at the inclusion of the traditional social elites, which is 
summarised by Woolrych’s accusation that Milton really proposes ‘a central oligarchy 
balanced by a multiplicity of local aristocracies’, thus suggesting that the decentralisation 
Milton proposed hardly constitutes a democratic element to the constitution.
107
 This is further 
supported by the perpetual nature of the local assemblies as proposed in The Present Means 
when he suggests to Monck the creation of a ‘standing Council in each City’.108 Further 
examination demonstrates that those who were to sit on these local councils in reality 
represented the traditional social aristocracy of the counties, as opposed to any true element of 
popular government. Throughout all of his constitutional proposals of 1659 and 1660 in 
which he discussed this proposed decentralisation, he consistently suggested that it ought to 
be ‘the nobilitie and chief gentry’, ‘the chief Gentleman’ or the ‘ablest Knights and 
Burgesses’ who be eligible for election.109 That Milton incorporates the traditional local 
ruling elites is interesting considering his previous commendation of the abolition of the 
distinctions between lords and commons and his general advocacy of an aristocracy of 
virtue.
110
 Evident here is a blending of aristocracies, further suggesting that Milton’s belief 
that those who were capable of virtue and liberty were the “better sorts” and were who he 
meant by “people”. In this light, we can make sense of Milton’s pandering to Harringtonian 
proposals; in 1660 he neither wants, nor advocates, allowing the ‘rude multitude’ to 
participate in any level of government because they continue to be ‘devoted to kingship’.111 It 
gives further credence to the claim that ‘the whole picture in The Readie and Easie Way of the 
nobility and greater gentry running local affairs from their palazzos in the county towns 
suggests an English equivalent to the hereditary regent class in the cities of the Dutch 
Republic’.112  
Milton clearly saw utility in the Dutch federal system, both in the way in which it was 
constitutionally structured and the membership it allowed. He also saw ways in which the 
Dutch system was ineffective, particularly relating to the veto and the location of its 
sovereignty, and responded to these by creating his own constitutional model in such a way 
that these problems would be rectified. The two systems no doubt differed in the final results, 
but that he was adapting the Dutch system can be in no doubt, since he himself stated in no 
uncertain terms that by making his proposed changes: 
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We shall also far exceed the United Provinces, by having not as they (to the retarding and 
distracting oft times of thir counsels on urgentest occasions) many Sovranties united in one 
Commonwealth, but many Commonwealths under one united and entrusted Sovrantie.
113
 
The influence of the Dutch Republic on Milton cannot, therefore, be denied. He looked at the 
way republican government functioned there, borrowed aspects where they functioned well 
and adapted others where he saw defects. In this way, a quasi-federal form of republican 
government was proposed for England by the usually constitution-averse Milton.  
Once again, however, Milton and Nedham took different positions over this issue. What 
Nedham’s newsbook accounts of ongoing events in the United Provinces reveal is that he was 
very aware of the divisions within and between the provinces and even the towns: ‘it is 
strange to consider, how that every Town here in the Countrey seeks to make itself great by 
the undoing of another. If they proceed this way, they are in the way to ruin. If they agree not 
about their own affaires, what union then can be expected among them touching others affairs 
when they all meet in the great assembly’.114 He clearly believed that pursuing interest in this 
particular context, as towns or provinces as opposed to individual interest almost represented 
faction within the state, and could therefore only be dangerous to the continuation of liberty. 
Faction, to Nedham, was ‘that grand Cankerworm of a Commonwealth’.115 We can 
extrapolate from this that Nedham would have distinctly disagreed with Milton over this 
aspect of the Dutch system. Milton admired the federal system as a means by which to ensure 
the localisation of potential troubles, thereby ensuring stability; Nedham appears to have 
taken the opposite view that federal government caused interests to pull in different directions 
that ultimately would lead to the breakup of the United Provinces. His interpretation of the 
Dutch Republic in this way might have been due to Nedham’s awareness of the power of 
Amsterdam as well as the resentment this caused throughout the Dutch Republic: ‘all the 
other Towns do envy Amsterdams greatness, saying that they of Amsterdam do seek to make 
themselves a Province’. Moreover, Nedham’s disdain for Venice comes back to the fore again 
when he compares the two powers: ‘and being jealous over them, as if they feared their 
intention were to make Amsterdam like Venice, the capital and commanding City that should 
dominate over all the rest’.116 The domination of the oligarchy in Venice over their city and 
beyond, into the terra firma, was a model that Nedham did not wish to see emulated in the 
Dutch Republic. Amsterdam pursuing its own interest at the expense of the rest of the 
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commonwealth could only result in a small, unrepresentative group exercising tyrannical rule 
over a wide and diverse majority. 
Conclusions 
Examining the ways in which English figures other than Harrington engaged with both the 
Dutch and Venetian Republics shines some interesting light on the connections that have 
traditionally been drawn between English republicans. By setting Nedham and Milton’s 
understanding of Venice against that of Harrington, the author of Oceana actually appears to 
have more in common with Howell. Both were considered to have complex royalist 
associations, both engaged with the form of republican constitution that England ought to 
have as a commonwealth, and both placed the myth of Venice at the centre of their political 
visions. On the other hand, Nedham came out as strongly anti-Venetian in the early 1650s, 
and anti-constitution modelling towards the end of the decade. Putting the two figures under 
the same republican banner hardly seems to make sense. Milton, too, proved rather reluctant 
to engage in the specifics of what an English republican constitution ought to look like. As 
such, Venice only features in those political works written in the dying months of the English 
Republic. Moreover, his engagement with the utility of Venice comes almost entirely from 
necessity; Harrington’s Oceana and subsequent writings continued to present Venice as an 
ideal form of government. Milton, who saw it as problematic, if not to the same extent as 
Nedham, was therefore forced to respond and consider which, if any, of the aspects of Venice 
might be suitable for England.  
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, what we also find is that the Dutch Republic features much 
more positively across the generally accepted canon of English republican thinkers. Both 
Nedham and Milton portray that republic in a positive manner, and find utility in it. Nedham 
consistently portrayed the Dutch Republic as popular, suggesting he found it much more 
favourable than the oligarchic, tyrannical Venice. Although he found no real utility beyond 
this, it is hardly surprising since he cared little for the specifics of political modelling. 
However, what this does do, is demonstrate a degree of consistency that is not often 
accredited to Nedham. Milton, on the other, found much more of use in the Dutch Republic 
when it came to thinking about the form of government England should take if they were to 
prevent the Stuarts from coming to power. In the Dutch system, Milton found a system of 
decentralised government and local assemblies that could balance the severely limited 
virtuous aristocracy that he wanted to actually possess real power against a system that gave 
the impression of political power to the ‘people’ more broadly defined.  
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What this chapter has also demonstrated is that republican constitutions were not static 
models. Nedham, Harrington and Milton all presented both the Venetian and Dutch 
commonwealths as to various degrees democratic, aristocratic and oligarchic depending on 
the political principles and motivations underlying their beliefs, as well as the linguistic 
gymnastics they were prepared to undergo to achieve any given portrayal. As such, we see 
Harrington at pains to portray both republics as democratic, whereas Milton takes the same 
republics and used them to support his own aristocratic, or perhaps more fairly, oligarchic 
vision for England by 1660.  
This has almost brought us full circle. Although Harrington was demonstrably often at odds 
with his republican contemporaries, in other ways he was at the centre of republican dialogues 
during the 1650s. This feeds into new questions that Foxley and Hammersley have already 
made a start at addressing with regards to the influence of Harringtonian principles of 
democracy in 1659 and 1660. Foxley in particular has demonstrated that Harrington’s 
innovative, sometimes manipulative, but wide ranging understanding of democracy forced 
other republicans to directly engage with his political thought and vision for an English 
constitution.
117
 So although Harrington was far from representative of the English republican 
tradition, we can still find him at the centre of fierce debates surrounding the nature of 
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Chapter 5: The Dutch Republican Experience 
 
On 8th May 1660, the Convention Parliament proclaimed that King Charles II had been the 
lawful monarch since the execution of his father in January 1649.
1
 The English experiment 
with republican government was ended, and the last eleven years all but overwritten. Many 
republicans fled to the continent in fear of repression or punishment for their beliefs or actions 
against the monarchy. Amongst them were Algernon Sidney and Henry Neville. Sidney was 
abroad working as ambassador for the English Commonwealth when Charles was restored 
and chose to remain on the continent rather than risk the wrath of the Stuarts. Neville had 
been less fortunate; after being imprisoned in 1663 for his suspected involvement in the so-
called Yorkshire rising he was released into exile in 1664. While abroad, and in the aftermath 
of republican exile and defeat, both men continued to engage in political writing. Sidney 
penned Court Maxims between 1664 and 1665, and Neville published The Isle of Pines in 
1668. Considering the numerous similarities between Neville’s The Isle of Pines and Sidney’s 
Court Maxims, it is rather surprising that they have not been sufficiently examined side by 
side. They have been placed alongside one another by name as both being tracts written after 
the ‘experience of defeat’, but the similarities between the key concerns and themes of the 
tracts have been woefully under-examined. Taking a closer look at these two tracts will 
demonstrate the considerable shift that had occurred in the way in which English republicans 
engaged with the Dutch Republic by the 1660s.  
As suggested above, there were similarities between the life experiences and careers of the 
two men. Sidney entered parliament in December 1645 as a Member of Parliament for 
Cardiff. He remained as an MP through the regicide (in which he appears to have played no 
role, believing parliament had no right to sentence the king) until Cromwell’s dissolution of 
the Rump in April 1653. In 1652 Sidney had become a member of the Council of State, and 
involved himself enthusiastically in foreign affairs. He promoted an aggressive foreign policy, 
which contributed to the outbreak of the first Anglo-Dutch war in that same year.
2
 Neville too 
had been a member of the Council of State in 1651-2 and took a particular interest in foreign 
politics, for which his travelling experience and foreign language skills would have prepared 
him.
3
 The successful expansionist policies of the Rump were looked upon by republicans with 
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pride. The fledgling republic had not just successfully waged war against the Dutch Republic, 
but had also finally vanquished the royalist threat, and conquered both Scotland and Ireland. 
Such success in a just a few years raised the reputation of the English republic, and was 
looked back on ruefully in the years following the Stuart Restoration, when English foreign 
policy was less successful. Despite his involvement with the Council of State, Neville quite 
quickly became disillusioned with certain parts of the Commonwealth government. As early 
as late 1649 or early 1650 he wrote Newes from the New Exchange in which he criticised 
what he considered to be the new commonwealth’s greed and lust for power.4 Neville was 
opposed to Cromwell after the dissolution of the Rump, and throughout the 1650s tried to get 
elected to parliament in order to keep Cromwell’s favoured candidates out of parliament, but 
he failed to gain a seat. After Cromwell’s death, he finally returned to parliament in 
December 1658. He used his position to present The Humble Petition of Divers Well-Affected 
Persons, which set out Harringtonian proposals for a republican constitution.  
As was outlined in Chapter 1, both men also spent time on the continent as exiles. After the 
Restoration, Neville retired to a more private life, but still found himself implicated in the so-
called Yorkshire rising. After a short imprisonment, Neville was released to go abroad. 
Neville spent most of his time in Italy, which appears to be where he wrote The Isle of Pines, 
whereas Sidney was much less settled, travelling around fairly regularly until 1667. What is 
particularly pertinent to this chapter is the fact that Sidney was in the Dutch Republic when he 
wrote Court Maxims. During his time there, he actively sought to encourage his fellow exiles 
in plotting to overthrow monarchy in England. He had very little in the way of success. By 
1664 he was in Holland, appealing to the Dutch for military and financial aid. After De Witt 
refused to support Sidney’s plotting, he turned to Louis XIV of France, who proved equally 
reluctant to assist him, and eventually Sidney was forced to cease his plotting. 
Neither Court Maxims nor The Isle of Pines have been widely considered part of the typical 
republican canon until recently. For Neville, we have historians to blame, for failing to take 
The Isle of Pines seriously as a political statement. Historians have invariably described it as 
arcadian, utopian, dystopian, as travel literature, Restoration satire, a parody of Biblical 
patriarchalism, and even as a ‘pornotopia’.5 Even Caroline Robbins, the first twentieth-
century historian to treat Neville seriously as part of the English republican canon argued that 
although The Isle of Pines did portray a ‘social moral’, it more probably ‘sprang simply from 
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Neville’s high spirits and Rabelaisian humour, writing to amuse himself’.6 Contemporaries 
and historians alike have, however, agreed that The Isle of Pines was intended as a 
representation of England, and the Pines family as symbolic of the Stuart monarchy. The 
sexual “liberty” or depravity of the Pines was intended to mirror and condemn the 
licentiousness and moral decline of the Stuart court, a decline that in consequence extended to 
England’s political and commercial position. The work of Adam Beach began to take The Isle 
of Pines seriously, drawing connections between the sexual satirical aspects of the tract and 
the serious political comment Neville was trying to make about England’s declining position 
as a European power.
7
 But it is the work of Mahlberg, Susan Wiseman and Daniel Carey that 
put Neville’s political agenda, and more specifically his commentary on patriarchal 
government, at centre stage.
8
 Wiseman and Mahlberg are right that it is important to take The 
Isle of Pines seriously as a political tract; however, my interest is less in its treatment of 
patriarchy and focuses instead on the political interactions it depicts between the Dutch and 
English as well as the political form taken on the island. Court Maxims, on the other hand, 
was never published by Sidney or his contemporaries. In fact, the manuscript was only 
discovered in the 1970s by Blair Worden, and a printed edition only became available for 
wider consumption in 1998. Although it does not survive in Sidney’s hand, historians have 
agreed that it does not appear to be have been significantly tampered with content wise, 
although Jonathan Scott suggests that the chapters may have been reordered.
9
 Court Maxims 
now features in any study of Sidney, but it has never been sufficiently examined alongside its 
contemporary and thematic partner, Neville’s The Isle of Pines. The principal historians of 
each of these men, Mahlberg on Neville and Scott on Sidney, both fail to offer any analysis of 
the two tracts side by side. Scott does not even mention The Isle of Pines in any of his work 
prior to 2011, although the recent excellent work on Neville by Mahlberg does lead Scott to 
correct this error; he offers some analysis on The Isle of Pines in When Britannia Ruled the 
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Both tracts were written in the escalation and explosion of tensions between the English and 
the Dutch. This is particularly pertinent given the fact that Sidney was writing in the months 
of increasing tensions leading up to the second Anglo-Dutch War, in circumstances in which 
he implored the English and Dutch to recognise their common interests rather than fighting 
against one another. Similarly, it is worth noting that Neville was writing The Isle of Pines in 
the years after the raid on the Medway, when the Dutch humiliated the English navy by 
sailing up the Thames and setting English ships ablaze, ultimately winning them the war. The 
Dutch were inevitably at the forefront of English thinkers’ minds during the mid-1660s, as an 
increasing power and military threat. Taking a closer look at the roles in which the Dutch 
were cast during these years by Sidney and Neville can therefore inform us about how their 
republicanism shifted in the years following the restoration of the monarchy. 
Form and Purpose 
Despite the similarities between the contexts within which the tracts were written, the forms 
they take are rather different. Court Maxims was written as a dialogue between two people, 
Philalethes, ‘a moral honest Courtier and lover of state truth’ and Eunomius, the 
Commonwealthsman. The two characters discuss fourteen maxims of the court, with 
Philalethes expounding the schemes of an absolute monarch, in which he seeks to put people 
and country to his own private use. At the beginning of the dialogue, Philalethes asks 
Eunomius to explain the ancient ‘virtue and piety’, that he as a courtier cannot understand. 
Eunomius explains that the English people are discontented with the king, and argues that it is 
not necessary to have government by one man. As such, a king should only be allowed to 
govern so far as men’s interests require it. Hereditary kingship brings only vice and hatred, 
and is contrary to the principles of reason. In the present age, argues Eunomius, kings sought 
to make the nobility weak, effeminate flatterers, while the people were reduced to poverty and 
obscurity.
11
 The government of the Stuarts amounted to tyranny, and tyrannous government 
could never last, because ‘whatsoever government is unjust, cannot be permanent’.12 The pair 
also discuss England’s foreign policy; Philalethes encourages an alliance with France and 
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Eunomius argues for a union of protestant nations. It is within these discussions that the 
Dutch Republic takes centre stage.  
The form of The Isle of Pines was somewhat less straightforward, in terms of a clear political 
narrative. Neville published the work in several parts and presented it as a genuine travel 
narrative. It told the story of a ship called the India Merchant, which supposedly set sail from 
England, heading east to seek the advantages of trade. After sailing into a great storm the ship 
shattered upon some rocks and killed all on board but a few. Only George Pines - a 
bookkeeper - and four women survived: the ship’s captain’s daughter, two maidservants, and 
a black slave. Finding no other survivors, the company set about building shelter and 
salvaging what they could of the ship’s cargo. The island abounded with fruits, nuts, and 
harmless animals that could easily be hunted for food. Eventually realising it was unlikely 
anyone would rescue them, the five settled in to a luxurious, leisurely, and licentious life and 
began to populate the island. After forty years, their offspring had become so numerous that 
George had to bring order to society by marrying males of one family or ‘tribe’ to the females 
of another. George named his eldest son, Henry, ‘King and Governor of all the rest’ upon his 
deathbed, and also wrote down his story in case anyone ever discovered them. After George’s 
death, morality on the island began to decline, and social disorder, licentiousness, incest, and 
violence broke out, forcing Henry to gather those near to him to march on and punish the 
worst offenders. To prevent any future social unrest, Henry put into place a law code, which 
appeared to bring peace to the island. After Henry’s death, his son William succeeded him, 
and it was under his rule that the islanders were finally discovered. Dutch ships, also headed 
to the East Indies, noticed fire from the island and set out to investigate. They were stunned to 
find English speakers and disembarked in order to hear more about these strange people and 
explore their island. After assisting the islanders in various ways – supplying tools, improving 
their lodgings and helping suppress a rebellion – the Dutch continued on their journey. One of 
these Dutch sailors, Henry Cornelius Van Sloetten, wrote an account of his discovery of this 
‘Land of Pines’, also including the original narrative written by George Pines, much to the 
astonishment and amazement of Europe.  
When it was first published in 1668, people accepted this tale as truth, and accepted the tract 
as a genuine travel narrative; for instance, The Isle of Pines was included in Samuel Pepys’ 
library bound up with other ‘Pamphlets Naval’. 13 The core narrative, that of George settling 
his descendants on the island, had originally been published in June 1668, and was followed 
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by a separate letter allegedly written by van Sloetten, describing the discovery of the island by 




 But as much as 
people wanted to believe in the story of the ‘Land of Pines’, doubt was soon thrown upon its 
authenticity, causing people to reject the pamphlet outright.  It was eventually exposed as a 
scam perpetrated by Neville, who had recently returned from exile in Italy.
15
 After its 
authenticity as a travel narrative was undermined, the tract fell somewhat into obscurity.  
Although different in form, the two tracts are tied together by their mutual belief that the 
Dutch Republic offered an example of how republican government was inherently more 
successful and powerful than the monarchical government of England. Both men 
demonstrated this by comparing English experience with the success of the Dutch military 
and commercial enterprises. Sidney demonstrated the strength of the Dutch Republic in both 
the military and commercial realms quite clearly. In Court Maxims he declared that ‘The 
United Provinces is not to be contested with at sea, and able very powerfully to hinder 
progress by land’.16 He also wrote of ‘their power and riches, their security, happiness and 
prosperity’, a sentiment he repeated when he argued that ‘through good government and 
liberty of traffic’ the Dutch had become ‘so rich, powerful and prosperous that no state in 
Europe dares singly contend with it’.17 The Dutch, the Hollanders in particular, ‘in all 
business of war or peace with any nation do principally consider trade’ and as such had 
‘advanced them[selves] from one of the most contemptible nations in Europe to be formidable 
to the greatest princes in the world’.18 There was therefore an explicit connection made here 
between good government, commercial success, and the building of a powerful and wealthy 
nation.   
Sidney’s political beliefs were more clearly displayed in Court Maxims than in the much 
subtler The Isle of Pines. This was partly due to the purpose and audience of the tracts. 
Neville’s work was published, which in itself meant that it had to err more on the side of 
caution lest the censors ban it, or worse, accuse him of treason and imprison him once again. 
He may have chosen a form of writing that was distinct and therefore separate from typically 
political or republican tracts. In fact, the genre choice of a travel narrative acted almost as 
code, allowing the author to conceal hidden messages and criticism without angering 
government censors. And indeed, Neville had many things he wished to criticize about the 
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restored English monarchy and the ongoing internal political corruption he saw therein.
19
 By 
hiding his republicanism in amongst a sensationalist travel narrative, he would have reached a 
much wider audience, who may have been able to decipher the political messages hidden 
within. Sidney, conversely, did not publish Court Maxims, and even if he had, caution and 
subtlety were hardly characteristics of his personality or approach to any situation so it would 
be hard to imagine him toning his invective down for publication. Court Maxims was an 
explicitly republican tract, written in the form of a dialogue (a form Neville would later 
borrow for Plato Redivivus) which clearly argued that ‘a free nation, full of men who excel in 
wisdom and experience…[should] keep the power in their own hands of governing 
themselves or one another by turns’ rather than suffer being ‘perpetually governed by one 
man and his posterity’.20 Moreover, he argued that ‘if it appear that another government does 
more conduce to their good than that of kings, they may choose some other form of 
government from which they may expect more happiness’.21 Sidney not only criticised the 
restored monarchy, he explicitly stated that republican government was more beneficial to the 
people of England and actively encouraged Englishmen to overthrow the Stuart tyranny. 
Court Maxims was therefore an outright appeal to England to once again change its form of 
government.  
It was not simply, however, an appeal to the English. Sidney wrote Court Maxims whilst 
living in Holland, and aimed to garner not just English but also Dutch support to assist in 
overthrowing the Stuarts. As such, Court Maxims is by necessity much more based in the 
historical moment than The Isle of Pines whose abstract nature does not require it to be so. In 
appealing to the Dutch audience as well, Sidney also showed that he was capable of a level of 
pragmatism. In the early 1650s, Sidney had encouraged England to pursue an aggressive 
foreign policy according to his understanding of ideal republicanism, which aspired to create 
an expansionist English commonwealth that could become the new Rome. Part of this policy 
had involved a head-on attack on the Dutch Republic. Historians are now largely in 
agreement that this war was undertaken as part of an economic strategy to expand England’s 
trade by destroying their closest commercial rivals.
22
 By the 1660s, however, Sidney was not 
pursuing a republican foreign policy; he had to restore republican government first, and 
sought to do so by persuading the people of the danger posed by a Stuart tyranny, and to 
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convince them to rise against it in order to secure their liberty. He needed assistance and allies 
to do this, and the Dutch Republic was the most likely nation to encourage the spread of 
republican liberty. From 1663 he was actively seeking allies and financial support in order to 
launch an invasion against England and overthrow Charles and the English monarchy. His 
incorporation of the Dutch Republic in his tract was a continuation of this policy; a means to 
persuade not just the English, but also the Dutch, that England ought to overthrow monarchy 
and establish a commonwealth.  
The Isle of Pines 
For Neville, the theme of the strength of England and its position in Europe was central to his 
concerns and his republicanism. At the beginning of the later Plato Redivivus, the Noble 
Venetian asks why England, ‘which has ever been esteemed (and very justly) one of the most 
considerable people of the world…is now of so small regard, and signifies so little abroad?’23 
This concern for England’s reputation and position as a European or global power was not a 
new one for Neville, as it also made up one of the key themes of The Isle of Pines. In The Isle 
of Pines the English were being held up against the militarily and commercially successful 
Dutch Republic; more importantly, England was found wanting. Reading The Isle of Pines, 
the superiority of the Dutch, who arrive on the island to find naked, uncivilised Englishmen, 
is evident. The contrast between the experiences of the two nations allowed Neville to present 
the Dutch Republic as a model of republican government worthy of emulation. At first this 
might appear like a bold claim; The Isle of Pines has often been overlooked as part of the 
republican canon, and when compared to the much more explicitly republican Plato 
Redivivus, it almost pales into insignificance. However, given the circumstances in the mid-
1660s, which saw the Charles II re-established as a legitimate monarch, Neville merely 
expressed his republicanism in a different way in The Isle of Pines, drawing on the 
experiences of the Dutch to praise their republican principles, rather than explicitly admiring 
their constitution. 
Neville put this contrast between English and Dutch fortunes at the centre of his narrative.
24
 
George Pines’ account, which was published first and on its own, initially presented a utopian 
vision of island life, only the arrival of the Dutch sailors breaks this illusion. There were three 
key ways in which the Dutch were presented as superior to the English: their naval power; 
their industry and work-ethic towards colonisation; and their military strength, each of which 
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will be examined in turn. From the first moment the islanders encountered their strange 
visitors, their ignorance of naval affairs is exposed. The ‘naked islanders’ encountered by the 
Dutch were ‘so wondering at our ship as if it have been the greatest miracle of nature in [the] 
whole world’.25 The Dutch asked the English how they should have come to inhabit that 
island, ‘having not, as we could see, any ships or boats amongst them the means to bring them 
thither, and which was more, altogether ignorant and mere strangers to ships or shipping’.26 
Knowledge of shipping and naval affairs, or at least the little that George Pines likely knew, 
was not passed down to subsequent generations, to the extent that the English descendants 
had no conception of ‘a thing called a ship’.27 Not only had the descendants of the English 
lost all conception of what a ship is, they were also ignorant of their geography. While the 
Dutch confidently navigated the seas, the English no longer had any sense of their place in the 
world, or of the presence of anyone else. They could only vaguely conceptualise that George 
Pines’s ‘native country was a place called England, far distant from this our land, as he led us 
to understand’. They also refer loosely to George’s original destination, ‘a place called 
India’.28 Despite the position of power that England aspired to across the globe, and which 
had appeared to be coming to fruition after the military successes of the English 
Commonwealth, the English had diminished to a point where even if they wanted to become a 
global power, they could not tell up from down. Although something of an exaggeration, this 
demonstrates the fall in the perceptions of English naval power in England as well as the 
wider world.   
The Dutch experience was altogether different. During their journey to the East Indies, the 
Dutch encountered a ‘violent storm as if all the four winds together had conspired for our 
destruction’.29 However, despite, it being ‘beyond our expectation that we should have 
escaped’, the Dutch guided their ship to safety. Similarly, when they continued on their 
journey after leaving the Isle, the Dutch continued to save themselves when crisis arose. Near 
Cambaia, their vessel sprang a leak and they were ‘forced to put to shore…we were forced to 
ply the pump for eighteen hours together, which, had that miscarried, we had inevitably had 
perished’.30 Further storms and the ship ‘striking twice upon a rock’ did not deter the Dutch, 
and when ‘we were chased by a pirate of Argiere’ ‘by the swiftness of our sails we outran 
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him’.31 Thus, even as a standalone example, the Dutch appeared to be able seamen, capable of 
sailing through dangers without significant loss or shipwreck, and ensuring that their riches 
transported from the East reach their destination. However, when juxtaposed against the 
English, the strength of the Dutch, as well as the inferiority and ignorance of the English 
becomes strikingly obvious. George Pine’s narrative began in a very similar way to that of 
Van Sloetten, with a fleet setting out to the East Indies. Indeed, like the Dutch, the English 
also encounter a ‘great storm of wind, which continued with such violence many days’. 
Drawing near land, and ‘losing all hope’ and ‘perceiving no safety in the ship, which we 
looked would suddenly be beat in pieces, the Captain, my master, and some others got into 
the long board thinking by that means to save their lives, and presently after all the seamen 
cast themselves overboard, thinking to save their lives by swimming’.32 The contrast between 
the behaviour of the Dutch and English sailors is stark. Whereas the Dutch worked for 
eighteen hours to prevent their boat from sinking upon a leak, the English merely abandoned 
ship and sought to save themselves, rather than labour together to salvage the ship and its 
contents. Ultimately, the Dutch survive numerous storms and other dangers through their 
industry while the English predominantly perish.  
As a metaphor, this connects directly to the experiences of the United Provinces and England. 
The English had lurched from crisis to crisis throughout the 1640s and 1650s with the 
political system of the country repeatedly being challenged, reshaped and usurped. The 
country was so divided that nothing seemed capable of uniting them. Only under the restored 
monarchy of Charles II did something resembling stability appear to return. However, it is 
worth remembering that The Isle of Pines was written only a few years after the Restoration; 
there was no guarantee that this was the government that was going to stick either. On the 
other hand, the Dutch had weathered several constitutional challenges over the same period, 
without suffering anything close to the turmoil of England. William II had attempted a 
military coup to increase the political power of the stadholder and re-start war with Spain; two 
years later he died suddenly, leading to the decision taken by five provinces to abolish the 
position of the stadholder. In none of this was there any challenge to the political functioning 
of republican government. The message here seems to be that the Dutch republican 
government was put together in such a way as to make it effective and stable even in times of 
uncertainty. This stability therefore allowed them to pursue their military and commercial 
ambitions without being hindered by internal dissent.  
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The naval success of the Dutch, in terms of both commerce and conquest, had begun in 
earnest after the signing of the Treaty of Münster and continued right through to the second 
Anglo-Dutch war. While the Dutch had been at war with Spain, their trade had stagnated, 
allowing the English to make commercial gains. However, when the Treaty of Munster was 
signed in 1648, the Dutch were able to re-establish themselves as a major trading power. The 
Treaty of Munster was not the only factor, of course, in Dutch expansionism. The effects of 
the English Civil War on English overseas trade and the Venetian-Turkish war, which 
paralysed Venetian trade in the Levant, also played a part.
33
 As well as re-establishing their 
commercial power in familiar markets, the Dutch also engineered vast changes in the 
Caribbean, massively extending sugar cultivation, for example, and bringing in huge profits, 
while such a thing was barely heard of in English or French colonies. Moreover, the Dutch 
were innovative and opportunistic. They were able to take an island that appeared barren and 
unsuited to plantation agriculture, like Curacao, and turn it into the West Indian Company’s 
(WIC) crowning territorial asset; they saw its deep harbours and ideal location near the 
Spanish American mainland, and used it as a huge storehouse for their trade in the 
Caribbean.
34
 As well as achieving success in the Caribbean, the Dutch were also able to make 
huge gains in south west India, through a combination of military success, large garrisons, 
and a vigorous diplomacy backed by force.
35
 Thus by the early 1660s, the Dutch had swept up 
the Malabar coast of India, driving the Portuguese and English out and devastating English 
trade in the region. In 1663 the Dutch also extirpated the English from the Guinea coast in 
Africa, dealing a severe blow to the Royal Africa Company, and in the process adding to the 
factors of the outbreak of the second war.
36
 The Dutch were therefore making significant 
gains in trade, war and colonisation, which stood in stark contrast with the situation of the 
English.  
The differences between the industry and attitude of the two nationalities was not simply 
limited to their naval prowess; they can also be seen in the ways in which the Pines and later, 
the Dutch, approached life on the island. In George Pines’ narrative, the initial industry of the 
stranded English quickly gave way to a life of luxury and licentiousness. In the first few days 
on the island, the company salvaged what they could of the ship and set about building 
somewhere to live, so that ‘in the space of [a] week had made a large cabin big enough to 
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hold all our goods and ourselves in’.37 However, after seeing to these very basic human needs 
– food and drink being in abundance on the island – the company gave into ‘living idly’. They 
failed to explore the island properly. For instance, when they landed on the island, George 
expressed fear that there may be ‘wild people’ or ‘wild beasts’ who might seek them out. But 
rather than explore the whole island to ensure their safety, they simply accepted that since ‘we 
saw no footstep of any, no not so much as a path, the woods round about being full of briars 
and brambles’ there must be no imminent danger.38 It was only after they had lived on the 
island for a ‘full four months, and not so much as seeing or hearing of any wild people’ that 
they decided the island ‘was wholly uninhabited by any people, neither was there any hurtful 
beast to annoy us’.39 In fact, because ‘the country [was] so very pleasant, being always 
clothed in green, and full of pleasant fruits, and variety of birds, ever warm and never colder 
than in England in September’, George stated that the island ‘had it the culture that skilful 
people might bestow upon it, would prove a paradise’.40 The implication here was that the 
island could be a utopia but not under the governance of the English. Instead, the islanders 
gave in to their lusts and felt themselves at ‘liberty to do our wills’, after which point the 
narrative became an account of the sexual and familial relations between the rapidly 
developing population.  
The Dutch disdain for the laziness of the English is present from their first impression of the 
living conditions of the Pines. They described the ‘palace’ as ‘about the bigness of one of our 
ordinary village houses…supported with rough unhewn pieces of timber, and covered very 
artificially with boughs’.41 Having seen this, and been entertained by the islanders, the Dutch 
‘resolved to go higher into the country for a further discovery’, something which the English 
appear never to have attempted.
42
 In doing so, they explored the more remote villages on the 
island, as well as noting the fertility of the land and abundance of nature, so much so that they 
echoed George Pines’ initial sentiment and the utopian nature of the island: ‘no question, but 
had nature [had] the benefit of art added unto it, it would equal, if not exceed, many of our 
European countries’. The Dutch seemed dumbfounded by the good fortune they had stumbled 
upon: ‘it was very strange to us to see that in such fertile country, which was as yet never 
inhabited, there should be notwithstanding such a clear and free passage to us’.43 Although 
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they were talking here about the physical hindrances – grasses, trees, etc – the double 
meaning can hardly be missed. Here, lying in front of the Dutch was a rich, untapped 
resource; that they considered it to be ‘never habited’, in spite of the thousands of islanders 
who resided there, indicates just how little respect they had for the “civilisation” that the 
English had established on this outpost. Having discovered this, the Dutch set about 
documenting the island more thoroughly, taking into account possible good harbours, the size 
of the island, its climate, and other relevant information. The Dutch were so industrious that 
‘after our return back from the discovery of the country, the wind not being fit for our 
purpose, and our men also willing thereto…we built up a palace for this William Pines’.44 The 
Dutch were always willing to work hard, simply because they could, whereas the English had 
built a basic, inadequate hut and had settled for it to pursue a life of idleness.  
The military strength of the Dutch was indicated even before there was any political upheaval 
on the island. During their exploration of the island, the Dutch came across more islanders 
who offered to journey with them. During this time, a Dutchman ‘espying a beast like a goat’ 
‘discharged his piece, sending a brace of bullets into his belly, which brought him dead upon 
the ground’. The ‘poor naked unarmed’ islanders, who had never experienced such violence 
and power before, ‘without speaking any words betook them to their heels, [ran] back again 
as fast as they could’. Moreover no assurance from the Dutch that ‘they should have no hurt’ 
could have any impact on the islanders, who refused to go any further with their dangerous 
visitors.
45
 The contrast here is stark; the English were just as vulnerable as the goat, who had 
been mown down without any understanding of what was happening to it. Any time the 
Dutch felt like it, they could turn their guns on the English and immediately gain the upper 
hand. And in spite of their promises, the Dutch did eventually turn their guns on the islanders. 
William calls upon them and the ‘strange effects of [their] powder’ to help suppress unrest 
between two factions on the island.
46
 The rebels were armed simply with sticks and stones, 
which were of course useless against the Dutch guns; as van Sloetten states: ‘what could 
nakedness do to encounter with arms?’47 Just twelve Dutch men go with William, and after 
attempts to parley fail, the Dutch ‘discharging off three of four guns’ caused the rebels to flee, 
and the ringleader to be captured and condemned to death. The nakedness of the English 
islanders points not just to their lack of civilisation, but also to their lack of defences – likely a 
commentary on the English vulnerability when the Dutch had sailed up the Medway.  
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By placing these narratives side by side, of Dutch power and English weakness, ‘Neville 
contrasted the republican Netherlands with the patriarchal monarchy of England, concluding 
that the patriarchal state is not conducive to trade, progress and military strength’.48 However, 
there was more to it than this. Neville was also demonstrating just how, tactically, the Dutch 
had continued to gain the upper hand in colonisation. They achieved this through their 
recognition of the advantage to themselves of having England remain under monarchical 
government. After all, the Pine/English dynasty was clearly ineffective, but nonetheless, the 
Dutch continued to support and bolster it, by providing useful resources and increasing the 
regality of the monarchy. They ensured the friendship of the islanders by providing them with 
necessary tools and equipment, but more significantly, they ensured the friendship and 
indebtedness of Prince William. Having suppressed the rebellion for him, William owed his 
continuing position of power to the Dutch. Moreover, they set about building a palace for 
‘this William Pines the Lord of that country’ – the mockery in this comment can hardly be 
missed – which although ‘much inferior to the houses of your gentry in England, yet to them 
(which had never seen better), it appeared a very lordly place’. William was delighted with 
his new home, thanking the Dutch ‘for so great a benefit, of which he said he should never be 
able to make a requital’. This upgrade caused a shift in William’s position on the island. 
William was initially described as a man with ‘nothing of majesty in him’, and the island as a 
place where ‘prince and peasant here faring alike’, by the end of the Dutch visit, William was 
‘attended after a more royal manner than ever we saw him before, both for a number of 
servants and multiplicity of meat’.49 By increasing the royal nature of William’s government, 
the Dutch intended to more deeply entrench the concept of patriarchal monarchy on the Isle, 
and as such, keep the English in an inferior position.  
Thus Neville was not just showing that the Dutch were superior to the English, he was 
demonstrating that the Dutch knew they were superior, and were continuing to support the 
English monarchy because it kept the English nation weak. Under the English Republic, the 
English had defeated the Dutch Republic at war, and had been able to force political 
concessions from them. Under the restored Stuart monarchy, the Dutch had won the second 
war, and had been able rapidly to expand their global trade. Thus, it was ultimately to the 
advantage of the Dutch to keep the English under weak, patriarchal, monarchical government, 
because it provided them with the military edge, and allowed them to take advantage of 
English weakness in trade by forcing them out of key English trading outposts, such as the 
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Guinea coast and southwest India. Neville was able to view this perhaps with the gift of 
hindsight. The second Anglo-Dutch war had proved to be an abject demonstration of the 
weakness of the English in naval and military affairs. The raid on the Medway was a national 
humiliation, demonstrating the strength, resilience, courage and ambition of the Dutch naval 
forces. During the course of the war, the Dutch had also demonstrated the grip they had on 
key commercial trading routes, which helped fund the continuation of the war.
50
 The strength 
of the Dutch demonstrated to Neville the benefits of republican government, the industry and 
virtues that it instilled in its people, allowing them to grow in power and European influence.  
Republican Languages 
The different approaches taken by Neville and Sidney to influencing ideas and events led to a 
difference in the republican languages they used. Neville incorporated Machiavellian ideas of 
conquest and greatness with concerns about patriarchal government and, most importantly, a 
Harringtonian concern with the balance of property and power. This latter issue has not been 
acknowledged before and, as shall be demonstrated, puts a more radical spin on The Isle of 
Pines than has previously been recognised by historians. Sidney, however, used a different 
language from Neville. While they did share some Machiavellian commitments, Sidney’s 
language of republicanism embraced that of his host nation, the Dutch Republic. In engaging 
with Dutch republican interest theory, expounded by the De la Court’s and De Witt in the 
years immediately preceding the composition of Court Maxims, he hoped to appeal to and 
persuade the Dutch to assist the English republican cause. It also enabled him to tie together 
the histories and fates of the English and the Dutch based on the interests of the various 
parties within both nations.  
To examine Neville’s Harringtonianism first will demonstrate the uniqueness of Sidney’s 
arguments within an English republican tradition. Neville was not just commenting on the 
comparative strength and success of the Dutch against the failing foreign and commercial 
policies of the English. Rather, this commentary served a greater purpose, to examine how the 
type of government in each country contributed to its achievements. The republican Dutch 
were able to outstrip the English exactly because of the latter’s patriarchal monarchy. The Isle 
of Pines therefore contains a thread of the constitutional republicanism that was more 
dominant in the 1650s than in the 1660s, where arguments against monarchical government 
were much more dangerous than they had been under the Commonwealth or Protectorate. 
Moreover, given that we know Neville supported Harringtonian principles during the 1650s, 
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and later they are clearly set out in Plato Redivivus, it only seems logical to seek them in The 
Isle of Pines as well. The notion that ‘empire is founded upon dominion’ is particularly 
relevant here, and helps to explain not only why government on the island had degenerated so 
rapidly, but also why the Dutch were so successful.
51
 Because the Dutch were able to carry 
out a successful and stable expansionist policy, we can extrapolate that Neville viewed the 
Dutch as holding the correct balance, the result of which was stable internal republican 
government. On the other hand, the English Pines, with their monarchical government, were 
inevitably going to fail because their internal balance was already unsettled. They could not 
follow a successful foreign policy or colonisation project until they established an appropriate 
balance between property and power.  
As Mahlberg has established, The Isle of Pines is a critique of patriarchal government.
52
 
George Pines, as the only surviving male, established himself as ‘King and Governor of the 
island’. Even the dynastical name, ‘Pines’, was an anagram of ‘penis’, hyping up the 
patriarchal connotations to satirical levels, and ensuring that even the basest of readers 
understood the underlying themes of the pamphlet. Under George the political constitution 
was undefined. As the eldest male, and with all other males on the island being his offspring, 
he was by default the ‘patriarch’ as both the fatherly head of the family and of the 
government’. All the land on the island was therefore his, and he exercised sole sovereignty. 
He was able to exercise a personal influence over a small (albeit growing) number of people. 
Only when he was nearing death did George appear to have put any kind of official 
government, law, more loosely, rules into place. He made his eldest son Henry ‘King and 
Governor of all the rest’, as well as informing them ‘of the manners of Europe, and charged 
them to remember the Christian religion’ at a Bible meeting once a month.53 William 
supplemented this story with his own detail, that Henry was charged ‘not to exercise tyranny 
over them, see they were his fellow brethren…exhorting him to use justice and sincerity 
amongst them’.54 Whether George had ever titled himself as King is unclear; perhaps as the 
undisputed patriarch, by virtue of his age, he did not feel the need to define his power in such 
a way.  
Under Henry, however, it immediately became clear that the problems of governance had 
increased: the ‘people growing more populous, made them to range further in the discovery of 
the country’, and thus ties of kinship, tradition and law weakened. So, William informed his 
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visitors, ‘it is impossible, but that in multitudes disorders will grow, the stronger seeking to 
oppress the weaker, no tie of religion being strong enough to chain up the depraved nature of 
mankind’ and so ‘mischief began to rise, and they soon fell from those good orders prescribed 
by my grandfather’.55 The ‘neglect of hearing the Bible read’ was accounted as the source of 
their mischief, causing the islanders to fall to ‘whoredoms, incests, and adultery’.56 Henry was 
astute enough to launch a pre-emptive strike against these sinners, gathering those near him 
and denouncing the wickedness of the sinners, and rousing them to march against them, 
‘arming themselves with boughs stones, and such like weapons’. As a result of this disorder, 
Henry introduced new laws, so that ‘bad manners produceth good and wholesome laws for 
the preservation of humane society’. Mahlberg has pointed out that these laws resemble the 
Ten Commandments, punishing blasphemy, rape, adultery, as well as forbidding any 
defamation of the Governor.
57
 Although this was a minor disturbance to the peace of the 
island, it appeared merely a quaint quarrel when compared with the unrest under William. 
When the Dutch appeared on the island, there seemed to be peace under William’s 
governance. However, the day before they intended to leave the island, the Dutch were held 
up by ‘the prince, W. Pines’ who, ‘imploring our [Dutch] assistance in an insurrection’, 
persuaded the Dutch to delay their departure in order to help suppress this island rebellion.
58
 
The insurrection was instigated by Henry Phill who had ‘ravished’ the wife of one of the 
principal family members of the Trevor tribe, causing the Trevors to assemble themselves 
together to bring him to justice. The Phills fought to defend themselves, resulting in the whole 
island become a ‘great hurly-burly’.59 William turned to the Dutch and their superior weapons 
for aid, and the rebellion was easily suppressed. 
So how does this connect to the Harringtonian aphorism that empire equalled dominion? 
Initially the island had been stable and peaceful under the sole government of its leading 
patriarch, George. However, as the population expanded George found it necessary to relocate 
some of his many offspring: ‘I sent and placed them over the river by themselves severally, 
because we would not pester one another’.60 There is a suggestion here of granting new land 
to his citizens as well as a widening of the geographic area over which the Pines sought to 
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maintain control. Under George, however, this shift does not appear to have dangerously 
unsettled the balance of land to power. However, when Henry came to rule ‘and the people 
growing more populous, [he] made them to range further in the discovery of the country’.61 
Again, the proportion of land held by the monarchical element of the island’s government was 
further diluted by a growing population taking ownership of new, more distant lands. Under 
Henry’s rule, and as Harrington argued it would, social upheaval and political instability 
resulted, since the form of government had not altered accordingly. In fact, instead of 
devolving political power to the islanders, Henry introduces harsh new laws, and a 
rudimentary judiciary to enforce them. Power therefore shifted even further from the balance 
it needed to strike with land ownership in order to ensure political stability on the island.  
The failure of the Pines' monarchy mirrored the reason why the Stuart monarchy was also far 
from glorious. As Harrington had argued of England, the balance of land had shifted into the 
hands of the people, and a commonwealth was the only form of government that suited those 
circumstances. William’s monarchical government was therefore unsuited to this shift in 
power balance, and just as had happened with the outbreak of the English Civil War, unrest 
had broken out on the island between ‘two great potent factions’, threatening ‘general ruin to 
the whole state’. 62 Moreover, Neville presented William as powerless in the face of such 
unrest; despite having ‘interposed in the matter’ he ‘found his authority too weak to repress 
such disorders’. Where the centre of government, in this case the King (represented by 
William Pines), is weak, or, ‘where the hedge of government is once broken down’, it ends up 
being ‘the most vile [who] bear the greatest rule’.63 It would only be a matter of time before 
the people of the Isle successfully overthrew their oppressor and established a 
commonwealth, just as the English had already tried to do, and the Dutch had managed 
successfully.   
The instability of the island (whether England or Pines) was the result of an  imbalance of the 
ownership of power and property; in order to ensure continued stability on the island, 
government on the island needed to be in the hands of the people. Only in doing so and 
subsequently achieving internal stability could the English hope to be able to match the 
expansionism of the Dutch. More importantly, the Dutch themselves were also aware of this, 
explaining why they continued to support the Pines monarchy. By keeping the English under 
monarchical government and therefore perpetual instability, the Dutch were free to continue 
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their seemingly relentless pursuit of trade and land. Although not an explicit call to arms 
against the Stuarts like Court Maxims was, Neville can still be clearly seen arguing that 
democratic republican government was, under the current circumstances, the only form of 
government that could achieve success and power. 
Sidney set out the same arguments, albeit couched in much more explicit terms, in Court 
Maxims. What set this tract apart from The Isle of Pines, however, was the language used by 
Sidney to make his case against monarchical government. He spoke in a republican language 
that would have been much more familiar to the Dutch than the English; that of interest 
theory. Dutch republican interest theory was first explicitly expounded in the works of the 
brothers De la Court. The De la Court’s most influential works were entitled Political 
Balance and Political Discourses, as well as The Interest of Holland (1662), which De Witt is 
also thought to have had a hand in. Indeed, these are considered to be the first clear 
expressions of a distinctly Dutch republican theory.
64
 They argued that there did indeed exist 
a normative common interest, in this case the ‘interest of Holland’. But the De la Courts also 
asserted that humanity more often than not sought to further self-interest at the cost of the 
common good.
65
  They argued that self-interest as the defining characteristic of human 
behaviour could be reconciled with the indisputable interest of society at large. This entailed a 
crucial departure from the classical view that the quest for personal advantage should be 
subordinated to the common good. Ultimately the republican use for interest theory was 
summed up in this maxim: ‘true Interest cannot be compassed by a Government, unless the 
generality of the People partake thereof’.66 The self-interest of the people could only be 
realised under a republican form of government. Moreover, any form of monarchical 
government amounted to tyranny, as the tyrant sought to pursue interests at odds with the 
common good. As such, they explicitly rejected the stadholder as it represented monarchical 
government. Weststeijn has recently demonstrated that the De la Court’s notion of self-
interest was closely tied to commercial activity in the Dutch Republic; he argues that for the 
brothers, ‘a true republic could only be a commercial republic’.67 The Dutch Republic was 
able to thrive because of its commerce, its liberty and its peace, all of which were inherently 
connected. The political writings of the brothers De la Court were ultimately a ‘radical plea 
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for a truly republican government, devoid of any monarchical element such as a stadholder, 
for far-reaching religious toleration and comprehensive economic liberty’.68 
Philalethes recognised that the Dutch experience in freeing themselves from tyranny and their 
subsequent prosperity was a dangerous example to England. The Dutch had, after all, 
with such difficulties oppugned with the vast powers of Spain, and have with small helps attained 
so great prosperity, England, if so governed, may promise itself incomparable more, abounding in 
all they want, and being free from all inconveniences they suffered or feared, apprehending no 
opposition but that of the Stuart family, which is left weak and naked the first moment we come to 
discover its reign inconsistent with our welfare.
69
 
In other words, as soon as the English looked to the Dutch experience and realised how easy it 
would be to overthrow the Stuarts and the huge gains in prosperity and liberty that could be 
garnered from doing so, the English monarchy would be doomed. The only way to prevent 
such a thing happening, therefore, was ‘by destroying Holland’. Philalethes proposed going 
about this by manipulating the private interests of ‘monarchs’ (for ease of terminology, I will 
use the word monarch here to refer to the position of Orange within the constitution, assuming 
that was what Sidney was suggesting Orange would become). It was in the interests of both 
Stuart and Orange to ‘make the prince of Orange master’ of the Dutch people’, Philalethes 
argued, because it enabled them to ‘kill two birds with one stone: destroy them we hate and 
fear in Holland, and set up the title and power of the Orange family, that may help us to 
destroy our more hated and feared enemies at home’.70 Philalethes therefore suggested that it 
was in the private interest of Charles to suppress republican government in the Dutch 
Republic as this would both crush any examples of alternative, and perhaps better 
government, and that it was in the private interest of Willian of Orange to support Charles, 
who would help him regain his power and position as ‘monarch’ in the United Provinces.  
Moreover, this connection of interest between the two dynasties was considered by 
Philalethes to be historic, if not almost hereditary. Philalethes demonstrated how James I and 
Prince Maurice allied to get rid of Oldenbarnevelt, in order to further continue the advance of 
the House of Orange. Moreover, ‘the same design went on in king Charles and Henry, prince 
of Orange’.71 Charles I continued this policy, marrying his daughter Mary to Frederick 
Henry’s son, William, on the condition that Charles help make him Lord of the United 
Provinces, and then he would employ all his power to make Charles absolute master in 
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 This connection of interests between the two families was not therefore a new 
phenomenon, but rather representative of the fact that monarchs pursue their own private 
interests, and that these interests invariably involved increasing their own personal power and 
infringing upon the liberty and wellbeing of their people.  
The problem was that ‘the power of a prince and subsistence of their commonwealth is 
inconsistent’, as Philalethes clearly recognised. He acknowledged that ‘that their liberty is 
their life’ and that this liberty had led to their ‘vast revenues, treasure and credit’.73 
Philalethes was repeating the arguments of the De la Courts, but from the opposing 
perspective. He knew that the people’s liberty, and by extension their and the nation’s 
economic success depended on not having a monarch; he therefore had to argue that both of 
these were bad in order to justify his continued support for Charles II and monarchical 
government in general. Philalethes believed that a monarchy ought to keep the people ‘poor, 
weak, miserable, and few [so] they will be humble and obedient’. Otherwise, he warned, ‘all 
people grow proud when numerous and rich; they think themselves masters of all. The least 
injury puts them in a fury’.74 He argued that wealthy cities were cities that revolted against 
government: ‘in all times, seditions have begun in the richest and most populous cities. All 
the tumults in the Low Countries began in Antwerp, Ghent, Brussels and other principal 
cities’.75 The evidence of the connection between liberty and commerce was evident to 
Philalethes in the example of Dutch recent experience: ‘Antwerp, Ghent and Bruges are 
almost desolate by loss of trade, whilst Amsterdam gaining it flourishes in number of men, 
riches and power…by increase of trade, it is of a poor town grown in short time the richest 
and most powerful city in the world…this art is well understood by the Hollanders’.76 The 
connection between commerce, liberty and power is explicitly made here.  
Sidney as Eunomius readily accepted that ‘the king will endeavour to ruin the United 
Provinces and set up his nephew’, suggesting that the connections between the two houses 
was widely understood by all parties.
77
 On the other hand, he was able to state explicitly that 
liberty and economic success were good things, and that it was in the private and public 
interests of both the English and the Dutch people to join together to ensure that monarchical 
private interest never be allowed sovereignty in their respective nations.  
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the king seeking the ruin of the English trade and people, and the ruin of the Holland 
commonwealth, these two nations may see their joint interest against him and Orange, and unite in 
counsels and action joining their hands, hearts, and heads to extirpate the two detested families of 
Stuart and Orange, who, like serpents, as soon as they recover a little vigour, tear out the bowel of 




For Sidney, there was no question that the people of England could have no peace while 
Orange and Stuart posed a serpent-like threat to their liberty. The two would continue to 
collaborate, acting upon their private interests, and by extension, against the public interest, 
until the Dutch Republic was destroyed and both nations subjected to tyranny and oppression. 
The interests of a monarch and the people could never be reconciled and as a result, 
republican government was the only way in which to ensure self-interest and the public good 
were in harmony.  
Like Neville, Sidney also had a European perspective to his republicanism. Where Neville 
was concerned about England’s slipping prestige in Europe, Sidney was more concerned 
about the balance of power on the continent more broadly, although he couched his concerns 
in interest theory once again. Eunomius argued that the Dutch and the English had a common 
interests in uniting against the ambitions of France in order to maintain the European balance 
of power: ‘the interest of every nation that cannot pretend to a universal monarchy or more 
limited superiority over its neighbours, is to keep any others from attaining it and maintain its 
own freedom and independency on any for protection’.79 Sidney therefore saw allying with 
the Dutch not just as a strategic move in terms of the future of English government, but also 
as a means of preventing England from entering into a war that would ultimately be disastrous 
to England and the balance of power in Europe. Commerce likely played a significant role 
here.
 80
 In a lengthy exposition, Eunomius outlined exactly why Philalethes’ plan to seek war 
with the Dutch was a bad idea. He goes through numerous European countries, including 
Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Copenhagen, Prussia and Poland, explaining in detail 
why, because of their important trade connections, none of them would side with England, 
against the Dutch, in a war.
81
 From this speech, we can extrapolate that Sidney placed huge 
emphasis on the power and influence that trade provided. Half of Europe had to remain allied 
with the Dutch in order to maintain their own economic interests. Fighting the Dutch 
therefore made little sense. If the English and the Dutch could unite and fight the French, 
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Sidney argued that the English and the Dutch would benefit from the trade opportunities that 
would present. Eunomius stated that the ‘king of France knows that in losing the benefit of 
trade with Holland, by which all the maritime provinces receive great advantages and his own 
revenues much increase, those provinces might be discontented and his revenue much 
diminished’.82 Trade was therefore rapidly becoming, in Sidney’s opinion, the currency of 
European power.  
This leads us to consider what exactly it was that Sidney saw in the Dutch Republic. Although 
in his earlier years he had pursued an aggressive foreign policy against the Dutch, his 
admiration for them at this point in the 1660s seems to suggest a change in opinion. Sidney 
believed that England ought to be an expansionist republic, as republican Rome had been. 
However, ‘unlike Rome, the republic of the De la Courts is not a commonwealth for the 
increase of territory, but for the increase of trade’.83 The Dutch Republic therefore more 
resembled the commercial and peace loving Athenian commonwealth than the Roman 
Republic. Indeed Alan Houston has argued that Sidney viewed the Dutch as a commonwealth 
for trade and peace, which he must reject because he favoured territorial expansion.
84
 
However, it is worth examining just what we mean here by expansion. Although the Roman 
example demonstrated military conquest as expansion, there is also surely an argument to 
suggest that trade and commercial interests must also seek out expansion, especially in city 
states or republics such as the United Provinces which lack natural resources for trade. 
Recently, Kustaa Multamäki has argued that defining the Dutch Republic as a commonwealth 
for peace and trade places limits on the understanding of their government and overlooks part 
of Sidney’s argument.85 Eunomius stated that ‘the greatest advantage to their state is the 
increase of people that they may have the more trade, and of that trade they may have the 
more people’.86 Thus, he suggests, Houston underestimates the effect that trade could have 
upon a commonwealth; in this case, trade proved to be the catalyst to expansion, which in turn 
helped trade, which in turn aided expansion and on and on until the Dutch monopolised the 
world. This historiographical development leads me to suggest that the aggressive military 
foreign policy against the Dutch in the early 1650s and the suggestions of alliance between 
the two nations in the mid-1660s might not be as conflicting as they first appear. Both 
positions acknowledge the benefits of an expansionist republican foreign policy, but come at 
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it from different perspectives: firstly that of empirical expansion and the second from 
economic expansion. Both sought the same thing – an aggressive foreign policy that would 
increase English power and influence across Europe and beyond. This is not to say that had 
England suddenly become a republic in the 1660s that Sidney would have continued 
forevermore to pursue an alliance with the Dutch, but rather to suggest that his experiences in 
the Dutch Republic might have opened his mind to the differing understandings of what an 
expansionist commonwealth might look like.  
Conclusions 
In setting Court Maxims and The Isle of Pines alongside one another in this analysis two 
things become particularly clear. First, it demonstrates just how large the Dutch republic 
seemed to loom in the English republican narrative in the post-Restoration years. In both 
texts, the Dutch Republic is presented as an aspirational type of commonwealth, one that was 
raised in glory and power by its military and commercial prowess. Both Neville and Sidney 
saw the Dutch as the answers to the problems, albeit in different ways. Sidney saw this 
literally; he engaged with the republican language of that country in order to try and persuade 
its people and leaders to support the overthrow of the Stuarts and the re-establishment of the 
English commonwealth. Neville saw salvation in the Dutch example less literally, instead 
recognising that the example of the Dutch – their military strength, their naval prowess, their 
commercial power and particularly their internal stability – served as the ideal counterpoint 
for shaming England into addressing her own political problems under monarchy.  
The presence and positive portrayal of the Dutch Republic in these two tracts also supports 
the findings of Chapter 4. In both Court Maxims and The Isle of Pines the Venetian Republic 
was all but invisible, and the United Provinces remained at the forefront as a contemporary 
example of republican government. However, the ways in which those prior to the 
Restoration engaged with it was considerably different to how Sidney and Neville did in the 
aftermath of the Stuarts’ return. While in the 1650s the focus was primarily on the 
constitutions and institutions of the Dutch Republic, this was not and could not be the case in 
the 1660s – the altered political context simply would not allow it. Instead, Sidney and 
Neville focused on the immediate and recent historical experiences of the Dutch. They did not 
seek to construct a republican blueprint of government like Harrington, but rather sought to 
demonstrate that  republican government was superior to monarchical government, which was 
evidenced by the fact that the Dutch were militarily and commercially far more successful 
that the English had been since the monarchy had been restored.  
 169 
The aims of these two men in writing their tracts were different. Sidney was explicit in 
arguing that the overthrowing of the Stuart monarch and the re-establishment of republican 
government free from monarchical interest was the only way to save both England and the 
Dutch from years of tyranny, slavery, and oppression. Although much more subtle, The Isle of 
Pines was also a commentary on the dangers of poorly restrained monarchy for England. 
Using Harringtonian language, Neville argued that England would never be politically or 
socially stable under Charles II if he maintained the same degree of power because the 
balance of land had shifted too far into the hands of the people. As such, they could never 
hope to match the power of the Dutch, who easily outshone the English islanders in naval and 
military powers, as well as in their industry and colonisation. Until the monarchical element 
had been rectified in their government, the English could neither enjoy liberty nor political 







Chapter 6: The Exclusion Crisis 
 
In the opening years of the 1680s, both Neville and Sidney were again motivated to put pen to 
paper and set about writing new republican tracts. Again, they were writing with the same 
context, this time the so-called Exclusion Crisis. However, just as in the 1660s, they were 
writing for considerably different purposes. Neville’s Plato Redivivus was a more restrained, 
cautious republican tract in which the author was very aware that he was writing under a 
monarchical government, even if it that monarchy appeared to be in crisis. Sidney on the 
other hand, true to form, wrote Discourses Concerning Government, a tract that has been 
described as the only writing of the seventeenth century to not only justify, but encourage 
rebellion.
1
 It was a tract so damning and inflammatory that it was used as a means to secure 
his subsequent execution. However, there is more to tie together Plato Redivivus and 
Discourses Concerning Government than might perhaps meet the eye. Both Sidney and 
Neville, to differing degrees and certainly different levels of success, sought to conceal their 
true intentions in the way in which they presented their political writings.  
Single Person Government: Revisited 
Both tracts were written in the context of the Exclusion Crisis, and this necessarily informs 
our understanding of them. In particular, this context forced a re-engagement with what has 
been argued to be one of the key themes of the English republican tradition: single person 
government and the rejection of monarchy. In fact, the Exclusion Crisis has been described by 
Scott as a repeat of the arguments that led up to the outbreak of the civil war and the regicide, 
namely debates surrounding popery and arbitrary government. These fears centred on the 
issue of succession. Charles II was ageing but had no legitimate heir, meaning that the throne 
would pass to his brother James, Duke of York, who was suspected of Catholicism. Two 
solutions were offered to this crisis. One was, as the name of the crisis suggests, to exclude 
James from succession, and name the Duke of Monmouth, the eldest illegitimate son of 
Charles II, as heir in his stead. Others argued that a more constitutional approach would 
achieve the same ends. 
In Plato Redivivus, two of the main characters take these two positions. The dialogue sets up a 
debate between the Doctor and the English Gentleman about the appropriateness and 
usefulness of excluding the Duke of York from succession, and replacing him with the Duke 
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of Monmouth, who was a staunch Protestant. These Whig Exclusionists, represented by the 
Doctor, saw exclusion as the cure to the disease that threatened the health of the English 
monarchy. The English Gentleman, who represented the voice of Neville himself, disagreed 
with the Doctor’s diagnosis, and argued that the dangers that the exclusionists believed James 
represented, namely tyranny and popery, were merely symptoms of a greater sickness, and 
that exclusion would not address its root cause. Instead, Neville took a seemingly 
Harringtonian stance, arguing that because the balance of property had shifted to the hands of 
the people, the king ought to surrender some of his powers to them. In placing limitations on 
the power of the monarch, he would never be able to ‘violate the laws’; in doing so, they 
would produce ‘an infallible remedy both against popery and arbitrary power’.2 In setting up 
this primary narrative, Neville therefore made Plato Redivivus appear as though its only 
commentary was on the Exclusion Crisis, thereby remaining very much within the realms of 
the immediate political, monarchical context.  
As a result of this context, Neville remained cautious and explicitly declared that ‘there are 
not a more loyal and faithful people to their prince in the whole world, than ours are’.3 
However, there is more than just expediency at play here. Although Neville endorsed the 
Harringtonian idea that empire equalled dominion in The Isle of Pines, this does not 
necessarily preclude an individual figurehead sitting at the top of a commonwealth, and as a 
result, Neville’s position on this was not exactly clear in the 1660s. However, if we look at the 
way in which Neville presented the Dutch Republic in Plato Redivivus, we can get a clearer 
sense of his stance on this. He appears to have seen in the stadholder a monarchical element 
of government that functioned effectively, having upon its powers clear restraints and 
limitations. In his fairly brief consideration of the Dutch constitution, Neville made very clear 
that power in the United Provinces rested with the ‘people’ (broadly defined): ‘every one of 
these cities is a sovereignty; governed by an optimacy, consisting of the chief citizens’ who 
have ‘continued to govern those towns, time out of mind’. Sovereignty in the Dutch Republic 
was therefore not just highly decentralised, but also lay in the hands of the ‘chief’ citizens.4 
Since gaining their liberty from the Spanish, the Dutch ‘have instituted an artificial minister 
of their own, whom they still call stadtholder; and make choice of him in their provincial 
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assemblies, and for form sake defer something to him, as the appropriation of their Skepen 
and other magistrates, and some other matters’.5 There are several noteworthy points to take 
from this. First, that after their independence, the Dutch people still continued to have a single 
figurehead, or ‘artificial minister’ at the apex of government. Moreover, the name stadholder 
continued to be used even with its connections to their years of oppression. Similarly, this 
position was held ‘in the succession of the princes of Orange’ or ‘some other of the house of 
Nassau’, again connecting this to older, semi-hereditary positions. Second, the choice of the 
next stadholder rested in the hands of the people; although the position was usually held by 
the Orange family, there was a formal process of selecting the stadholder which made clear 
that he was accountable to the people. Finally, the choice of the powers granted to the 
stadholder remained in the hands of the people, and those that were offered to him were of 
minimal importance.  
The example of the Dutch stadholder therefore appeared to be of comparable nature and 
utility for Neville. Indeed, the Dutch example was so comparable to English experience that 
he described how the United Provinces was ‘so oddly set together, and so composed of a state 
intended for a monarchy’.6 Borrowing from this almost-monarchical structure that the Dutch 
had put together would reduce the king to the position of an ‘artificial minister’, and would 
not necessarily prevent the Stuarts from continuing to hold this position, as the Orange family 
had done. The Dutch example even demonstrated how they had been able to actively 
intervene in the nature of their constitutional structures in 1650 when the majority of the 
provinces, at Holland’s persuasion, abolished the position of stadholderate. Moreover, they 
had since reinstated the position when William II’s son, also William (III), became of age. All 
of which occurred without any significant political, social, or military upheaval. Moreover, 
over the years in which William III had been stadholder, he had tried in several ways to 
impose his own will and agenda, but rarely to any significant avail, with William frequently 
being forced to confront the limitations on his own power.
7
  The Dutch Republic thereby 
provided Neville with perhaps the most explicit English republican argument for the value of 
a single figurehead, accountable to the people, at the top of a republican constitution. 
As we have seen, Neville’s approach to the Exclusion Crisis was to work within the given 
constitutional structure, and as a result it was necessary to ‘totally exclude a civil war from 
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being any of the remedies’ to the existing political crisis.8 Sidney, on the other hand, was 
typically less willing to work within the existing political context. Although his Discourses 
was ostensibly a refutation of Filmer’s Patriarcha, Sidney barely bothered to hide the calls to 
rebellion that were present within the text. Although the tract was never finished nor 
published in Sidney’s lifetime, the contents were still dangerous enough that they served as an 
extraordinary ‘witness’ at Sidney’s trial for treason in 1683. Within the tract, Sidney argued 
that the people had not just a right but a duty to disobey bad laws and even to depose or kill a 
tyrant. Thus he argued:  
the whole body therefore of a nation cannot be tied to any other obedience than is consistent with 
the common good, according to their own judgment: and having never been subdued or brought to 
terms of peace with their magistrates, they cannot be said to revolt or rebel against them to whom 




But Sidney did not necessarily argue that the constitution could not possesses a monarchical 
or magisterial element. Indeed he asserted that ‘there never was a good government in the 
world, that did not consist of the three simple species’.10 An element of monarchical 
government was therefore accepted even by Sidney, who advocated killing monarchs who 
became tyrannical. The issue was accountability. The value of this could be shown through 
the Doge. He demonstrates how the ‘dukes of Venice have certainly a part in the government, 
and could not be called magistrates if they had not. They are said to be supreme; all laws and 
publick acts bear their name’.11 They are, however, ‘so well known to be under the power of 
the law, that divers of them have been put to death for transgressing it’.12 He demonstrated 
that the Doge and all the magistrates of Venice were not able to ‘commit undue acts’ or 
‘endeavour to overthrow the law’, since men, using their judgement, would recognise them as 
against the laws of the country, and would ultimately hold them accountable. The citizens of 
Venice were, and always had been, 
born and bred in families that never knew a master, who act for themselves, and have a part in all 
the good and evil that befalls the commonwealth, and know that if it be destroyed, they must 
perish, or at least that all changes are to their prejudice, do neglect the publicks interest, as thinking 
that the whole not depending of any one of them, things will be well enough governed, though they 
attend only their private benefit.
13
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The wisdom of Venice, he suggested came from ‘a knowledge, that whosover offers an injury 
to a private person, or attempts a publick mischief, is exposed to the impartial and inexorable 
power of the law; whereas the chief work of an absolute monarch is to place himself above 
the law’.14 If they ‘prove false’, the dukes ‘ought rather to be hanged, than suffered to 
accomplish the villainies they design’. If this is the case for ‘the highest magistrates’ in other 
republics, why, he asked 'should not the same be in all others, by what name soever they are 
called?’.15 The ‘power of the duke is so circumscribed, that in 1300 years no one except 
Falerio and Tiepoli has dared to attempt anything against the laws; and they were immediately 
suppressed with little commotion in the city’.16  
In some ways, then, the line that Sidney was advocating was not far from that which Neville 
had proposed; it suggested that a monarch could be held accountable through popular 
government and power curtailing laws. Under the monarchical context of Charles II’s reign, 
the Doge and the stadholder became increasingly relevant and useful counterpoints of single 
person rule. Here were two examples of individual figureheads at the top of a republican 
government who were restrained and limited in such a way that they did not endanger the 
common good. In addition, the recent experiences of the Dutch with William III as the 
reinstalled stadholder, who often fought against his chains but could rarely break them, served 
as an example to the English that there was hope for a single figurehead, even a reinstituted 
Stuart monarch. English republicans in the 1680s were therefore engaging with the same 
debates that had been ongoing in the 1640s and 1650s; exclusivist republicanism was still far 
from the dominant narrative or language.  
Ends of Government 
Although Sidney included Venice as a useful example of republican over monarchical 
government, it was not an ideal model for him. For one thing, what mattered most to Sidney 
was not longevity, but value: that something endured interminably did not automatically make 
it a good thing.
17
 While for Harrington, Venice was the prime exemplar of republican 
government because of its continued existence, this was not enough for Sidney. He accepted 
tumults and political upheaval as necessary to the maintenance of liberty: ‘the wisdom of man 
is imperfect, and unable to foresee the effects that may recede from an infinite variety of 
accidents, which according to emergencies, necessarily require new constitutions, to prevent 
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or cure the mischiefs arising from them, or to advance a good that at the first was not thought 
on…changes therefore are inevitable’.18 However, as the title of section seventeen of The 
Discourses attests, while ‘good Governments admit of Changes in the Superstructures…the 
Foundations remain unchangeable’. Indeed, where his earlier contemporaries had maintained 
a particular concern with the constitutional aspects of contemporary republics, Sidney argued 
that it was the ends of government that would really dictate their success.  
Following Machiavellian principles, Sidney divided his commonwealths into four basic types: 
those designed for war and conquest (Rome and Israel), those aimed at defensive war 
(Sparta), those focused on war and trade (Carthage) and those that prioritised peace and trade 
(Venice).
19
 He considered which of these ends is best, asking: 
whether it were better to constitute a commonwealth for war or for trade; and of such as intend 
war, whether those are most to be praised who prepare for defence only, or those who design by 
conquest to enlarge their dominions. Or, if they admit trade, whether they should propose the 
acquisition of riches for their ultimate end, and depend upon foreign or mercenary forces to defend 
them; or to be as helps to enable their own people to carry on those wars, in which they may 
frequently be engaged’.20  
Ultimately he came to the conclusion that ‘the best judges of these matters have always given 
preference to those constitutions that principally intend at war, and make use of trade as 
assisting to that end: and think it better to aim at conquest, rather than simply to stand upon 
their own defence’.21 Wars for conquest and trade were consequently the ideal ends of a 
commonwealth. On the other hand, those who desired peace in order to trade, and who as a 
result hired mercenary soldiers to fight any wars that they were inadvertently entangled in, 
were held lowest in his esteem, for those who ‘serve for wages, often betray their masters in 
distress, and always want the courage and industry which is found in those who fight for their 
own interests, and are to have a part in the victory’.22 
However, when considering the ends of government, the Dutch Republic proved to be 
somewhat problematic for Sidney and also for Neville. Both men had portrayed that 
commonwealth as a powerful military (particularly naval) and commercial force in their 
1660s writings. In Plato Redivivus, Neville described how the provinces united under the 
Union of Utrecht only as a means of defence against the ‘the cruelty and oppression of the 
Spaniard’. As such he argued that it seemed ‘to be composed only for necessity as a state of 
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war, [which] has made modern statesmen conjecture, that it not be very practicable in times of 
peace and security’.23 This was therefore a republic that could only function under war 
conditions, whereby the different provinces were united by a common enemy and continued 
active defence of liberty. Sidney similarly had argued that the ‘the United Provinces is not to 
be contested with at sea, and able very powerfully to hinder progress by land’, but that ‘in all 
business of war or peace with any nation do principally consider trade’.24 By this account, the 
Dutch Republic most closely resembled Carthage, a commonwealth for war and trade. 
However, Sidney created a new category for federated commonwealths like the Dutch and 
Swiss, which he defined as a ‘commonwealth composed of many cities, associated together, 
and living aequo jure’.25 These sorts of commonwealth, however ‘are more hardly preserved 
in peace’ since ‘disputes may arise among them concerning limits, jurisdiction, and the like. 
They cannot always be equally concerned in the same things. The injuries offer’d to one do 
not equally affect all’.26  Internal peace was therefore not something that ought to be expected 
from a federated republic like the United Provinces. However, all things considered, ‘we may 
safely conclude that their state is as well settled as anything among men can be…still 
continuing in their union in spite of all their endeavours that have been used to divide them, 
give us an example of such steadiness in practise and principle, as is hardly parallel’d in the 
world’.27  
According to Sidney’s understanding then, when considering the Dutch Republic from a non-
constitutional perspective, it was a commonwealth that excelled in war and trade; however, 
when considered from a more analytical, constitutional position, it did not quite fall under this 
category. Instead, it was defined almost exclusively by its federal nature, and the resultant 
dangers that this could cause to the internal peace of the republic. Although he had alluded to 
these in Court Maxims – in seeking to further divide the Dutch provinces by ‘setting up 
private interest in each’ in order to create ‘faction’ and thereby ‘dissolve the union’ – Sidney 
had dismissed it due to the ‘particular regard to the preservation of the liberties and privileges 
of each’.28  
There was a similar shift in the way in which the Venetian Republic was portrayed between 
Court Maxims and Discourses Concerning Government. In Court Maxims, Venice is not 
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mentioned with any regularity, but when it is, it is praised for its strength in military and 
trading pursuits. In order to demonstrate the strength of commonwealths in warfare, Sidney 
used the United Provinces and England, but also, and perhaps unexpectedly, Venice:  
The one of the United Provinces, defending themselves against all the power of Spain, and 
increasing in strength and riches during the war. The other of Venice, warring with little loss for 
twenty years against the dreadful power of the Ottoman empire. And the English commonwealth, 
which in five years conquered absolutely Scotland and Ireland, and in so many battles broke the 
Hollanders that they were brought to the upmost weakness’.29 
The war to which Sidney refered here between the Venetians and the Ottomans is the Cretan 
War. The war, which had begun in 1645, was being fought over the valuable Venetian 
possession of Crete and was still raging in the mid-1660s when Sidney was writing. Although 
the Venetians had lost control of most of the island in the early years of the war, they had 
managed to maintain their hold on the island’s most valuable possession, the port of Candia. 
Sidney’s emphasis on the ‘dreadful power’ of the Ottoman Empire thus highlights the 
admiration Sidney had for this feat, so much so that he repeats his admiration later in Court 
Maxims: ‘they have been able for twenty years to war with little loss against all the power of 
the Ottoman empire’.30 Given the enormous size of the Ottoman Empire, the strength of the 
Venetians was indeed being demonstrated through their ability to hold off the Ottoman forces. 
That he held Venetian achievements in the same esteem as those of the early English 
commonwealth, acts as a testament to his admiration.  
Sidney secondly praised the Venetians for their ability to utilise trade to assist them with this 
war. Speaking of Amsterdam in that other famous contemporary commonwealth, the Dutch 
Republic, he says: ‘by increase of trade it is of a poor town grown in short time the richest and 
most powerful city in the world’. Moreover, he asserted that ‘this art is well understood by the 
Venetians’.31 Sidney clearly saw Venice as a powerful trading country, whose riches were 
assisting them in their war with the Ottomans. Additionally, he demonstrated how a lack of 
trade weakened a commonwealth, and particularly its people.  Using the contrary example of 
the Duke of Florence, Sidney showed how ‘following the maxims of a politic prince’ the 
Duke of Florence had ‘by destroying trade ruined many he suspected, forced others to change 
their habitation, and so weakened the spirited commonwealth’s men of Florence that he reigns 
securely’. Trade provided men with an economic motivation to engage in the defence of the 
republic. Venice, then, ‘according to the custom of a well-governed commonwealth, 
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endeavoured to increase trade and people’. This ‘succeeds so well’ that ‘with those helps’ 
they had been able to defend Candia for two decades.
32
  
Politically, the war was also gaining momentum and wider support by the 1660s. Sidney’s 
time in Venice coincided with the end of the Franco-Spanish War, after which individual 
soldiers and companies of men were responding to Venetian calls-to-arms. The French were 
particularly responsive to this, as can be demonstrated in an account written by a gentleman 
who served ‘in the first expedition of the French Forces under the Command of M. de la 
Fueillade’.33 Simultaneously though, there was talk of a defensive and offensive alliance 
between the English and the Ottoman empire against the French and Venetians.
34
 The war 
was beginning to resemble a sort of ‘crusade’ against the Ottomans, and Sidney would 
undoubtedly have been infuriated that the restored Stuart monarchy was prepared to support 
what he perceived to be the wrong side. Although he had been prepared to support the new 
monarch, Sidney would not have been any more endeared to Charles II by this act of betrayal. 
In supporting slavery over liberty, Sidney perhaps foresaw a rapid backslide into absolute and 
tyrannical government, a total abandonment of everything the English commonwealth stood 
for. Moreover, by the time Sidney came to write Court Maxims, the Cretan War was 
becoming increasingly romanticised on the continent.
35
 Numerous accounts of Venice and the 
defence of Candia were published in both English and French, suggesting a widespread 
interest in the affairs of this small Venetian outpost.
36
 Although the majority of these accounts 
were written in the later 1660s, after Sidney would have written Court Maxims, the number of 
publications, and the length and detail of each one, suggests that there was a wide audience 
for this material, and that it was a topic of much debate in the cities of Europe at the time. 
Moreover, the accounts predominantly sung the glories of the Venetians, particularly the 
works of Jean Gailhard and the Earl of Castlemaine.  
Read in the light of the later defeat of the Venetians by a reinvigorated Ottoman army, 
Sidney’s later, and much more negative, view of Venice hints at his disappointment that such 
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a glorious war ended in a decidedly inglorious defeat. After three years of unrelenting siege 
warfare by the Ottomans, and without consulting the Venetian mainland, the Candian fort 
surrendered in 1669. The peace terms that were negotiated, though surprisingly generous, left 
the Venetians with nothing to show for its twenty-five years of warfare. The criticisms that 
were levelled at the Venetian republic in the Discourses represent the specific factors which 
led to the loss of Crete. First, Sidney complained of how the Venetians are often ‘unwillingly 
enter’d into wars’ as they had been into the Cretan War by Maltese piracy.37 Secondly, he was 
critical of Venetian reliance on mercenary soldiers, particularly of their being ‘always forced 
too much to depend upon foreign potentates’.38 Indeed, Venetian over reliance on French 
support, particularly in the latter stages of the war, proved to be disastrous for the republic. 
An anonymous French account of the Candian siege highlights the problems that mercenary 
soldiers brought with them, and the havoc they wreaked. The author stated that ‘we began to 
complain, that instead of attempting some brave and considerable enterprize, as they had 
promised us, we were…imploy’d night and day on trifling services, in which we lost the best 
of our men’.39 This suggests that men went to seek glory for themselves, rather than to seek 
the glory and victory of Venice. Not only this, but there were tensions between the 
commanders themselves: ‘Mr. Fueillade…desired we might have the guard at the bastion of 
S. Andre: but the Knights of Malta and other Officers of the Town, who had had the keeping 
it a long time before, oppos’d it very strongly’.40 It appears that the criticisms levelled at 
Venice by Sidney in the Discourses were a direct reaction and response to the factors which 
led to the loss of the Cretan War.  As such, Sidney complained, the Venetians were wont to 
‘buy peace with ignominious and prejudicial conditions, and sometimes to fear the infidelity 
of their own commanders, no less than the violence of their enemies’.41   
The shift in Sidney’s attitude to Venice could therefore be related to the specific experience of 
that republic in war and the subsequent disillusion with Venice after its loss. We can only 
speculate as to whether this might have changed his categorisation of state aims. Certainly he 
never seems to have considered Venice as a commonwealth for conquest: ‘Venice in our days 
has nothing to fear more than the enlargement of its dominion.’ Referring to Venetian 
expansion in the fifteenth century into northern Italy, he condemned ‘the ill-measured design 
of gaining the Polesine and the Ghiradadda’ since it ‘brought that noble city to the brink of 
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destruction’.42 However, its success in fighting a defensive war against the powerful Ottoman 
Empire might have led to a more conflicted categorisation of the Venetian Republic. In the 
end, however, the loss of the Cretan War marked a turning point in Venetian history. Their 
resources were sorely depleted, and after a couple more brief skirmishes, Venice began 
pursuing a policy of neutrality which would continue through the eighteenth century, further 
accelerating her decline.
43
 Never again would that commonwealth be considered a global 
power.  
This shift in the way in which Venice was portrayed therefore reflected a wider 
disillusionment with the history and politics of Venice. The myth of Venice was now 
significantly in the decline, and the anti-myth was beginning to dictate the narrative. This 
cultural shift makes it all the more interesting that in Plato Redivivus, Neville chose to have 
the final of his three characters as a Noble Venetian. The rest of this chapter will take a closer 
look at the characters, themes and political intentions of this text, particularly in relation to the 
myth and anti-myth of Venice.  
Venice and the Anti-Myth in Plato Redivivus 
Plato Redivivus has more often been connected ideologically to Harrington’s Oceana rather 
than anything of its own period, like the Discourses. In fact, so closely connected were the 
two works, that in the preface to Plato Redivivus, it was necessary to defend Neville against 
accusations of plagiarism.
44
 The publisher composed a letter in which he denied lifting 
wholesale ideas from Oceana: ‘My next doubt was; that a considerable part of this treatise 
being a repetition of a great many principles and positions out of Oceana, the author would be 
discredited for borrowing from another and the sale of the book hindered’. He claimed that 
‘whosoever sets himself to study politics, must do it by reading history, and observing in it 
the several turns and revolutions of government; and then the cause of such change will be 
visible and obvious, that we need not to impute theft to any man that finds it out’.45 This 
connection between Harrington and Neville has continued down the centuries, from Neville’s 
contemporaries who accused him of having ‘a finger in that pye’ of Oceana, to modern 
historians who have termed Neville a neo-Harringtonian.
46
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Neville certainly did utilise many Harringtonian principles in Plato Redivivus, but defining 
Neville against Harrington has become increasingly problematic, since it predetermined the 
parameters within which Neville has been examined. This is particularly true in the case of 
Caroline Robbins and Pocock, both of whom drew connections between Harrington and those 
who inherited his ideas from the late seventeenth into the eighteenth centuries. Neville’s case 
is somewhat complicated by the fact that although he was a contemporary and friend of 
Harrington, his intellectual contributions to republican theory apply not to the period of the 
English republic, but to the later constitutional crisis regarding Charles II.
47
 This approach has 
overlooked crucial ways in which Harrington and Neville differed. By exploring the way in 
which Neville portrayed Venice, and in particular through a close analysis of the character of 
the Noble Venetian, it will be possible to demonstrate that in fact Plato Redivivus undermined 
Harrington’s idealisation of Venice and in places had more in common with anti-myth tropes. 
I will consider why Neville took this position with regards to Venice, and what this might 
mean for his ‘neo-Harringtonianism’.  
It is important to point out that the recent work on Neville by Mahlberg has done an excellent 
job of assessing Neville’s political thought in its own right. By assessing his body of work as 
a whole, she has highlighted the jocular and satirical nature of his writings, particularly in 
works like The Parliament of Ladies.
48
 Nonetheless, Plato Redivivus has universally been 
read as a serious political text. Whilst it undoubtedly strikes a more serious and intellectual 
tone than his previous work, it is a mistake to ignore Neville’s wry, satirical and sarcastic 
voice in this text when it is so present in his other political writings. This jocular nature will 
therefore be taken into account throughout my examination of the characterisation of the 
figures represented in Plato Redivivus.  
We can learn a lot about the themes and form of Plato Redivivus, as well as Neville’s 
approach, even before we reach the main body of text. The full title of the tract is: Plato 
Redivivus: Or, A Dialogue Concerning Government, wherein, by Observations drawn from 
other Kingdoms and States both Ancient and Modern, an Endeavour is used to Discover the 
Present Politick Distemper of our Own, with the Causes, and Remedies. From this, we can 
draw some important observations. First, that Neville’s starting point for his analysis of 
England’s troubles will be drawn ‘from other Kingdoms and States both Ancient and 
Modern’. This certainly mirrors the method that Harrington described in The Commonwealth 
of Oceana, particularly ‘The Council of Legislators’, indicating that both men valued not just 
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ancient republics but modern commonwealths as well, and put their experiences to use in their 
own political modelling. We also learn that the tract will take the form of a dialogue and that 
illness and disease form the main thematic basis of the tract. The dialogue takes place 
between an English Gentleman, a Doctor, and a Noble Venetian. The Noble Venetian, who 
resides with the English Gentleman during his time visiting England, falls suddenly ill while 
his host is away in London. The Venetian calls to his aid the Doctor, who is said to be 
renowned for his skill. When the English Gentleman hears of his companion’s illness he 
rushes home, at which point all three protagonists meet in the sick man’s chamber. The 
English Gentleman is thankful that his friend appears much recovered and the conversation 
then turns towards politics.  
It is important to take a moment here to consider the setting and form that Neville chose, since 
these decisions, particularly where the discussion is located and who participates in it is surely 
directly related to the meaning of the dialogue.
49
 The choice of the dialogue form allows a 
level of textual and sub-textual flexibility that might not be achievable in a more static 
treatise. It allows the author to present different arguments to the reader via each of the 
participants in the dialogue.
50
 This may indeed be one of the main reasons that Neville chose 
this form; the political situation was still divided in the 1680s, and the three-way dialogue 
enabled him to address several audiences at once. The impetus for him to do so may well have 
been sparked by his involvement in political clubs during this period. In Plato Redivivus, the 
English Gentleman comments that he has often enjoyed the ‘good conversation’ of the 
Doctor, but that recently the latter has ‘done coming to our coffee-house’. Such a location was 
common place for political clubs to meet, and we know that Neville had participated in the 
Harringtonian Rota Club in 1659-60. It is therefore not unreasonable to suggest that he was 
keen to engage in debate during the years of the Exclusion Crisis. The most prominent club of 
the period was the Green Ribbon Club whose “Whiggish” membership debated and agitated 
for Exclusion. However as David Allen has argued, this club was most prominent because of 
its oppositional stance and visible nature. However there were plenty of smaller, lesser known 
Whig clubs that reflected the diversity of factions within the Whig “party”; Tim Harris has 
calculated there to have been twenty-nine in London alone during the Exclusion Crisis. One 
of these divisions, Allen suggests, was between those who were mere Exclusionists and those 
who can be defined as republicans, advocating the sort of limitations on the monarchy that 
Neville argues for in Plato Redivivus. One such location that housed those who thought 
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similarly to Neville was The Salutation in Lombard Street, hosted by the Duke of 
Buckingham. We cannot say for sure whether Neville was a party to this or any other political 
club, but it seems reasonable to assume that he may have been.
51
  
What the existence of these clubs demonstrates is that there were a multitude of solutions 
being proposed to the crisis concerning the English monarchy. In creating a three-way 
dialogue, Neville attempted to address at least two of these broad audiences. With the Doctor 
and the English Gentleman, Neville was addressing the validity of exclusion as a means 
through which to resolve the crisis. This debate has been the main focus of historians’ 
attentions. The purpose of the Noble Venetian, on the other hand, has rarely troubled scholars. 
Robbins overlooked the importance of the Noble Venetian to the dialogue, and although Fink 
criticised her for this, he offered no analysis either.
52
 Mahlberg has dismissed him as a 
‘neutral enquirer’.53 However, if this is the case, surely the character could be simply a 
generic Englishman? Why make him Venetian? Hilary Gatti has recently addressed these 
questions, concluding that Neville demonstrates his commitment to Machiavelli’s rejection of 
Venice.
54
 Her focus is therefore on Machiavellian critiques of Venice, focusing on military 
weakness due to its aristocratic nature. While this offers an interesting way into interpreting 
Plato Redivivus, it does not take into consideration the position of Venice in the 1680s, with 
the rise of a more contemporary anti-myth and the increasing awareness of the Venetian 
decline.  
The inclusion in the dialogue of the Noble Venetian serves as a means to address the 
republican audience and set forth his vision of how an English republic could function under 
the existing political structures. The Noble Venetian stands as a symbol of republican 
government, as a representative of values that had once been embraced by England. 
Furthermore, he represented a symbiosis with Harringtonian ideals as set out in Oceana, 
which had been so heavily influenced by the myth of Venice. That the Noble Venetian is 
intended to represent the myth of Venice is indicated clearly when he mentions Giannotti. The 
Noble Venetian declares that he has ‘read many descriptions of our frame, which have taught 
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me something in it which I knew not before’. But it was from Giannotti in particular that he 
found himself best informed, for it was he ‘to whom I refer those who are curious to know 
more of our orders’.55 Giannotti was not only one of the most influential writers of the 
republican myth, but he was also used at length by Harrington in The Commonwealth of 
Oceana. The Noble Venetian stood as a figurative representation of the Harringtonian 
idealisation of Venice, its orders, and its constitutional structure. 
For Neville’s alternative perspective, we might look towards the list of ‘political discourses 
and histories’ included at the beginning of Plato Redivivus. The list comprises twelve texts, 
nine of which offer accounts of contemporary countries and governments: four on Venice, 
two on the Ottoman Empire, two on France and one on the United Provinces. Of particular 
interest, however, are two accounts by Frenchmen who offer assessments of the Venetian 
republic’s history, policy, and constitution; these are Sieur de la Hay’s The Policy and 
Government of the Venetians, Both in Civil and Military Affairs, and Amelot de la Houssaye’s 
The History of the Government of Venice. The existence on the list of these two texts is 
significant because they were key texts in shifting the Venetian narrative from myth to anti-
myth. They demonstrate that the most up-to-date literature regarding the Venetian Republic 
propounded a much more negative position than that which would have been available to the 
republicans of the 1640s and 1650s. If the Noble Venetian was therefore connected with this 
older position of Giannotti, Harrington and the myth of Venice, then the English Gentleman 
and therefore Neville, must be read through the anti-myth. This suggests that he was using the 
dialectic between the Noble Venetian and English Gentleman to argue against the mythical 
portrayal of Venice, and its use as a political model for England.  
According to the traditional historiography that understood Neville as sitting alongside 
Harrington as an uncomplicated advocate of the Venetian constitution, we would expect that 
it would be his word, rather than the English Gentleman’s, that is considered wise and 
authoritative in this dialogue. Instead, the reader is promptly made aware of the limitations 
inherent in the Noble Venetian’s understanding. This is initially indicated when we learn that, 
like most Italian gentleman, the Venetian understands very little Latin; whilst the Doctor has 
reached ‘perfection in that tongue’, he himself remains ‘defective’ in it.56 Later, the Noble 
Venetian moves onto more political issues, stating that ‘I am one of those unskilful persons 
that cannot discern a state-marasmus, when the danger is so far off’.57 Perhaps the most 
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relevant instance of the Noble Venetian’s limitations appears as part of a discussion that 
immediately references the political reputation of Venice. In an allusion to Harrington’s 
assertion that ‘he that understands Venice right shall go nearest to judge…right of any 
government in the world’, Neville mocks the notion that if the Noble Venetian was not the 
man to save England, ‘then no man living can; for your government is this day the only 
school in the world, that breeds such physicians’.58 The Noble Venetian continued to argue 
that his companion was overestimating the Venetians’ political knowledge, he argued that the 
English Gentleman over-valued: 
not only me, but the wisdom of my fellow-citizens; for we have none of these high speculations, nor 
has scarce any of our body read Aristotle, Plato or Cicero, or any of those great artists ancient or 
modern, who teach that great science of the governing and increasing great states and cities…we only 
study our own government; and that too chiefly to be fit for advantageous employments, rather than 
to forsee dangers.
59 
That the Venetians lacked a broader understanding of political history or theory beyond that 
of their own republic is suggestive. In rejecting study of any other constitutions beyond their 
own, they have become insular. Moreover, in only reading the histories of their own 
government, the Venetians were only exposed to the myth of Venice itself and could 
comprehend little else. To them, there was no mythical Venice, but just a straight history of 
the most Serene Republic. By the time Neville was writing Plato Redivivus, however, the 
anti-myth was beginning to gain traction across Europe and it was impossible wholly to 
accept the traditional portrayal of Venice as fact.  
Nor will the Doctor be able to provide a cure to England’s ills. At a superficial glance, the 
Doctor is placed high in the protagonists' and readers' esteem. He is described as an ‘eminent 
physician of our nation’, ‘renowned for his skill and cures at home’.60 Our immediate 
impression is of a doctor with a widespread reputation and unique skill, and if the praise 
stopped here, we might have no cause to query it. However, the hyperbole which Neville 
invoked in his further descriptions of the Doctor undermines this perspective. The English 
Gentleman describes him as ‘the Aesculapius of our age’, a man who has ‘arrived to so exact 
and perfect a discovery of the formerly hidden parts of the human bodies’ that he now knows 
and teaches more ‘than either Hippocrates, or any of the ancients or moderns’.61 This is 
repeated later in the text when the English Gentleman exclaims: ‘your skill did not terminate 
in the body natural, but extended to the politic: for a more pertinent interrogatory could never 
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have been made by Plato or Aristotle’.62 The Doctor’s skill is so grotesquely exaggerated, that 
it cannot be read as serious appreciation of his abilities. 
The theme of illness also emphasises the idea that not even a doctor will necessarily 
understand the exact causes of a disease. Moreover, analogies of medicine and doctors was 
fairly common in Plato's works and in ancient Greek philosophy more generally.
63
 A Platonic 
dialogue themed as such had several important implications. One was that it suggested a 
hierarchical model, with the doctor presumed to be more knowledgeable than the patient. 
However, Platonic theory claimed that understanding is dependent on the capabilities of each 
person to realise the truth of a given philosophical argument. This meant that although the aim 
of the dialogue was to reach mutual agreement, not all participants in a dialogue were capable 
either of contributing equally, or of learning the same lessons, based on their capacity for 
understanding.
64
 Just as not all people were simultaneously capable of the same level of 
understanding, so nor were they necessarily capable of correctly diagnosing ills and offering 
an appropriate solution. This naturally applies to the Doctor in Plato Redivivus, but it also 
extends to the idea of curing England’s ills by simply imposing mythical Venetian solutions. 
Neither was going to actually cure the patient’s underlying problem. Neville utilised medical 
analogies in order to really emphasise this point: ‘the patient cannot know what they ail, but 
are forced to send for some artist to tell them; yet they cease not to be uneasy and impatient, 
and lay hold oftentimes upon suitable remedies, and impute their malady to wrong and 
ridiculous causes’.65 Most importantly in Plato’s dialogues, his main protagonists (often 
Socrates) frequently argued that just as we seek an expert when our body is in need of help, so 
we should do the same for our soul. Presumably, the same logic applies to the state as well. 
Indeed, the Noble Venetian in this case has already declared himself ignorant of problems 
within both the English and the Venetian constitutions, further supporting the idea that 
Neville was warning against looking to Venice as an outside source of political wisdom. Even 
the ‘expert’ in this case, the Doctor, will fail to find the cure:  
I will borrow one similitude more, with our doctor’s favour from his profession –  I knew once a 
man given over by the physicians, of an incurable cachexy; which they said proceeded from the 
ill quality of the whole mass of blood, from great adustion, and from an ill habit of the whole 
body: the patient had very often painful fits of the colic, which they said, proceeded from the 
sharpness of the humour which caused the disease; and, amongst the rest, had one fit which 
tormented him to that degree, that it was not expected he could outlive it; yet the doctors 
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delivered him from it in a small time; notwithstanding, soon after the man dies of his first 
distemper . Whereas, if their art had arrived to have cured that which was the cause of the other, 
the colic had vanished of itself and the patient recovered.
66
  
The medical comparison demonstrates that the Doctor might not always provide a cure to the 
actual illness, but rather to the symptoms of the illness. So whilst patient and doctor might 
both examine the disease and its symptoms, they may both still reach different and incorrect 
solutions, and more importantly, fail to treat the actual disease itself.  
In undermining both the Doctor and the Noble Venetian, Neville was demonstrating that those 
who were traditionally considered experts were not necessarily to be trusted. The Doctor 
could not necessarily be trusted with differentiating between symptoms and causes, thereby 
increasing the risk of killing the patient through misjudgement of the severity of the situation. 
On the other hand, the Noble Venetian, who ought to represent the ultimate in political 
wisdom demonstrates that in fact he and his countrymen were rather ignorant of the realities 
of constitutional systems. Simply borrowing wholesale from that commonwealth was just 
another example of addressing the symptoms of the English malaise rather than curing the 
illness itself. The characterisation of the Noble Venetian is therefore far from the 
mythologised idea of Venice’s citizens that was evident in Harrington’s writings. Rather than 
following either of these characters, we ought to listen to the English Gentleman, who 
‘understands the government of England better’ than his conversational fellows. 
As such, the English Gentleman proposed different solutions that deal with the fundamental, 
foundational problems within the English constitution as opposed to the superficial issues the 
Doctor recognises. He acknowledged that the true cause of England’s problems was the 
‘breach and ruin of our government: which, having been decaying for near two hundred years, 
is in our age brought so near to expiration, that it lies agonizing; and can no longer perform 
the functions of a political life’.67 According to the Harringtonian aphorism that Neville 
endorsed in Plato Redivivus, power ought now have to shifted to the many; the established 
government however was keeping them from this power, thus causing an imbalance between 
empire and dominion. The cure to this illness, Neville argued 
will follow naturally, if you are satisfied in the disease and in the cause of the disease. For if you 
agree that our government is broken; and that it is broken, because it was founded upon property, and 
that foundation is now shaken: it will be obvious, that you must either bring property back to your 
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old government, and give the kind and lords their lands again; or else you must bring the government 
to the property, as it now stands.
68
  
He, of course, subsequently argued for the latter solution. The way in which he proposed to 
transfer some power from the monarch to the people focused primarily on the need to put 
limitations on the prince so that he ‘can never violate the laws’; in doing so, they would 
produce ‘an infallible remedy both against popery and arbitrary power’.69  
The myth of Venice suggested that the citizens of Venice possessed some exceptional 
capabilities that enabled them to establish and perpetuate their system of government 
throughout the centuries. Harrington declared that Venice was unique as it had not needed a 
legislator to design their commonwealth, rather they possessed citizens so wise and virtuous 
that they had been able to formulate the ideal government by themselves.
70
 It is therefore 
tempting to take the English Gentleman upon his word when he declares that the Venetians 
‘have ever enjoyed a succession of wise citizens, that have had the skill and ability to 
forewarn you’ of dangers to the republic.71 This apparent praise follows a discussion between 
the English Gentleman and the Noble Venetian regarding the inability and unwillingness of 
the English parliament to instigate the necessary cure to England’s disease. The English 
Gentleman declares that ‘our counsellors (perceiving the decay of the foundation, as they 
must if can see but one inch into the politics) ought to have addressed themselves to the king 
to call a parliament, the true physician, and to lay open the distemper there; and so have 
endeavoured a cure’. Following Machiavelli he concedes that: 
diseases in government are like a marasmus in the body natural, which is very hard to be discovered, 
whilst it is curable; and after it comes easy to discern, difficult (if not impossible) to be remedied:  yet 
it is to be supposed that the counsellors are, or ought to be skilful physicians; and to foresee the seeds 
of state distempers, time enough to prevent the death of the patient: else they ought in conscience to 




Neville therefore excused both the people and the king for England’s current situation, and 
places the blame on the ministers of state, who are ‘inexcusable; and deserve all the fury, 
which must one time or other be let loose against them’.73 The suggestion of the English 
Gentleman’s tirade is that politicians who cannot acknowledge and rapidly respond to 
emerging problems within the English constitution ought not to engage in employment within 
politics. Given the great reputation of the Venetian patriciate, who were theoretically capable 
                                                 
68
 Ibid., 152.  
69
 Ibid., 160. 
70
 Harrington, Aphorisms Political, PWJH, 772.  
71
 Neville, Plato Redivivus, 83.  
72
 Ibid., 81.  
73
 Ibid., 82.  
 190 
of meeting and solving all constitutional crises, we would expect the Noble Venetian to be 
excluded from this sub-standard type of politician. However, after the English Gentleman’s 
speech, he immediately requests to be informed ‘how the government of England is decayed; 
and how it comes to be so’; this explanation is necessary since the Venetian had already 
declared himself to be ‘unskilful’ in recognising disease or decline within a state.74 After such 
a declaration, we can only read the English Gentleman’s subsequent comments about the 
wisdom of the Venetian people as a gentle mockery of those, like Harrington, who placed 
such emphasis on their exceptional capabilities. Similarly, the English Gentleman’s comments 
that the Venetian government ‘is this day the only school in the world, that breeds such 
physicians’ can also be read as a dig at Harrington, who argued ‘he that understands Venice 
right shall go nearest to judge…right of any government in the world’.75  
Neville’s disregard for Harrington’s glorification of the Venetian model of government was 
further emphasised when the three protagonists begin discussing the specific constitutions of 
modern republics. The English Gentleman gives a lengthy outline of the constitution of the 
United Provinces, but defers to the Noble Venetian for information about the Venetian 
republic, as ‘it would be a presumption for me to say anything, whilst you are present’. Once 
again, however, the Noble Venetian declared his ignorance of the specifics of his own 
constitution: ‘I believe strangers understand the speculative part of our government better than 
we do’.76 He continued in this vein: ‘we that manage the mechanical part of the government, 
are like horses who know their track well enough, without considering east or west, or what 
business they go about’. Neville was suggesting that ballot, which Harrington considered to 
be the cornerstone of the Venetian constitution, was understood by none of the patriciate, who 
simply did what they were told. For Harrington, this was part of the beauty of the ballot, as 
outlined previously in his mechanised kitten metaphor. Furthermore, he declared that anyone, 
‘if they can but draw the balls, though they understand nothing at all of the ballot’, can 
understand how the system functions. Indeed, ‘to philosophise further upon this art, though 
there be nothing more rational, were not worth the while, because in writing it will be 
perplexed and the first practise of it gives the demonstration’.77 By having the Noble Venetian 
outline his own lack of understanding here, it suggests that Neville was less enthralled with 
the Venetian model of balloting than Harrington was. It undermines the idea that this 
constitutes a wise means by which to incorporate the people into the political system. 
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Moreover, it further supports the medical analogies examined earlier, since by not fully 
understanding the system in which they were engaged, people could not reach optimal 
understanding, thereby resulting in faulty solutions or cures. We can suggest then, that Neville 
did not put much faith in the mechanised virtue created by the ballot; in fact, the ballot itself 
is not mentioned again.  
This scepticism is reinforced by Neville’s discussion regarding what constitutes wisdom. The 
Noble Venetian asks the English Gentleman whether the cure that the latter has proposed is 
likely to be put into practise any time soon. The English Gentleman declared that his country 
was ‘not ripe yet for any great reform’, the reason being that: 
most of the wise and grave men of this kingdom are very silent, and will not open their budget 
upon any terms: and although they dislike the present condition we are in as much as any men, and 
see the precipice it leads us to, yet will never open their mouths to prescribe a cure.
78
  
There is a deliberate parallel drawn here, through word repetition, between the way in which 
Neville describes the politicians of England, as ‘grave men’, with our introduction to the 
Noble Venetian at the very beginning of the text, who is described as ‘a grave, sober 
person’.79 This parallel is further drawn out in this discussion of England’s politicians’ 
reluctance to enact a cure, who ‘being asked what they would advise, give a shrug, like your 
countrymen’.80 This allusion to silence also relates back to Harrington’s idealisation of the 
lack of debate in the lower house, which he considered essential: ‘set the wisest man of your 
house in the great council of Venice, and you will not know him from a fool’.81 For 
Harrington this was a positive feature, since even the most base of citizens were enabled to 
participate in the process of government. But this also links to the biblical proverb ‘even a 
fool, when he holdeth his peace, is counted wise’.82 Neville was therefore mocking 
Harrington for being tricked into thinking that the silence in which the Venetian system is 
conducted is a good thing. Whilst the Venetian remains silent, they could not expose their 
ignorance; by including the Noble Venetian in his dialogue, Neville could expose his 
foolishness. This is emphasized in the lengthy soliloquy given by the Noble Venetian about a 
Venetian Capuchin called Bernardino da Udine, intended to demonstrate the danger and 
futility of trying to dictate to the highest of powers, which in the story alluded to God, but 
within the context of the dialogue itself referred to monarchy.
83
 The Noble Venetian tells the 
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story in earnest, but the narrative is so exaggerated that the Noble Venetian and his 
countrymen appear ridiculous for having ever entertained it. Indeed, the Doctor subsequently 
declares that this ‘serious discourse’ can only be turned into ‘ridicule’, and the English 
Gentleman also teases him later when he states: ‘if I should have proposed anything in this 
discourse, which should have entrenched upon the king’s hereditary right; or that should have 
hindered the majesty and greatness of these kingdoms from being represented by his royal 
person; I should have made your story of the capuchin friar very applicable to me’.84 The 
Noble Venetian is made aware of his own foolishness, seeing that ‘you have not forgiven me 
that novel yet’.85 
Neville undermined the mythical idea of the exceptional wisdom of the Venetian citizens 
merely by including him within this dialogue. By opening his mouth, the Noble Venetian 
undermines the value placed on silence within the Venetian constitution. He is exposed as an 
ignorant fool, who knows very little of the actual functions of the government he has served. 
Although he can recount the historical myth of Venice, and how it came into being, he cannot 
explain exactly how the constitution works, implying that he is nothing more than an animal 
who is trained to perform a trick with the balloting balls. The problem with this lack of 
understanding is that it means that an effective solution cannot be attained. What this 
combined lack of wisdom and balloting system actually result in it keeping the patriciate 
ignorant and blind to the realities of their government. The Venetians are thereby rendered 
unable to fully analyse their constitution and current political status, meaning that they cannot 
recognise if or when they were in danger from internal disease. The Venetian patriciate 
therefore ought not to call themselves politicians at all, if they could not ensure the stability of 
their republic.  
One of the aspects of the Venetian government that the authors of the anti-myth discussed at 
length was the Council of Ten. Although Neville does not specifically refer to it in Plato 
Redivivus, it is alluded to in the discussions surrounding the Privy Council. The Council of 
Ten sat outside of the traditional mixed government of monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy, and as such sat uncomfortably alongside the constitution, and similar concerns 
surrounded the Privy Council. The Doctor asks why ‘we may not begin, and lay the 
foundations now, by removing his majesty’s present council, by parliament’, since it does not 
serve the public interest, but rather that of the king. The English Gentleman responds that the 
Privy Council ‘is no part of our government…nor is the king obliged by any fundamental law, 
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or by any act of parliament, to hearken to their advice; or so much as to ask it’.86 He later goes 
on to state that as for the privy council, ‘the king may still please to continue to nominate 
them at his pleasure; so they act nothing in matters properly within the jurisdiction, of these 
four councils’ that Neville proposes be established (for war and peace, for armed forces, for 
appointing officers, and for public revenue – all of which having previously been royal 
prerogatives).
87
  He says that the privy council ought to have no foundation in law nor any 
public capacity at all, for these are often ‘private men who speak according to the best of their 
cunning’. Rather, Neville hopes that ‘his majesty please to take their counsel in private, but 
summon no persons to appear before them’.88  
That the Council of Ten is considered to have too much power is also indicated through the 
parallel drawn with the Privy Council. The English Gentleman continues that as the Privy 
Council cannot summon people to appear before them, much less should that council be given 
‘authority to send for in custody, or imprison any subject; which may as well be done by 
judges and magistrates: who, if secrecy be required, may as well be sworn to secrecy as these 
gentleman’.89 The Noble Venetian, on the other hand, is horrified by the leniency and lack of 
secrecy of the English government. He asks: ‘But would you have none to manage state-
affairs? None imprisoned for secret conspiracies, and kept till they can be fully 
discovered?’.90 Indeed, he is shocked by ‘an act made here lately, about imprisonments; that 
every people shall have his habeas corpus, I think you call it: so that no man, for what 
occasion soever, can lie in prison above a night, but the cause must be revealed, though there 
be great cause for the concealing it’.91 Here, the fear, suspicion and perhaps paranoia, that the 
Venetian government possessed becomes evident; the Noble Venetian rejects the idea that 
justification ought to be provided for the arrest and imprisonment of a person.  
Here the parallel between the Privy Council and the Council of Ten becomes obvious. The 
criticism being made here is that both councils have taken upon themselves authority beyond 
their remit. Both Amelot and De la Hay strongly rebuked the increasing authoritarianism of 
the Council of Ten. They accused it of usurping sovereignty by considerably surpassing the 
agreed limits of its power, and they condemned the severity with which the Council acted 
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against anyone it considered to be an enemy of the state.
92
 Thus by discussing the Privy 
Council, Neville has been able to further debunk the myth of Venice; he could show how the 
republic relied on extra-constitutional bodies, and their excess of judicial control, to create an 
atmosphere of fear and suspicion. In doing so, the anti-myth suggests, the people are cowed 
into submission. 
Conclusions 
By looking at Plato Redivivus and Discourses Concerning Government side by side we can 
see several patterns. First, that exclusivist republicanism was still not the dominant republican 
language by the 1680s. Even Sidney, who called for rebellion and revolt against bad 
monarchs, did not argue against monarchy per se. He certainly made it clear that popular 
government was his favoured form of government, but he also demonstrated that an 
individual could sit at the top of that system. What was ultimately most important to Sidney 
and to Neville was that the powers of the king were sufficiently limited and significantly 
reduced. In these circumstances, the examples of the stadholder and the Doge both became 
pertinent examples of how this could effectively be achieved in a modern commonwealth.  
What also becomes clear is that there was a shift back in these texts from a focus on the 
experiences of republican government to the particulars of constitutional republicanism. This 
was not a balanced shift. Sidney was always less concerned with the specifics of building 
republican institutions or engaging with republican practices. However, the nature of the 
Discourses, as a response to Patriarcha, meant that to a certain degree Sidney was forced to 
engage in these sorts of issues. Rather than looking at constitutional specifics, however, he 
shifted his focus on military and commercial strength that had been so present in Court 
Maxims into a discussion of the ends of government. By looking at the way the Venetian 
Republic was portrayed in these two tracts, we can also trace a wider cultural shift in the way 
in which Venice was perceived in the aftermath of the Cretan War, which left the republic 
considerably weakened as a trading, military, or even diplomatic power.  
In Plato Redivivus the shift from experiential to constitutional republicanism was much 
clearer, as is the shift in the way in which Venice was perceived. In taking a closer look at the 
role of the Noble Venetian in the dialogue, as well as taking into consideration Neville’s other 
political writings and the wider themes of Plato Redivivus, it has been possible to uncover a 
layer of meaning to the text that has long evaded discovery. The Noble Venetian represented 
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the idealised vision of Harrington in the 1650s, building an allegedly utopian vision for 
England on the back of a myth. Neville’s use of him, however, sought to undermine that 
vision and instead Venice becomes Neville’s anti-model. That republic was problematic to 
Neville for a number of reasons. The citizens of Venice failed to recognise or address the 
problems and subsequent decline of their own commonwealth; an issue that was worsened by 
mythologizing, since even the Venetians appeared to have bought into it. In doing so, they 
were blinded to the reality of their situation. Neville therefore found it difficult to consider the 
Venetians wise as ‘state-physicians’, resulting in him casting a more critical eye over the rest 
of their constitution. Although not explicitly condemning or dismissing them, Neville also 
appeared critical of key cornerstones of the Harringtonian and Venetian polities; the system of 
balloting was portrayed as problematically mechanical and the silence of the Great Council 
further undermined the wisdom of the Venetian people. Similarly, the Council of Ten was 
criticised because of its extra-constitutional powers. 
Never again would the myth of Venice reach the levels of veneration it had in the sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries. Harrington and Howell marked the end of the myth as 
dominating the cultural narrative. Nedham had indicated the beginning of a step-change in the 
overarching narrative of the Venetian Republic. After the loss of the Cretan War and with the 
subsequent French publications that examined the absolutism of Venice, the most Serene 
Republic began to lose its grip on the story told about it. Negative portrayals of the Venetian 
republican reflected the very real decline of its power. Plato Redivivus marked this clearly. 
Neville used Harrington’s vision of his beloved Venice against him, and in doing so 
undermined the value of the Venetian republic as a model for restoring republican 







This thesis starts from Venturi's assumption that the contemporary world had a direct and 
important impact on the political thought of English republican thinkers. The importance of 
the Dutch and Venetian republics to these figures has been largely neglected in existing 
scholarship in this field. The most eminent scholars, particularly Pocock, Skinner, and more 
recently Nelson, have dictated a narrative that constrained debates on the origins of English 
republicanism to classical examples and ideas. Although they are aware of the importance of 
contemporary debates and contexts, this has not precluded a quest for classical origins. 
Moreover, the contemporary debates that have been taken into consideration have often been 
limited to within national borders, thereby further contributing to the founding of an ‘English 
republican tradition’.1 The value of their work is not, of course, to be dismissed; the 
educational culture of the seventeenth century was steeped in the classical world, and the 
importance of ancient ideas of republicanism cannot be underestimated. However, by placing 
the Venetian and Dutch republics at the forefront of an assessment of republican writers in the 
mid- to late-seventeenth century, it is also clear that modern republics had an important 
influence on the way in which English thinkers understood republicanism functioning in the 
contemporary world. Using contemporary European republics as the lens through which to 
view English republicanism presents new perspectives, issues and ideas that challenge 
existing understandings of this topic.  
The significant influence of the Dutch and Venetian commonwealths on English thought 
reinforces the recent progression towards ‘shared’ understandings of republicanism, and 
cultural transfers more generally. Once we understand that the contemporary world had a 
direct impact on the way in which political ideas were formulated and political visions were 
conceptualised, and that there are ways in which we can trace these influences, then the 
scholarship can begin to shift further towards an appreciation of the modern republics 
alongside the old. Skinner and Van Gelderen were therefore right to begin considering a 
‘shared heritage’ of republicanism, even if their execution of the idea represented, as Wootton 
expressed it, individual trees rather than the whole forest.
2
 This thesis has not attempted to 
provide a view of the forest, but it has demonstrated that the roots of these individual trees are 
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intimately entwined. Although they look like stand-alone national republican traditions, there 
were fundamental connections between each that shared foundational values and 
commitments.  
One of these shared commitments was an understanding of the role of single person 
government in a republic or commonwealth. Only by looking at England from the perspective 
of other republics that possessed figureheads at the apex of their constitutions does it become 
clear just how misguided the scholarship has been in defining English republicanism as anti-
monarchical. From their earliest institution, the Venetians had elected a Doge and the Dutch 
continued to elect a stadholder after they had declared themselves a republic (except between 
1650 and 1672). In both of these commonwealths, this figurehead represented a monarchical 
element to their constitution, but was not considered to be inconsistent with republican 
liberty. Nonetheless, English republicanism has been increasingly defined by historians, due 
in no small part to the work of Worden and Skinner, as distinctly anti-monarchical. The 
dichotomy between republic and monarchy has become one of the primary ways in which 
scholars have examined English political thinkers in the mid-seventeenth century, and as a 
result, certain figures have been side-lined. Milton, for instance, while remaining as part of 
the traditional republican canon, has been viewed by Worden and Corns as decidedly 
uncommitted to republicanism because of his very belated conversion to an outright rejection 
of kingship in England.
3
  
However, by approaching the thought of Milton and his contemporaries from an 
understanding of Dutch and Venetian republicanism, our understanding of English republican 
commitments inevitably shifts. It forces us to take into consideration the different 
understandings of what kingship might represent or entail. By considering the distinction 
between kingly power and kingly office, we can carefully pick apart the ways in which each 
of the five English republicans understood single person government. In every instance, they 
argued that there were ways in which republican government was compatible with monarchy, 
princes, legislators, or individual figureheads. In some instances this is particularly 
transformative of the way in which we conceptualise the political writings of certain English 
figures. Where Harrington’s Oceana has long been understood as proposing a constitutional 
blueprint that shifted power into the hands of the people, rarely has the position of Archon 
been considered. However, examining him in the light of the Venetian Republic and the Doge 
makes clear that Harrington made considerable space within his republican constitution for an 
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individual leader. Similarly, Nedham’s engagement with the Orange family and the 
stadholdership demonstrates that he was actually much more radical in his republicanism than 
scholars have generally assumed, lending support to Scott’s observations that his 
republicanism was present from the early 1640s.
4
 The rejection of monarchy, or aspects of 
monarchy, was undoubtedly part of English republicanism but it cannot and should not define 
the movement in its entirety.  
If anti-monarchism was not the defining feature of seventeenth-century republicanism, then 
the importance of the Regicide and Restoration on the conceptualisation of republicanism 
must be downplayed. Although there were exceptions, notably Nedham, 1649 appears to have 
been less of a shift than has often been emphasised.
5
 In continuing to accept the possibility of 
an English republic headed by a single leader, Milton, Harrington, and at times Nedham 
embraced a language of republicanism that had its roots already within English culture, 
therefore building upon Peltonen and Norbrook’s concept of ‘civic republicanism’. This 
understanding of republicanism also survived the Restoration, right through to the 1680s, 
where Neville and Sidney were both still accepting of the possibility of good republican 
government under a single person. This is not to suggest, however, that there was not a 
constitutional element to English republicanism. In the 1640s and 1650s, there was a 
distinctly constitutional approach taken by Harrington, Nedham, and Milton to Venice and the 
Dutch Republic. These figures used the constitutional and institutional aspects of each of 
these republics to frame their arguments, whether they were pro- or anti- Dutch or Venetian. 
Although examination of the minutiae of these constitutions lessened considerably after 1660, 
there are still traces of this in the writings of Sidney and Neville in the 1680s.  
It was, in fact, in the 1660s writings of Sidney and Neville that the biggest shift in republican 
language becomes clear. After 1660, constitutional conceptualisations of republicanism gave 
way to one focused more on what I have termed the republican experience. Although there 
were still constitutional overtones, in the sense that authors such as Sidney and Neville still 
sought ultimately to demonstrate the superiority of republican over monarchical government, 
the way in which this was approached was through demonstrating the successes of the 
commonwealths. So the Dutch Republic – its military strength, commercial prowess, naval 
power – became the successful, influential brother of failing, weak, and oppressed England. 
This shift was to a certain extent a result of circumstances; with the restoration of the 
monarchy in England it was considerably more dangerous to advocate republican models of 
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government. This is because the execution of the king inevitably tied these writers to a 
distinct moment in time that appeared to be anti-monarchical, regardless of whether that was 
their actual position or not. In fact, in the writings of the 1660s, monarchy is more explicitly 
contrasted with freedom than in the tracts of the 1650s, whereby Milton and Harrington in 
particular continued to insist that a monarch-like figure could still exist within an English 
republic. This figure would have been largely unrecognisable as a ‘king’ to many 
contemporaries. Milton and Nedham both favoured not just considerable restraints on the 
power and privileges of monarchy, but also believed that a publicly minded political 
figurehead ought to follow the sober, understated humility in the tradition of the early Dutch 
stadholders. Harrington’s vision for a monarchical element in the constitution was perhaps a 
little more kingly, arguing that personal regality and splendour was, as in the case of the 
Doge, acceptable since the limitations of his power should be sufficient to prevent this from 
being a corrupting force. Perhaps it is this ‘unrecognisable’ nature of kingship within 
seventeenth-century political writings that has led generations of scholars to overlook its 
importance to republican thought in England.  
This thesis has also demonstrated that the chronological divisions by which English 
republicanism is often studied are problematic. 1649, as noted above, was less of a turning 
point in English republican thought than has often been understood. However, when framing 
republicanism in a wider context and setting it against other European republican traditions, it 
makes even less sense. While 1649 might have been a landmark year in English history, it had 
no significant political impact in Venice for instance. Moreover, developments in the Dutch 
and Venetian republics had a specific impact on the way in which those republics were 
understood, and these changes help us to understand the nuances and shifts within English 
republican thought. For instance, the actions of William II in 1648 and his untimely death in 
1650 were both influential in understanding Nedham and Milton’s shifting understanding of 
the monarchical element of a republican constitution. 
What this thesis also foregrounds is the fact that during this period, the Dutch Republic was 
utilised much more frequently that the Venetian republic, and that it was more regularly used 
as a positive example of republican government. Venice was placed at centre stage by the 
work of Fink, and the importance of that republic to Harrington has been noted by numerous 
commentators. However, its centrality to English republicanism more generally has here been 
called into question. The rapid rise to power of the Dutch Republic appears to have 
overshadowed the Venetian Republic which, by the mid-seventeenth century was stagnating 
and losing the influence it had once held, and subsequently its reputation declined as the anti-
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myth began to predominate in the pamphlets and literature being published in England and 
across Europe. The Dutch Republic was rapidly becoming the most powerful force in Europe, 
and shared political connections with England through their ruling families. This brought it to 
the forefront of English thinkers’ attentions, and although they frequently found the 
constitutional structures of the United Provinces awkward, they found innovative ways to 
adapt, interpret and reshape Dutch political theory and practises for their own republican 
agendas.  
Venice, meanwhile, proved consistently problematic to all but Harrington. For Nedham, it 
represented oppression and tyranny. He seems to hold especial vitriol for Venice perhaps 
because it portrayed itself not just as a commonwealth, but as perfect model of liberty, frozen 
in time. This stood in stark distinction to the way in which Harrington understood Venice, 
presenting it as he did as somewhat flawed, but ultimately the best example of republican 
government in history. Milton and Neville found themselves engaging with the political ideas 
and institutions of the Venetian Republic, despite their reservations surrounding its utility as a 
political model, because of Harrington’s position. Milton in particular, felt it necessary to 
incorporate Harringtonian and Venetian concepts of rotation into his vague outline of a vision 
for a republican constitution. Neville too engaged with Venice, but as a means to subvert its 
image; the Most Serene Republic was by the 1680s in considerable decline in global power 
and prestige, and themes of the anti-myth had become the dominant narrative.  
What this suggests is that Harrington in many ways remains at the centre of the English 
republican narrative, but his role is now inverted. Rather than representing the quintessential 
English republican, he stands as the divisive figure, against whom people rallied. Both Milton 
and Nedham felt sufficiently strongly about Harrington’s constitutional proposals in Oceana 
to pen responses against them. Moreover, they both disapproved of the idea of incorporating 
Venetian political practises into England. In fact, Harrington was in many ways so distinct 
from his fellow republicans that, considered through the lens of the Venetian republic, he can 
be legitimately assessed alongside the ‘royalist’ James Howell, who in turn appears more 
‘republican’ when compared with Harrington. Although this comparison ought not be pushed 
too far, the way in which both understood Venice to represent an example of model 
republican government in a way that no one else did, suggests at least a underlying shared 
commitment to its values and lessons. Both saw in that commonwealth the cornerstones of 
effective republican government: stability, longevity, and mixed government. Although they 
differed on the emphasis placed on the different aspects of the constitution, they both saw in 
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Venice a constitutional model for emulation that could form the foundations of the English 
commonwealth.  
Considering Plato Redivivus in the light of attitudes to Venice also offers a corrective to the 
scholarship that unquestioningly describes Neville as a ‘neo-Harringtonian’. In failing to 
consider the purpose of the Noble Venetian within the specific dialogical form of the tract, it 
has been too easy for scholars to continue to accept that Neville was merely repeating 
Harringtonian aphorisms in the context of a different political crisis. In fact, by taking into 
consideration the entirety of Plato Redivivus, the Noble Venetian can be seen as representing 
Neville’s shift away from the vision that Harrington had in the 1650s. By the 1680s, the 
Venetian narrative had shifted from predominantly mythical to the counter-myth, and this 
informed Neville’s reading of that commonwealth. Through an understanding of Neville as 
associated with this counter-myth, it is possible to reinterpret some aspects of his thought. 
While he remained true to certain Harringtonian aphorisms, Neville rejected several key 
aspects of the Venetian myth and its constitution. He did not believe, like Harrington that 
importing Venetian practises would cure the disease at the heart of England’s political system. 
In this sense, it does not make sense to continue to define Neville as a neo-Harringtonian.  
Ultimately, this thesis has demonstrated that narrowly constraining definitions of 
republicanism does a disservice to the diversity, flexibility and vitality of republican thought 
in mid to late seventeenth-century England. It questions the categorisation of ‘English 
republicans’ as a distinct group, and it also suggests that there is a ‘right’ way to be a 
republican, particularly in rejecting any form of monarchical element in government. In 
looking at English republicanism through the lens of the Dutch and Venetian republics, we 
can see the real diversity of positions. Each of these figures engaged with different republican 
languages as events within the country shifted under their feet and forced a new approach. 
The concept of a single English republican tradition is therefore flawed. Instead, we ought to 
recognise that different republican traditions were tapped into at different times, sometimes 
being broadly constitutional, sometimes rejecting monarchy, and sometimes simply 
demonstrating the superiority of republican government in the benefits to trade, foreign policy 
and political stability. These languages were all connected and English republicans felt 
entirely comfortable shifting between them, seeing no contradiction in their republican 
beliefs.  
Wootton’s trees and forest metaphor is therefore too simplistic as a way of understanding the 
complex nature of European republicanism, since it suggests that each tree represents one, 
clearly definable national tradition. This has been demonstrably proved false. Instead, we can 
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build on Wootton’s metaphor by understanding the diversity that exists within a forest. We 
can continue to think of the forest itself as the shared European tradition as conceptualised by 
Skinner and Van Gelderen, but we need to reconsider what the trees might represent because 
‘tree’ in itself is not a monolithic category. Rather, there are numerous families and types of 
tree, related but nonetheless distinct. If we consider each individual tree to represent a specific 
republican language, then each family of trees can instead represent the national basis for 
these. Not only are all these trees related, but within these forests they might intersect and 
intertwine, at the roots or in the canopies. This represents the various stages at which these 
republican languages or traditions transfer between national boundaries, not all of which will 
happen at once, but which may be dictated by the passing of time or the alteration of political 
circumstances within a nation. In approaching English republicanism through the 
understanding of Dutch and Venetian republicanism, we uncover a complex mesh of 
republican languages and national traditions, intersecting and diverging at specific points. 
Continuing to examine republicanism in the light of this much more diverse vision can only 
serve to offer important new directions of study as further ways in which ideas were 
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